THE SEXUALLY SPECIFIC SUBJECT, REGIMES OF TRUTH, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF LEADERSHIP

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In this paper I want to look at leaders and leadership from a feminist perspective: I want to analyse the leader from the point of view of the construction of the sexually specific subject or knower, and to analyse leadership from the point of view of the construction of leadership knowledges as regimes of truth. I want to look at how theorizing the sexually specific body and its impact on the construction of the subject and on the production of knowledge might change our views of the leader and of leadership. I want to look at how the leader is constructed and to ask 'who is that leader?', and to acknowledge that 'the who' is sexually specific if not necessarily binary; I want to look at how knowledge about leadership is constructed, to ask what is that knowledge, and who puts that knowledge into play; and finally I want to consider these implications for the leader and for leadership knowledge in terms of how we might structure our workplaces in a more egalitarian and democratic fashion.

However, the organizational literature is not helpful for my discussion of the construction of the leader in terms of the sexually specific subject or knower, nor is it helpful for a discussion about leadership knowledges as regimes of truth put into play by sexually specific knowers. The focus within the literature has been on the universal or the same rather than on "the different"--the subject or the knower has been deemed generic, universal, sexually indifferent. The different has not been theorized. But this sexlessness of the universal subject--the subject as disembodied--has been taken up by feminist theorists over the past decade. They contend that contrary to the universalism inherent in sameness, the transcendent sexless subject of Enlightenment thought is indeed specifically sexed--but it is sexed as a male, a construction which rests on the
Cartesian equivalencies of the male/female, mind/body dualisms, dualisms which leave the female subject untheorized and the male subject disembodied, and dualisms which create the conditions for hierarchical regulation and control. Within these dominant modes of representation and systems of knowledge the subject as male is left unacknowledged, the male claim of mind and the evacuation of the male body left uncommented, the structural involvement of these dualisms in the creation and perpetuation of relations of domination and subordination overlooked. The female subject is submerged, her sexually specific representation effaced under the rubric of [male] universalism, her female body inscribed "as a negative, dependent, lacking object" (Gross, 1986, p. 134), her subjectivity and self-representation denied within a system that depends for its coherence on the female body while systematically denying its difference.

I would like to begin there, to briefly take up this construction of the subject or the knower as male, a focus which necessarily includes the impact the "specificities of the male body" (Grosz, 1993, p. 188) has on how we understand this subject who knows; to explore what the submersion of the female subject and the evacuation of the male body in the construction of this universal [male] subject position may mean; and finally to explore what the representation of the specificities of the female body might entail for the theorizing of the female subject who knows. I wish to make quite clear that this is not an "anatomical, physiological or biological account of the body" (Ibid, p. 195), but a sociocultural conception, a conception which is embedded historically and materially (cf. Smith, 1990; Hennessy, 1993) and constructed within a system of representation or language. In the second part of the paper, I would like to address how our knowledge of leaders and of leadership would change if we both acknowledged [the male] and postulated [the female] sexually specific subject or knower rather than the transcendent universal which is current in the literature. When we rethink how work is organized, who does what, and how it is decided, as we are doing when we are talking
about leaders and leadership, what does that mean for the sexually specific subject, both for the men, and for the women who have been submerged under the [male] universal? Might this theorizing help us rethink our hierarchical organizations and to think of other ways to organize work which are fairer to the women and men who work together?

Underlying this focus is a question that has too often been subsumed under the broad brush of sex versus gender: Is the assertion of sexual difference, and thus of course the theorizing of human variety, necessarily incompatible with a subject who can know and act in ways that are not implicitly dominating, where the one must triumph over the other? If we theorize about the sexually specific subject, the different rather than the same, the same being the universal same which structures our understanding of the subject, the knower, the leader, what does that mean for women and men acting both for and as themselves when they work together in our organizations? Is there a fundamental incompatibility in asserting sexual difference because to do so leads to the perpetuation of conditions of domination, as has been argued by much of liberal thought? I will argue that this is a necessary exercise which we must undergo in order to rethink our notions of the leader and of leadership, which like the subject/knower, have been based on the unacknowledged dominance of the male and the subordination of the female, and that to theorize difference is not to advocate domination but rather to dismantle some of its supports.

**Part I: Symbolizing the Sexually Specific Subject/Knower**

Both postmodernists and feminists have been concerned with the presupposed universalism and transcendence of the Enlightenment or humanist subject, an uninvolved subject who uses reason to discover innocent knowledge, language in this conceptualization a transparent medium through which the truth may be discerned. However, postmodernists like Derrida and Foucault and anti-humanists like Lacan profoundly disagree with these conceptualizations, and their point of attack is language. Unlike the Enlightenment or humanist view where the subject is the source, the
guarantor, of meaning, to them the subject cannot stand outside language or discourse. To Derrida, the subject is produced within language, an effect of the repressive dualisms of Western metaphysics which attempt to ground the limitless instability of language, but where both meaning and subjectivity can be nothing other than a temporary, retrospective fixing (cf. Weedon, 1987). To Foucault, the subject is constructed as the effect of strategies of discourse, where power and knowledge intertwine to produce a disciplinary regime of truth focused on the body (cf. Diamond & Quinby, 1988). To Lacan, with whom I will be most concerned, the subject is constructed within the symbolic order; by taking up a place within language, the subject "is thus, unknown to itself, submitted to social law (the symbolic)" (Wright, 1991, p. 411). It is in the naming of things that language "gives rise... to the social order" (Ibid, p. 421), which itself hinges on the phallus, "the signifier of signifiers" (Ibid, p. 319). It is within this symbolic or social order, or the law of the father, that the phallus as the pre-eminent signifier provides the stability through which the subject is constituted, and through which the sexes are distinguished and positioned as opposites. Thus, in taking up our place in language, we become who we are and who we may be; this is a symbolic code that dictates our place in the social order.

For feminist theorists, suspicious of the possible replacement of reason by language as a metaphysical category (cf. Flax, 1990, 1993), the point of attack has been the sexually specific body and its impact on the construction of the subject and on the production of knowledge, untheorized sites of domination in both modernist and postmodernist thought. Much more so than Derrida, Foucault or Lacan, they have been concerned with exposing the impact the unacknowledged maleness of the Enlightenment subject has on our construction of the subject, and the impact that this specifically sexed body of the subject has on the production of knowledge. They take issue with the death of the subject or the disappearing act of postmodernism as inherently liberatory, and point out that this focus on language and discourse may merely shift the metaphysical
alignment from reason to language, in both cases obscuring the advantages to men which may accrue in ignoring the specificity of the male body in relations of domination.

For feminist theorists like Flax (1990, 1993) and Hekman (1990), the Enlightenment subject is a male subject who depends on the exclusion and repression of the other, the woman, to maintain its internal coherence, just as reason depends on the exclusion of the body. However, whereas both Flax and Hekman stop short of theorizing the sexually specific body, preferring multiple subjectivities, Luce Irigaray, the French philosopher, psychoanalyst and linguist, insists that the sexually specific body must be theorized, that a subject position for the specifically sexed female body must be articulated within a symbolic order which recognizes sexual difference. She analyses man the subject as a man who cannot see himself as sexually specific, a man who simultaneously relies on and disavows the role of his sexually specific, concretely sexed body in the production of knowledge within which his subjectivity is also understood, a man who confuses himself with the universal.

