dc.contributor.author | Kisner, Wendell | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-17T20:55:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-17T20:55:08Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.citation | "The Category of Life, Mechanistic Reduction, and the Uniqueness of Biology." Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, special issue "What is life?" Vol 4, No 1, 2008. | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://auspace.athabascau.ca/handle/2149/3573 | |
dc.description.abstract | The conceptual and ontological determinacies belonging to the category of mechanism,
determinacies that began to occupy centre stage within the scientific and philosophical
understanding of nature in seventeenth century Europe, continue to tacitly serve as theoretical
underpinnings in contemporary conceptualizations of biological life for many scientists as
well as philosophers. The conceptual hegemony enjoyed by the category of mechanism since
the seventeenth century is even evident in the tacit reliance upon it by some contemporary
theorists who otherwise wish to regard themselves as having gone beyond mechanism in their
conceptualizations of life. I will argue that such inadvertent reliance is the result of a failure to
make these conceptual and ontological determinacies belonging to the category of mechanism
explicit through a critical examination of the category of mechanism. In the Science of Logic Hegel
carries out precisely such a critical examination and explicit development of the determinacy
implicit in mechanism, along with the conceptual and ontological determinacies appropriate
to chemistry, teleology and, finally, biological life. Whereas reductive mechanism is commonly
criticized by opposing it with an alternate account said to be more ontologically, definitionally, or
empirically adequate, Hegel’s Science of Logic shows that the category of mechanism considered in
itself on its own terms is self-undermining or unsustainable due to its own inherent contradictions.
Furthermore, the Logic shows that rendering the implicit determinacy of mechanism explicit
necessarily leads to the development of conceptual determinacies that are appropriate to living
processes. Because the conceptual development of these latter determinacies results from the
inherent unsustainability of mechanism, mechanistic determinacy cannot provide a basis for
the conceptualization of life. For this reason, the category of life is rigorously irreducible to
that of mechanism. The exegesis provided in this paper of Hegel’s account of the category of
mechanism and his derivation of the idea of life from that category will provide the justification
required for the above claims. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject | Ontology | en_US |
dc.subject | Speculative | en_US |
dc.subject | Philosophy; | en_US |
dc.subject | Hegel; | en_US |
dc.subject | Biology; | en_US |
dc.subject | Life; | en_US |
dc.subject | Mechanism; | en_US |
dc.subject | Reductionism; | en_US |
dc.subject | Physicalism | en_US |
dc.title | The Category of Life, Mechanistic Reduction, and the Uniqueness of Biology | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |