dc.contributor.author | Morito, Bruce | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-14T20:12:12Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-14T20:12:12Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-07-14T20:12:12Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2149/2661 | |
dc.description | Reading took approximately 25 minutes. Questions about the criteria I use to justify calling Eastern approaches “philosophy” were answered: the criterion is that a tradition be based on argumentation rather than faith or some privileged revelation. Questions were also asked about whether it was sufficient to include courses in other traditions in departmental offerings. My response was to the negative. Students needed to be aware of the full extent of what should count as the canon of philosophy. Therefore, some indication of the various traditions should be included in introductory courses and viewed as integral to the programme offerings, not treated merely as idiosyncratic offerings by individual professors who happen to want to teach such a course. | en |
dc.description.abstract | This paper will examine the professional bias present in our philosophy departments against identifying Eastern traditions, such as Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism, as genuine philosophies that have a rightful place in the canon of philosophy. Following Anthony Flew’s lead on characterizing what will be called ‘professional philosophy,’ the paper argues that the criteria used to exclude Eastern and other traditions from the canon are in fact unsupportable biases. These criteria are that in order to be considered
professionally philosophical, ideas and positions must be based on systematic arguments (based on rules of logic) that analyse for presuppositions and implications of ideas. These arguments must be directed at determining validity and soundness. While these criteria are important and perhaps even vital for defining the philosophical, they are insufficient. Insofar as pursuing truth and wisdom can be matters of going beyond adherence to these very criteria, it is argued that philosophy and its canon must be conceived more widely than is currently the case. The paper concludes with a call to revisit what we consider the
canon of philosophy as a moral responsibility. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 83.R020.1103; | |
dc.subject | Professional bias | en |
dc.subject | Eastern traditions | en |
dc.subject | Taoism | en |
dc.subject | Confucianism | en |
dc.title | The Philosophical Canon: East and West | en |
dc.type | Presentation | en |