To Irigaray, if we as women are to achieve ontological status or subjectivity, if we are going to think about variety in human beings rather than sameness, we have to be able to conceptualize difference, difference which "must in some way be inscribed on and experienced by and through the body", but difference which is "not immutable or biologically ordained" (Grosz, 1993, p. 195). We are produced as "subjects of a particular kind" (Ibid); our subjectivity is not innate, but our bodies cannot be denied nor deemed irrelevant. To Irigaray sexually specific bodies must be theorized—we cannot escape from theorizing sexual difference, but this does not mean essentializing or romanticizing sexual difference. Irigaray's construction of ontological status for women explicitly disavows essentialism, but she does not elide sexual difference in favour of an unrestrained multiplicity. Instead, in order to theorize the sexually specific subject she uses the Lacanian turn to language and the symbolic while rejecting Lacan's phallocentric reading of Freud, a reading which reaffirms the positioning of woman as a
lack. Irigaray takes apart psychoanalysis, not to reveal the never-ending "play of the text" of Derrida, but to reveal the contradictions at its heart, the desire without which it could not exist. She wishes to establish a political position, to use psychoanalysis for her own ends, not to slot women into categories designed by men for men, and then merely extended to women (cf. Irigaray, 1991). She wishes to "undermine, provisionally overthrow the reign of dichotomous oppositions, those that define women, femininity and the various qualities and properties associated with them in some form of dichotomy with masculinity" (Gross, 1986, p. 135), to expose "the network of images, representations, methods and procedures for representing women and the feminine in some necessary relation to men and masculinity, a series of presumptions about the representation of one sex from a perspective deemed universal by the other sex" (Ibid, p. 134). It is a perspective which works to covertly maintain the centrality and dominance of one sex and the marginality and subordination of the other, all the while arguing for the Oedipal or phallic as universal and applicable to all.

Within the present symbolic or social order which we inhabit we are what men do not want themselves to be, or to have; we are their rejected parts of themselves, we are their necessary but disavowed bodies, disavowed to maintain the purity of reason, the mind unsullied by immanence. We are ourselves unsymbolized, unarticulated and inarticulate; what we are is a blank screen for men's projections, a state of nature⁹, a condition of dereliction, lost and abandoned. What Irigaray wishes is to rethink this symbolic which consigns women to a condition of dereliction, to create a place for two where only one had existed. By rethinking "the conditions of the male subject and the modalities of space and time, and of dwelling", Irigaray aims to give "women their house of language, a home in the symbolic order. . . . So while men need to take back and own their body, women need to accede to a symbolic representation of their own" (Whitford, 1991, p. 156). What we need is our own house so we can sally forth, to speak in a language which speaks of and to us, in the symbols and myths which "indicate
representationally how that society is structured and organized at other levels" (Ibid, p. 170), myths that resonate far beyond those which we have available to us now, where only the "maternal function" speaks, not the woman, where the mother-son of the Pieta presides, but never the mother-daughter. What Irigaray wishes is to construct "new fictions, to anticipate and perhaps assist the birth of a new social order"(Ibid)\(^\text{10}\).

As an undutiful daughter, Irigaray undertakes to use the same tools as Freud and Lacan to creatively imagine a symbolic within which women might inhabit as women, not as men with a lack, the metaphysics of Freud and Lacan. She proposes to creatively imagine a new language\(^\text{11}\), a new religion, and a different economy (cf. Whitford, 1991, p. 117), to create the social institutions necessary if the female imaginary\(^\text{12}\) is to be sustained, relations between women represented, and women brought in from the state of nature which they now inhabit in their present unsymbolized state. To Irigaray, what we must not do is embark on a journey of discovery or revelation of our innate being which has never been symbolized--an essentialist journey--but to create a female symbolic--a place in the language--where one has never existed. The myths that structure our understandings of relations between men and women allow only for the maternal; western metaphysics uses the body of women as its base at the same time it disavows it. Thus there is nothing that exists that symbolizes the relations between women, and in particular the relations between mothers and daughters which would allow the daughters to relate to their mothers not only as mothers but as women. And, as she explains, because this "unsymbolized mother-daughter relationship hinders women from having an identity in the symbolic order that is distinct from the maternal function, [it] prevents them from constituting any real threat to the order of western metaphysics . . . [or] the metaphysics of the Same" (Ibid, p. 109), where there is no real Other. She argues that the male imaginary "is in effect governed unconsciously by one of the 'sexual theories of children', the phantasy that there is only one sex, that that sex is male, and that therefore women are really men, in a defective, castrated version"
Women thus "remain 'residual', 'defective men', 'objects of exchange' and so on" (p. 109), left in a state of dereliction--"abandoned outside the symbolic order" (p. 109).

In order to creatively imagine the female symbolic we first need to "rethink all the categories which structure our thought and experience. It is not just a question of inventing some new terms, but of a total symbolic redistribution" (Whitford, 1991, p. 165--of men reclaiming those parts of themselves they have rejected, and women creatively imagining what it means to be a woman. This does not mean, however, that we are creating "a kind of pre-established harmony between the sexes, and the end of conflict and aggression. . . . The division within the split self means that there will always be conflict to be negotiated, both internally and externally. In addition, each sex has its own interests, needs and desires, and therefore represents limits to the interests, needs, and desires of the other sex" (Ibid, p. 165). In this process, where "Lacan, notoriously conservative, emphasizes the code . . . the domain of constraint: one is born into the symbolic order, one assumes it in order to become human . . . Irigaray emphasizes the context, the possibility of limitless combination, a new syntax of culture which is creative and open-ended. Metaphor or prediction fixes; the metonymic allows for process" (Ibid, p. 179-180). Thus Irigaray argues that "in order to prevent sexual difference from being neutralized yet again . . . women-among-themselves should invent new forms of social organization which embody in a public form the metonymical subject-to-subject relation between women" (Ibid, p. 184). Metonymy or contiguity is of course the "two lips" for which Irigaray is so famous, but she "is not outlining the truth of female sexuality or the makeup of the world. She is creating a discourse to contest or combat other prevailing discourses"; two lips may be "a deconstructive concept, perhaps an undecidable" (Ibid, p. 172). Metonymy stands for women's sociality, love of self on the women's side, the basis for a different form of social organization and a different economy (Ibid, p. 180). Irigaray wishes to creatively
imagine a new symbolic and a new imaginary as a home for women, giving back to men those aspects of themselves that they had thrust upon us, unwanted, and in this creative imagining giving us both the space to be free, to exist in contiguity, side by side, not in opposition, one over the other, within the hierarchical dualisms which structure our thoughts as well as our organizations.

What equally concerns Irigaray is the impact that the sexed body of the knower has on the production of knowledge, an impact which we must recognize if we are to displace "the hegemony over knowledges that masculinity has thus far accomplished" (Grosz, 1993, p. 187). If we can assert women's "right to know", independent of and autonomous from the methods and presumptions regulating the prevailing (patriarchal) forms of knowledge" (Ibid), if we can "develop the female body as the subject of knowledge", we can "reveal the phallocentric and partial ways of dominant knowledges as well as help to create new possible ways of knowing and producing knowledge" (Alcoff and Potter, 1993, p. 9-10). And to adequately conceptualize the subject we must include "its own production as a discourse within the knowledge it produces" (Grosz, 1993, p. 193); we must recognize that knowledge is recursive, that the "relations between power and knowledge must be considered internal to knowledges, providing their condition of possibility and guiding their material effects" (Ibid).

Although the body in Western philosophy is understood as universal rather than as sexually specific, Irigaray argues that we need to make "the singular domination of the universal by the masculine . . . explicit"; we need to invent and remake the "signifying, representational and epistemic norms" in order to provide the contrast which would then be able to recognize the "masculinity or maleness of knowledges" (Grosz, 1993, p. 204) which has been repressed or evacuated. Although men "have appropriated the realm of mind for themselves, men have nonetheless required a support and cover for their now-disavowed physicality. Women thus function as the body for men--correlative with the effacement of the sexual concreteness of their (womanly) bodies" (Ibid, p. 204). The
bodies that men have but do not want, women get, but not, paradoxically, their own bodies, which remain unsymbolized. Thus women are conceptualized as lacking, as castrated men, as incomplete men, an effect of men denying the specificity of "women's bodies, pleasures and desires" (Ibid). Men see women not as different but as the same, only lesser, as men without a mind who carry the burden of men's bodies. Men project their own "sexualized bodies into the structures of knowledges" (Ibid), but do not have to acknowledge that because women bear the burden of the body, women are denied both a voice and their place in the construction of knowledge. Women are not subjects, or knowers, or minds, but objects or [the bearers of the disavowed male] bodies. They can be known, but they cannot know.

Irigaray's concern, thus, is not only with the construction of the subject, but with the subject's place as knower, and with the acknowledgement of the effects of this sexual specificity on who can know and what we can know. She looks at knowledges as they have been constructed by men, and the impact of both this sexual specificity and its denial on these knowledges, knowledges which work not only to affirm but to maintain the centrality of masculinity. As Elizabeth Grosz explains in her study of Irigaray, because men see themselves as the mind, and women as the body, men know, and women cannot. In this formulation, women represent "the body, the irrational, the natural, or other epistemologically devalued binary terms" (1993, p. 209). But this can be only a partial formulation, a formulation that is the result of "historically specific political, sexual and epistemological imperatives" (Ibid). Instead of knowledge that is [only] theoretically neutral, Irigaray's work "poses the question of the partiality, ie. the sexualization of all knowledges. It entails an acknowledgement of the sexually particular positions from which knowledges emanate and by which they are interpreted and used" (ibid, p. 210). It is a position that Foucault, as a pre-eminent example, ignores but which feminists must of necessity take up.
What is particularly important in this reading of Irigaray is not that we strive to achieve ontological status as the subject, and as the subject of knowledge, by setting women up in opposition to what men are: we are what they are not. To do so would be merely to replicate the prevailing metaphysical dualities which depend on exclusion and repression for their coherence, fixing us in immutable opposition. Instead, strategically, we need to set ourselves up in contiguity or metonymy, not in opposition, to what men are. We need to create for ourselves a place in the language, a place in the realm of symbolic which depends on something other than hierarchical dualism through which to define ourselves (cf. Grosz, 1994). Only then will we be able to adequately symbolize ourselves as women, to bring ourselves back from the symbolic wilderness where we have been consigned as bearers of men's disavowed bodies, but where we have been deprived of our own. It is the symbolization of the sexually specific subject which Irigaray seeks, a sexually specific subject which is produced within knowledges that are themselves produced by concretely sexed bodies, bodies which are socio-culturally inscribed and through which we understand and describe the world.

**Leadership and the Pursuit of the Democratic Workplace**

In the previous section, feminist theorists argued that the subject/knower is constructed in such a way that the male body and its impact on the subject and on knowledge is paradoxically both underscored and erased, leaving the universal and transcendent--but nonetheless male--subject/knower firmly in place. The female subject is left bereft, untheorized because unsymbolized, without a place in the language, in a state of nature outside the realm of culture and thought. Feminist organizational theorists have constructed similar arguments regarding the unexamined presence of the male subject and its impact on our ideas about the leader and about leadership, although their solutions to the problem of the erasure of women from the subject position and the concomitant impact on knowledge differ. What I would like to do in this section is to present Jill Blackmore (1993) and Marta Calas and Linda
Smircich’s (1991) analyses of the construction of the leader as male, their solutions to
the lack of a subject position for women in the literature on leadership and the impact of
these solutions on how we understand knowledge about leadership, and finally how these
solutions and this knowledge might be understood in light of these previous theorists.

To Jill Blackmore, organizational hierarchy is mirrored by a hierarchy of gender
[her word], a mirror image that is generally not commented on, or if it is, it is justified
rather than analysed by most of those writing about leaders and leadership. A modernist
rather than a postmodernist theorist, Blackmore uses the Habermasian notion of the
requirements of technological rationality\textsuperscript{14} to analyse our understanding of what
constitutes leadership in an organization. As Blackmore points out, in much of
organizational theory,

administration is value free, hierarchy is technically rational and domination
legitimate. . . hierarchy is another word for domination. Given the worldview of
technical rationality, however, bureaucracy does not appear as a structure of
domination; on the contrary, the bureaucratic hierarchy manifests itself as a
technical necessity [to coordinate the subdivided tasks], as a rational
organizational arrangement for the accomplishment of collective ends. The
hierarchical arrangements in organizations. . . are thus premised upon such
notions of individualism and rationality (p. 118).

Blackmore argues further that organizational theory has a gendered subtext which
extends to the kind of leader which can be postulated within these technologically
rational organizations: in this conceptualization of the leader women can only be
understood as deficient men, as men with a lack. If women are mentioned at all, the focus
is on how women must become more like men in order to become leaders. Men, and male
experiences, are the norm against which women are judged and found lacking, although
the leader and leadership knowledge are ostensibly sexually neutral.
Blackmore argues that how we view men and what men are to be, and how we view leaders, are inextricably intertwined; maleness and masculinity are the templates for leadership. Within the confines of technological rationality, leadership has been constructed on the basis of male experience, but this experience has been universalized, and women have been labelled as deficient leaders. By definition, they lack what they can never attain. Men are the norm, women the deviant, the different, the lesser. This universalizing of male experiences and characteristics "is common across the main approaches to leadership in organizational theory, whether they be the "trait model, the charismatic/behavioural model or the situational/contingency models of leadership" (p. 100), although the arguments take slightly different forms. As Blackmore explains, "the trait approach assumes innate differences [,] the behaviourist perspective accepts the notion of learned behaviours which are gender stereotypic" (p. 102), and the situational contingency model "assumes that leadership styles and administrative contexts are gender neutral and that such skills are context and content free to be freely applied across a variety of 'categorizable' organizational situations" (p. 103). All three approaches are based on the unexamined universalizing of men and male experiences as the norm against which women are judged, and all three maintain the link between whatever has been defined as this norm as equatable to leadership.

As a solution to the male norm and to the definition of women as deficient in these leadership models, Blackmore recommends the valorizing or privileging of the deficient woman and women's ways of leading. She wishes to develop a "feminist" view of "leadership which is essentially relational and communitarian" (p. 99). She disagrees with the notion that women's ways of leading are inadequate or deficient and that they must act like men to be good leaders. Instead, she advocates the notion that although women's ways have been erased from consideration, these ways are not only different but better, and that they arise from women's experiences as women which heretofore had been excluded from consideration. What had been an unexamined polarity underlying
what we termed neutral leadership is not only revealed but reversed--it is women's ways of leading which are given star treatment.

However, although Blackmore argues against any form of biological determinism, her emphasis implies a fixed link between these "essentially relational and communitarian" ways of leading and notions of an innate female or feminine nature which arise from our common experiences as women. That traits and behaviours, tasks and skills, merit and competence in work situations are all historically constructed categories, that these categories exist within discourses which privilege maleness and erase the necessary female upon which a coherent definition of maleness depends, remain uncommented in both these models and in her analysis. This analysis discounts a socio-cultural construction of subjectivity in language: it discounts that what is constructed in language is constructed within relations of power and knowledge at the same time as it underlines ideas about human nature which are linked to biology and accessible via the trolling of experience by the fixed self. By focusing on the modernist notion of the fixed self and on experience which can be retrieved by this fixed self, Blackmore remains bound within a modernist argument that there are innate ways of being a leader associated with a particular sex, although she of course argues the unfairness of privileging the male sex over the female. As has so often happened elsewhere with oppressed groups, however, associating with particular traits or ideals is no certain remedy to oppressive power relations; either the traits themselves or the rating assigned to those traits can be changed at will by the more powerful group (viz. the argument that immigrant groups are bad because they're employed and thus taking jobs from more deserving groups, or they're bad because they're unemployed and thus a drain on the welfare system). There is nothing in Blackmore's argument to indicate that men as a more powerful group than women could either continue to downgrade these particular traits, or simply appropriate these traits and in appropriating them, argue that they are innately male rather than innately female. In other words, Blackmore's
argument is not necessarily one which will radically change gender/power relations in an organization, although which traits are valued might change. The links between a particular sex or the sexually specific subject, power, and leadership remain as tightly woven as ever, and valorizing either the subordinated sex or the subordinated term is not going to unravel them.

Furthermore, in an argument not entertained by Blackmore, technological rationality as well as the Habermasian project of reclaiming the rational from the grip of the technological (cf. Huyssen, 1990) remain constructed within the tenets of Western metaphysical dualism: these analyses rest equally on the denial and exclusion of irrationality and on the denial and exclusion of women from the rational for its internal coherence and stability (cf. Pringle, 1989). Whether in Weber or in Taylor, and including the critiques based on the Frankfurt School, Western metaphysical dualism, the exclusion of women from the rational, and the universalizing of the male subject, are missing as categories of analysis in leadership, hidden behind the veneer of technological rationality which structures in male domination but denies it through a tautological appeal to universal and transcendent reason—only men can be reasonable, and we want only reasonable leaders. The unacknowledged dualisms\textsuperscript{15} which provide coherence and stability to the arguments remain, and valorizing the subordinate term does not change the terrain.

If we are to analyse why so many definitions of leadership, so many organizational structures, and so many organizational practices continue to marginalize women, paradoxically often as the result of reforms which are explicitly focused on improving women’s position, we must recognize that equity between the sexes will not be possible as long as unacknowledged dualisms continue to be enshrined in organizational discourses\textsuperscript{16}. Rather than the reification of these dualisms, we must demand their deconstruction (cf. Martin, 1990)\textsuperscript{17}, as well as demand the symbolization of the repressed other on which these dualisms depend.
This discussion of the necessary analysis of the dualisms which provide the structure of Western thought brings me to the deconstructive analysis of Calas and Smircich, an analysis which takes leadership apart as a term to show the repressed underside on which leadership depends for its coherence but which it must deny. And if seduction is the hidden underside of leadership, how then is leadership structured? As Derrida has pointed out, the repressed always returns, purity is never possible, and the effort of exclusion is continuous--the border patrols must never be left unmanned.

Whereas Blackmore is concerned with the analysis of the form leadership takes within the modernist organizational discourse of technological rationality, its construction of a male norm opposed to a deficient female, and offers as a solution the privileging of this deficient female, Calas and Smircich (1991) draw on Derrida and deconstruction to analyse the problem of the female subject in leadership knowledge. They seek to show that leadership is predicated on the repression of its necessary other, seduction, and that this dualism is inseparable from the dualism of male/female, a repressed underside from which woman as subject cannot speak.

Their analysis seeks to examine how the repressed always returns, that "to seduce" is the repressed underside of "to lead", that leadership is dependent upon seduction, but that "rhetoric and cultural conditions work together to conceal this dependency" (p. 569). They focus on the unexamined other that is the repressed underside of the dualism, the repressed underside that provides the dominant term its coherence: to lead is also to seduce, but to ensure the coherence which the dominant term demands, it is necessary to deny and disavow the necessary other--purity can only be attained through exclusion. In their examination, leadership cannot be defined without recourse to seduction, just as maleness cannot be defined without recourse to femaleness. Thus to lead is inextricably tied to maleness, to seduce inextricably tied to femaleness, but the repression and exclusion which sustains the dominant term's coherence is disavowed. The term together, the signifier and the signified, serves to retain the pre-eminence of
the male over the female, the good, the open, the leader, over the bad, the hidden, the seductress. As they point out, "leadership works because it embodies desire, while covering its traces with the sign of truth" (p. 568). In their analysis, leadership is inseparable from seduction, but seduction which must be denied, repressed, an unwanted term handed over to women, excluded from consideration and yet indispensable to the coherent meaning of leadership. Thus leadership/seduction is a rhetorical game to be exposed, a game where the meaning of any word is but a temporary retrospective fixing that is itself a site of power, of competing discourses jostling for a fixity which can never be fully realized, of shadows just in vision.

In their deconstruction of leadership and thus their focus on what is denied and excluded, Calas and Smircich link our knowledge about leadership firmly to maleness and masculinity, pointing out that leadership or leadership knowledge promotes “only a homosocial system of organization, i.e. based on the values of masculinity, including masculine definitions of 'femininity'” (p. 571). Tracing this homosocial system of organization in the lineaments of leadership/seduction, they point out the inextricable links between the two terms: that “seduction includes leadership: seduction means to lead (astray), to mis-lead (mis: badly, wrongly). Seduction has a bad reputation. Seduction is leadership gone wrong. Notice also that leadership includes seduction: To lead is to attract and stimulate, to overcome. Thus, to seduce is to lead wrongly. And it seems that to lead is to seduce rightly” (p. 573). And not only are the terms inextricably linked to each other; they are inextricably linked to sexually specific subjects, as they point out: "One who seduces, lures, induces, entices, presents an attraction so strong that it overcomes restraints. One who seduces is a seductress: a female seducer. Seductors (male seducers) no longer exist. Thus, many can be a 'leader', but only a woman can be a 'seductress'. No need for the term 'seductor' when 'leader' will do (p. 573).
In light of this focus on the homosocial organization—the organization of the same rather than the different—they analyse five prominent authors who have written about leadership over the last sixty years, Barnard, McGregor, Mintzberg, and Peters and Waterman. Calas and Smircich argue that for each of them the definition of a leader remains quite narrow—a leader is someone who maintains the male homosocial order, although these leaders do this in different ways: Barnard through the father [priest] who leads/seduces his flock; McGregor, who maintains order by making the male homosexual servant and all women the butt of the joke; Mintzberg, who abandons himself to "unregulated narcissism", and Peters and Waterman, who return to Barnard, changing the words but maintaining "in place specific power/knowledge relationships" (p. 573) which continue to privilege the male leader. Thus "under these premises the space for women—and other 'feminized' non-dominant members—in the social arrangements of modern Western society is either submission or emulation of the competitive and glory oriented masculine narcissistic order" (p. 588). Nor is there escape: "This [male] homosexuality in the structures of society includes everybody. It is the male standard of knowledge—the apparently indifferent logos, science, logic—which measures all members of the structure along a predefined agreement over what knowledge is. And that is all the knowledge to be had about 'leadership'"(p. 591). Hence "leadership has come to be associated with the maintenance of orderly relations among men, beyond the bounds of time". And it's about seduction, but "the forms of seduction associated with homosocial domination and servitude" (p. 594). Women are once again excluded; leadership remains about men and the relations among men. The social order is predicated on the repression of woman the seductress, a necessary repression without which leadership could not maintain its internal coherence nor continue to evade its homosocial structure, or the leadership of the same.

In order to escape the confining dualisms of the Enlightenment where leadership depends on but disavows seduction, leaving women without a voice other than that of the
seductress, Eve whispering in the Garden, Calas and Smircich recommend Derrida's deconstruction of the dualisms of Western metaphysics and his strategy of multiple subjectivities which evade any attempt at fixity. By recognizing that "words are meaningful not because of their external referents--which are also linguistically constituted--but because of the existence of an oppositional term over which each apparently 'self-standing' term stands to differentiate itself from the other and become meaningful" (p. 569), we can deconstruct leadership. We can show the necessary but disavowed underside and explore the dualism, and in exploring the dualism, explore how power operates, through what words, what resonances. Leadership can then be understood as a construction, a discourse of power and knowledge, not as a definition which is fixed and which therefore can be revealed by the universal and transcendent subject in the pursuit of innocent knowledge unaffected by power, but a definition which depends on the repression of the unacknowledged other. So in Calas and Smircich's analysis, leadership rests on the banishment, the rejection, the repression of seduction. It covertly cements the link between masculinity and leadership, femininity and seduction, so that to act like a man, however that is defined, is to lead; to act like a woman, however that is defined, is to seduce. But unlike this common definition of leadership, to Calas and Smircich neither position is fixed: it is always subject to redefinition. Any and all traits or characteristics are political discourses, strategies jockeying for domination. The definitions, descriptions, and the ways we analyse are all reflections of who's in power at the moment, and as such, are always areas of contestation, resistance, and struggle. What Calas and Smircich recommend in their definition of leadership is the multiple subjectivities of Derrida, where the domination inherent in the fixed dualism of Enlightenment thought is subverted by a radical transience, where fixity itself is the enemy, power is everywhere, and strategy more important than the immanence of a fixed and physical body.
In the Derridean analysis of Calas and Smircich, leadership is deconstructed to show the repressed underside of seduction on which leadership depends, and they advocate, following Derrida, a multiplicity of speaking positions, a radically transient subject in order to prevent the fixity of Enlightenment dualities. However, multiple subjectivities, or the radical transience of a subject which eschews any fixity, falls prey to the criticism of Derrida— that his contention that anyone may speak as a woman leaves the body, and its impact on the subject and on knowledge, untheorized. The sociocultural subject remains unsymbolized, and the male norm reasserts itself. Without symbolization, the female subject remains in a state of derelicition, abandoned to and imprisoned in a state of nature. We remain what men are not, we are whatever men decide us to be, whether the kinder, gentler, more relational leader, or the subject who, speaking from a multiplicity of positions, once again evades the complicated work of theorizing the other, unsymbolized, body. Women still lack symbolization, we still lack myths and stories which are themselves the socio-cultural constructions through which we understand our bodies. Our sexually specific female bodies remain unsymbolized, outside the social contract, in a state of nature, bodies which form the repressed underside of the subject/leader which allows the linkage to men to go unexamined. Neither Blackmore nor Calas and Smircich take the position of Irigaray, and her advocacy of the necessary symbolization of the sexually specific subject who is female and her impact on the production of knowledges, knowledges which produce the subject, the leader, and what we call organizational theory, which in turn provide a guide to how we are to think about leaders, leadership, and the places where we work.

However, if we were to include the fully symbolized and theorized female subject, what might that mean for our understanding of leadership? What happens if, like Calas and Smircich, we deconstruct leadership, take it apart to show the repressed underside, the hidden otherness that provides its coherence, but rather than ignoring the sexually
specific body of women, as Calas and Smircich do, we theorize it, we provide a place in
the symbolic order from which women may speak as subjects?

The advantage of deconstruction is that it "dismantles a dichotomy by showing it to
be a false distinction. Categories that had seemed mutually exclusive opposites are
revealed to be inextricably intertwined" (Martin, 1990, p. 340). The deconstruction of
leadership as seduction shows how deeply complicitous it is in the maintenance of male
supremacy. Leadership as it is presently constructed in much of the literature depends
on but disavows deeply conflictual relations, refusing to recognize that one may lead by
charisma, but one may also lead by seduction. The disavowal and repression of the
various aspects of leadership lends itself to a definition which becomes just another
mutation of the human relations school, dependent on the maintenance of already present
power relations rather than their subversion. Leadership/seduction depends on a notion
of power based on sameness, on the presumption that within an organization individuals
are stamped out as equals, that there are no power differences among them.
Leadership/seduction disavows any knowledge of difference, any knowledge of difference
in power.

But men and women have quite significant differences in terms of power. How can
they, then, lead in the interests of a more democratic workplace? It is apparent that
leadership/seduction is only possible when everyone is the same, when the goal is the
maintenance of already present power relations. When the goal, as it is for Calas and
Smircich, is the subversion of those relations, it is not possible to use
leadership/seduction as it is presently structured; its internal coherence depends on the
maintenance of unequal power relations and the dependence on yet denial of difference.
The repressed underside of leadership is the conflict which women as the other must
bear; women must therefore be either excluded or allowed into the organization only as
pseudo-men. The coherence of the workplace and the workforce depends on the exclusion
of women; the conflict and the threat to order with which women are associated, like the
seduction which forms the underside of leadership, must be disavowed, yet it forms the metaphysical structure for the organization itself. Until the sexually specific subject is symbolized and theorized, until women are symbolized not only as the repository for the seductress or as the person who brings conflict into the organization with her presence, leadership/seduction as a category of analysis will not lead to a more democratic workplace, and multiple subjectivities will not overcome the need for new myths and new stories on which women may draw.

Conclusion

In this concluding section I will argue that until we deal with the lack of a subject position for women and its impact on knowledge both theoretically, and as Irigaray would argue, symbolically, new and fairer ways of leading will continue to elude us. In particular, without attention to the sexually specific body, the differences between women and men will continue to be ignored and sameness imposed to deal with the complications in power relations of sexually specific bodies that theoreticians are loathe to address. But the repressed always returns, with detrimental effects for the attainment of a more democratic and egalitarian workplace and a more democratic and egalitarian society. To follow the lead of Irigaray and posit not new metaphors, or sameness and thus of course its opposite difference, but metonymy or contiguity as a way of coming to new subject/leader positions, seems a way to escape the confining dualisms of the Enlightenment which rest on the unsymbolized other. To Irigary difference in the sense of other is an artificial construct; we can understand difference in other ways rather than as different/same, the "same" privileged or the "different" privileged. We can understand difference as difference alongside another difference, as human variety, as subject-to-subject positions which allow for new forms of social organization which are not based on some form of metaphysical dualism. Instead what might reside here are two fully symbolized subjects drawing on a multitude of myths which express society's organizing structure, not one symbolized subject which has shoved onto the other what it
does not wish for itself, but what it cannot live without either. So women have borne the burden of the unwanted male body, of unwanted emotion, that men might have the subject position of the mind, of pure reason in the pursuit of innocent knowledge. But domination is structured into that duality, and until men reclaim their disavowed body and disavowed other, they can never be free--and nor can women, who exist in that state of nature which remains unsymbolized. Until we symbolize the sexually specific subject, we remain locked within the hierarchical dualism which can be deconstructed but where nonetheless we remain, caught without alternatives. Only in symbolizing the different, the other, the woman as a sexually specific subject, can we begin to rethink our ideas of leadership in our pursuit of a more egalitarian and democratic workplace.

How, then, might we rethink leadership using Irigaray's notion of metonymy or contiguity, and its focus on the sexually specific subject: on who is the leader, and who, exactly, benefits from whatever form of leadership is being promulgated? Many of our assumptions about leadership, whether leadership is equated with management, or understood as individualized, or as a position at the top of the pyramid, arise from the hierarchical or subject-to-object relations which characterize most forms of organizing. These assumptions about leadership and the hierarchical forms from which they arise obviously do not fit with the Irigarayan notion of contiguity or metonymy exemplified in subject-to-subject relations or positions. For example, if we were to analyse the assumptions about leadership contained in the present drive to restructure or downsize the organization, we would find little room for notions of contiguity, despite their calls for the flattened hierarchy and for shared forms of leadership. Although restructuring and downsizing are supposed to be about flattening the hierarchy, about teamwork, and about a more enlightened--or shared--form of leadership, in reality downsizing and restructuring has meant a more coercive form of leadership focused on command and control. Hierarchical relations have been merely recreated, although under a different guise and using different words. Under this rubric leadership has
become a way of ensuring that workers toe the line, the definition of that line decided by fewer, not more, people. In this context, leadership is becoming even more hierarchical, more related to position, even more individualized, than before. Workers have less power, not more, and decision making is even further removed from the floor. Coercion and discipline, ensuring that the workers accomplish set procedures in certain ways, if not the watchwords, are certainly the reality (cf. Harrison & Laxer, 1995). In this form of organizing which has no place for contiguity, and where leadership continues to reside at the apex of the pyramid, associated with the individual and with the position, women once again are absent. The subject-to-subject relations postulated by Irigaray, the new myths which allow for more and more human variety in the ways of doings things, are not possible in this form of organizing with its emphasis on command and control and its retention of hierarchical relations, however disguised.

The democratic workplace has been suggested as a way of combatting the hierarchical forms of domination which characterize how we work together, but even democracy in the workplace does not necessarily guarantee new forms of leadership, particularly those based on contiguity or subject-to-subject relations. A democratic workplace is not necessarily fully or equally participatory; it may be representative, in that a small number of people continue to make the decisions, although they represent the larger number of workers. Leading is not a skill shared among all; it is a perogative held by a few, and once leadership is held by a few, representative or not, the least powerful are excluded. Representative workplaces and participatory workplaces, although both could be characterized as democratic, are not the same in terms of workers' involvement. There's a great deal of difference in choosing who your boss is going to be, and sharing amongst all whatever the boss might have done or will do.

However, in fully participatory organizations we can move from the use of and the belief in top down or expert authority, to guild-like conditions where we vote and administer as equals, conditions which preceded the present corporatist structures
which characterize our organizations today (Saul, 1995, p. 80). Voting and administering as equals are examples of organizing which are fully participatory, and as shared skills are very similar to Helen Brown's (1991) description of the shared skills of leading which constitute part of the skills of organizing. This is a form of organizing which allows for contiguous, subject-to-subject relations among the people working together; leading, like all other organizing skills, is a skill that is shared. It is not something assigned to a privileged one, or to a few, and then justified, but an act of organizing both learned from and taught to, and inherently dynamic rather than linked to a fixed individual or to a fixed position\textsuperscript{19}.

Brown defines leadership very broadly as skillful organizing. According to her, we can all learn to be skillful organizers, just as it is also something we can teach. And because it's not so narrowly defined as carrying out responsibilities, showing vision, getting things done, or any of the innumerable ways leadership has been defined and then confined, leading can be approached as a skill which can be learned and shared rather than a behaviour that may or not be innate--psychology as the handmaiden to capitalism, to use Lacan's turn of phrase. In Brown's examination of leadership, to be skilled in leading is to be both necessarily linked to others and implicitly non-hierarchical. It is to focus on subject-to-subject relations rather than subject-to-object; it is to build allegiances, to strategize, to network. In order to be involved in this organizing activity of leading, we have to let other people in on it. Hierarchical assumptions about leading, or leadership, or the leader imply that others must follow, but to be involved in the skillful organizing activity of leading means involving others, reaching out to others, others who are not the same as followers because they too are involved in this shared skill. The others must be equal or it won't work; if people are deferential, building allegiances, networking or strategizing won't work. This shared skill of leading can only exist in conditions of equality where we struggle not to exploit others.
If we are what we do, as Marx states, then our organizing is integral to the construction of both who we are as well as how we relate to each other--these are not separable. This process of leading as something shared among equals is integral to the making of myths, to rethinking how we relate to each other. It is not just matching women up to an existing myth inhabited by men, but rethinking the symbolic in ways which don't demand just revisioning our dualisms and filling in the blanks. It means constructing a symbolic which has more places for women, instead of the very few they are now allowed to inhabit, where body and mind are opposed dualities, where men inhabit one and women the other, the lesser. The way we organize work is inseparable from the establishment and maintenance of a democratic society; the exploitive conditions we tolerate in our workplaces lend themselves directly to societies based on exploitation--our present time a prime example. How can we have democracy when the vast part of our daily lives is spent in conditions of feudalism, where deference is the unspoken part of difference?

By organizing ourselves in ways which allow for subject-to-subject relations, we can avoid the present conditions, where organizations are places of inequities in power, places where men act out their needs to control women. These present conditions necessarily depend on places which are places of absence, places or spaces held by women so that men may define themselves. In these present conditions women are only the means to an end, the object through which the subject defines himself, but never the subject herself. How can we speak or act when our place is to be silent, but a place which must be held so that a state of bravery or leadership can be reached and thus proclaimed, proclaimed from the silently held place of women which provides the soapbox but never the speaker. If we are to change these conditions of exploitation we must draw attention to these silences, these places held, like the zero in a equation so the mathematics makes sense, but without recognition, like the tracks in the snow of Derrida that obliterate what other way might have been taken. Women are the place
holders by which and through which men define themselves, the hidden supports on which men stand to understand the world, to define leadership in opposition to what it is not, that hidden but defining opposition held by women.

Thus, if we follow Irigaray, we can no longer think about the leader and leadership in the same way we have. Her idea of metonymy or contiguity which underlies how she understands the subject, or the idea of sexually specific subjects existing side by side rather than in a hierarchical, oppositional --and unacknowledged--duality which underlies and underscores our present notions of the sexually indifferent subject means that we must rethink our notions of the sexually indifferent leader and sexually indifferent leadership. Instead, using her notion of contiguity, we can rethink what we do when we come together to get work done. The activity of organizing is not necessarily one which must be conducted in ways that result in the structuring into this organizing activity relations which entail domination and subordination. This is Brown's (1991) major point. To her, the act of organizing encompasses what we do when we come together to get work done; the act of leading is only one of these acts of organizing, although she points out that this act of leading is defined by its greater skillfulness.

In this analysis, the leader and leadership as fixed positions dependent on the suppression and oppression of the submerged other are done away with, and we have instead this act of most skilled organizing which is leading, activities which are both dynamic and shared, shared in the sense that these activities can be learned from others, and they can be taught to others. They are not innate, not behavioural, not linked to some form of identity category. These skillful organizing activities called leading are not predicated on some form of domination and subordination. They do not have to be justified, legitimated, or denied, or left unanalysed as some form of spontaneous cooperation. The contiguous or metonymic sexually specific subject of Irigaray can provide another theoretical justification of what we already know works in practice, whether it's the Histadrut, the labour councils of Israel (Meir, 142-44, 1975), or the
economically self-sufficient small print shops of Northern California (Newman, 1980), where equality is not prefaced with the word radical, and where difference is both acknowledged and recognized, and treated as either a possible source to educate, or to be educated.

The dynamic activity of skillful organizing or leading, which cannot be captured by the notion of fixed hierarchies which for all their vaunted denials are about power and its maintenance, and not about efficiency and rationality, is only possible when relations between sexually specific subjects are egalitarian, when the focus is on the shared activities of organizing, when people both learn from each other and teach each other, where difference is side by side, not lesser.

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Bibliography


In Mary Jo Frug's argument, she notes that "In the contemporary West, the recognition of differences seems inseparable from the creation or reproduction of asymmetric dualisms. Within contemporary Western cultures, differences appear to generate and are certainly used to justify hierarchies and relations of domination including gender based (or ascribed) ones. Gender relations and the inability to recognize and allow the free play of differences are integrally interconnected and mutually sustaining. Contemporary theories and practices of justice apparently presuppose or require
asymmetric gender relations and the suppression or misnaming of differences for their realization" (1992, p. 113). To Frug, positing the universal in their definition of justice requires the suppression and/or denigration of difference; "hence, far from making us free, such approaches to justice generate and require relations of domination"(p. 115).

1Foucault had little use for Lacan as a philosopher, but nevertheless he, like Lacan, was heavily influenced by de Saussure. Foucault's first well known book was Les Mots et Les Choses, translated into English as The Order of Things. The order of the Renaissance was ruptured by the inability of the modern era to continue to link words to their representation; as David Macey points out, to Foucault "structuralism is not a new method; it is the awakened and worried consciousness of modern knowledge', the realization that, far from being a transparent medium of communication, language is a material force with a being of its own" (from Les Mots et les Choses, quoted in Macey, 1993, p. 169). Rather than language as a transparent medium, the representation of the real, language now constitutes the real, as Lacan points out and as Foucault underlines in this book which hit the best seller lists in France in 1966.

2According to Macey's biography of Foucault, itself an recounting of intellectual currents in France since the Second World War, it was the Hegelian Alexandre Kojeve who was "the first philosopher to proclaim the death of man in France" in the 1960's, before Foucault (Macey, 1993, p. 169).

3Susan Hekman has convincingly argued that the subject of the Enlightenment was a male subject: the death of this subject in postmodernism is the death of the male subject. To Hekman, the most radical implications of postmodernism lie in its twin effects: that when we deconstruct knowledge, we deconstruct gender and the gendered subject, that we can't let loose the moorings of one without letting loose the moorings of the other. Absolute and unitary knowledge and the essentialism of the male subject who knows are inextricably bound, and to deconstruct one as the effect of oppositional dualities is to deconstruct the other as well. In his deconstitution of the founding myths of Western thought, Derrida employs both logocentrism and phallocentrism as analytical concepts; he deconstructs and displaces not only the dualism of how we come to know, the subject/object opposition which structures our search for absolute truth or knowledge, but he also deconstructs the dualism which informs all the other dualisms--the opposition of male to female and its extension to rational man versus irrational woman, the [male] subject who can know and the [female] object which can only be known. Hekman argues that the absolutism of foundational truth and the essentialism of the [male] subject are obverse sides of the same coin: both are the result of the dualism which underlies Enlightenment thought. As Hekman points out, "the Enlightenment defined 'epistemology' as the study of knowledge acquisition that was accomplished through the opposition of a knowing subject and a known object. . . . Feminists reject the opposition of subject and object because inherent in their opposition is the assumption that only man can be subjects, and hence knowers. . . . Postmodernists reject the oppositions because it misrepresents the ways in which discourse constitutes what we call knowledge" (1990, p. 9). She argues further that if there is no absolute truth, the effect of opposing the subject to the object, the knower to the known, neither can any of the other opposing dualities which structure the subject stand: the fully constituting subject as opposed to the fully constituted subject, active as opposed to passive, essential man as opposed to essential woman, biological sex as opposed to socially constructed gender. To Hekman, the impact of postmodernist thought means that to redefine the masculinist subject of the Enlightenment to include the woman who knows would be to retain the prison of the Enlightenment dualities which inherently define woman not only as the Other, but the lesser; its internal coherence, as Jane Flax (1990) has also pointed out, depends on our exclusion. We are the necessary Other which provides
stability to the whole edifice of the self-constituting Cartesian subject who is what we are not.

For example, as Flax and Ferguson (1993) do to varying degrees and in varying ways, should we conceptualize the subject as multiple--as multiple subjectivities--to follow Foucault's conception of power as capillary like networks, power as all pervasive rather than sovereign?

To Irigaray, patriarchy is a "symbolic order which is sexually indifferent, that is to say, which does not recognize sexual difference: in this hom(m)osexual economy, there are only men, either men possessing a phallus/penis, or castrated and defective men. The other sex is defined in terms of its relation to men: as mother, virgin or whore, for example, but not in relation to itself. Women have no identity as women. This sexual indifference is far reaching: it is embodied in language, in representation, in theory, in scientific knowledge, in philosophy and in psychoanalysis, yet it remains unrecognized, because women's difference is never symbolized. Irigary argues for the necessity of women's symbolic representation" (Wright, 1991, p. 180).

Grosz uses the he "on purpose, for the only socially validated and acknowledged knower has historically been male". She wishes to address "precisely the question of what role the sex or sexed body of the knower must have on the kinds of knowledge he or she produces" (1993, p. 211).

To Whitford, Irigaray is neither a "biological essentialist...proclaiming a biologically-given femininity in which biology in some unclear fashion simply 'constitutes' femininity", nor is she a "'psychic essentialist'"', that she "has misunderstood or misrepresented the implication of Lacan's theories, that she takes the feminine to be a pre-given libido, prior to language, in which specific female drives are grounded, thus positing two distinct libidos--a masculine and a feminine" (Whitford, 1989, p. 107).

Irigaray argues that if we look closely at Derrida's argument for multiple sexualities, that we must go beyond the oppositional dualities of male and female if we are to thoroughly [reproach] the confining and repressive dualities of Western thought, we see that this argument obscures two things: first, "women's generic identity in the symbolic", and second, "the sexual construction of the male subject who needs the maternal feminine as its base" (Whitford, 1991, p. 154).

To Whitford, irigaray is dealing with a single problem, in its multiple aspects: the absence of and exclusion of woman/women from the symbolic/social order, and their representation as nature"(1991, p. 170). Whitford goes on to point out that for "Irigaray the social contract--that which transforms 'nature' into 'culture'"--systematically excludes women, who are then left representing nature (Ibid). She goes on to point out that "for Lacan the symbolic order is a symbolic contract equivalent to the social contract" (p. 174), and explains that "from the point of view of political theory (cf. Pateman) the social contract conceals the sexual contract, which is a contract between men giving them access to women. But Lacan adds a new twist to this story, by claiming that in fact there is no sexual relation and all that we have is a purely fraternal relation of hom(m)osexuality. From the point of view of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Oedipus complex, seen as the 'form of the social tie' based upon common unhappiness, instinctual renunciation, and sacrifice, is fuelled by the promise of heterosexuality and access to women. But in fact, Lacan says, woman does not exist, and the promise is not kept. We should now interpret 'woman does not exist' as 'women are not parties to the social/symbolic contract; in Irigarayan terms, they are outside the symbolic order, which they can enter only 'as men'; in Rousseauistic terms, they remain in the pre-contractual state of nature" (p. 176-177).

In a recent lecture given by the critic George Steiner which echos Irigaray's wishes, he stresses that Europe needs new myths, new archetypes (to Steiner only four exist: Don Juan, Faust, Hamlet and Don Quixote), a "new 'story for Europe': one that embraced
the Shoah, the reality of the sciences, the vision and voices of women". Micheal Billington comments that one of the questions that the lecture raises, apropos Irigaray, is "can you will myth into existence"? Obviously that question is on the mind of European intellectuals, Irigaray, at least, thinking that you can and must (Billington, 1994, p. 26).

1To Irigaray, "'women's access to subjectivity requires the invention of language'"(Whitford, p. 159): a language to talk about rather than a definition is what we seek, a language which does not yet exist, and when imagined, will free us both.

1As Grosz (1990) explains, Irigaray's use of the symbolic and the imaginary is derived from Lacan: the subject does not exist "ready made" but is "socio-linguistically constituted. The subject is the end-result of processes that constitute it as an ego or unified self (the imaginary); and as a social and speaking subject (the symbolic)" (p. 78).

1Modern literary theory has often used 'metonymy' in a wider sense, to designate the process of association by which metonyms are produced and understood: this involves establishing relationships of contiguity between two things, whereas metaphor establishes relationships of similarity between them" (Baldick, 1990, p. 135).

1In their analysis of organizational theory, Cooper and Burrell(1988) make the point that technological rationality is a version of modernist organizational theory. Blackmore is not a postmodernist.

15If, for example, we are to talk about women and men working together, leading and being lead, we must talk not only about working together in the paid work place, but working together in the home. The unrecognized effects of the dualisms underlying Western metaphysics which Nancy Fraser (1987) had identified in her analysis of Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action and which troubles Blackmore's analysis of leadership means that the implications of the public/private, male/female dualisms continue to elude and impoverish leadership analysis. That same work time [and leisure time] which is to be shared outside the front door must be shared inside the front door as well. It is not only overcoming the privileging of "male" ways of leading over "female" ways of leading, or the privileging of the mental over the manual worker, the focus of much Marxist and neo-Marxist analysis of workplace organization and leadership. It is also overcoming the split between who has leisure time and who does not, who works a single day and who works a double day, who does the housework and the childcare on top of paid work (cf. Hochschild and Machung, 1989; Anderson, 1992).

16As Martin points out, we need to recognize "how apparently well-intentioned organizational practices can reify, rather than alleviate, gender inequalities" (p. 339), and how particular truth regimes "suppress conflict by eliding conflicts of interest, denying the existence of points of view that could be disruptive of existing power relationships, and creating myths of harmony, unity and caring that conceal the opposite....exposing the conflict that has been suppressed; the devalued 'other' is made visible....[revealing]power operating in structures of thinking and behaviour that previously seemed devoid of power relations"(p. 340).

17However, I would disagree that the public/private dichotomy, like any one dichotomy, is "the linchpin of modern women's subordination", as Martin argues (Martin, 1990, p. 357). Women with small children and the extra work that entails certainly operates against women at certain times, but other justifications operate as women get older to maintain the hierarchy based on the sex of the worker. Women doing more work in the home than men is just one facet of women's oppression. This isn't the only reason; there are a number of interlocking reasons, and the public/private dualism is just one within an interlocking network of bodily knowledges which operate to continue to position women as subordinate in the paid work force, and which continue to define women in terms of their maternal function. The Gordian knot does not exist. To deconstruct one particular dichotomy, the public/private, is not necessarily to end someone's right to
rule over another, not if, as Foucault argues, power is capillary-like, reaching everywhere rather than sovereign. In that sense, the deconstruction of the public/private must be inseparable from the deconstruction of any other dualisms, because the networks of power reside in more than one place. Whatever dualism we choose to deconstruct, we need to remember that power is not sovereign, it is not defeated by analysing only one form to reveal the source of oppression, that power lies in capillary like networks of power and knowledge, that to deconstruct one does not mean the answer has been found, only that one form of power has been analysed and resisted, and that other power networks continue to exist, to reshape themselves, and to require new strategies of resistance. To focus on one dualism is to remain caught within the confines of that dualism, to focus on one site of power/knowledge, one discourse, one site of bodily knowledges alone is to perversely forget that that dualism is itself a production of bodily knowledges which leave one subject unsymbolized. This disavowal of and yet dependence on women which characterizes most analyses of the labour force process which ignores women's double work day in the home is a replication of the disavowal of yet dependence on the body/woman which is structured into Enlightenment thought. As Irigaray has pointed out, it is not in resymbolizing the maternal, but in symbolizing all relations, those between women and women, and those between women and men, that we can hope to free ourselves from the confines of dualisms which rest on the blank or the unsymbolized other.

In their studies of equity and organizations, Joan Acker (1989) and Linda Blum (1990) have similar analyses; both point out the puzzle that we often recreate or reconstitute inequality even as we try to eliminate it; that we cannot focus on one source of oppression alone, whether it's the split between the manual and the mental, the public and private, or the sexually segregated labour force, or, to focus more precisely on irigaray, the dichotomy of the different versus the same. Women's inequality is produced, or generated, form a number of sites: just as power, following Foucault, is capillary like, so are sites of oppression and resistance.

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18 As another example of coercion and control, how might the assumptions about leadership contained in total quality management be analysed? TQM is a euphemism for command and control, greater command over the workers, greater control over the workplace. Hierarchies with individualized leadership are well suited to TQM with its emphasis on discipline and control. The constant focus on the collection of data in terms of performance of TQM underlines the fact that its assumptions about leadership and workplace structure rest on control. Removing middle layers of management does not necessarily mean less control; in TQM it means more. Performance indicators, key to TQM, are never analysed for their political content. The question of who defines these measures is is not asked.

19 These very loose, non-hierarchical structures are not antithetical to action; these very loose ways of organizing to get work done can shrink and grow depending on the need for activism, like Friends of Medicare in Alberta, active when doublebilling was an issue in the 1980's in Alberta and again in the mid-nineties as medicare comes under threat from provincial and federal cuts. Nor must activism be linked to the presence of either individualized or hierarchical leadership. In the recent workers' strikes in France in the fall of 1995, it is, as Rosa Luxembourg has said, apparent that the workers as a group are leading, and that the union leaders are not. Or similarly, in the fall of 1995 in Alberta, it was ill-paid laundry workers, not the leaders of the Alberta Federation of Labour or the Canadian Union of Public Employees, who decided on strike action, and who mobilized citizens in a very conservative part of Canada to side with their cause. As an editorial writer for a major daily in Alberta pointed out, people want to walk together
with, not straggle behind someone blindly, unable to see, to be linked arm in arm in the pursuit of a social goal like justice and fairness, like the French strikers. A revolution is not the same as a coup d'etat. "They don't want to follow a leader at all. They want to walk beside one another,—in a long, uneven, horizontal line of humanity—but they're trapped in vertical political [and I would add, organizational] systems" (Goyette, Edmonton Journal, November 8, 1995).