The Sexually Specific Subject and the Dilemma of Difference:

Re-thinking the Different in the Construction of the Non-Hierarchical Workplace.

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I. Introduction: Rethinking Difference as Contiguity in the Re-structured, Non-Hierarchical Workplace

In this chapter I want to consider how we might best work together if we are not all the same, and particularly if we are not all the same sex. I will argue that if we are different, or specifically sexed as Elizabeth Grosz (1990) puts it, a hierarchical structure cannot be the best way to organize because the processes which construct difference simultaneously construct hierarchy. Difference conceived as other than and as less than, I contend, is inseparable from the creation and maintenance of hierarchical relations, or relations of domination and subordination based on privileging sameness and denigrating difference.

However, does that mean that we must all be the same if we are to be equal, and therefore that women must be the same as men if inequality is not to be reconstituted? If we accept the premise that hierarchy requires difference not only as other than but as less than in order to both sort and rank, then must the assertion of sexual difference lead inevitably to hierarchy? Must this assertion of sexual difference necessarily operate within a hierarchical framework which itself depends on fixed categories like sameness and difference for its internal coherence, in the same way that a coherent meaning of a word depends on that which it both excludes and represses, but without which it cannot exist? Must this assertion of sexual difference necessarily be incompatible with the subject who can know and act in non-hierarchical ways?

In answer to these questions I will argue two points. First, we can assert sexual difference without inevitably and simultaneously reconstructing
hierarchy, by theorizing difference as contiguity, or difference side by side, without sameness as the norm or the anchor by which difference is constituted. Secondly, the acceptance of difference or diversity in the workplace cannot be achieved other than within a non-hierarchical or egalitarian structure. More precisely, it cannot be achieved other than as the [temporary, retrospective] product of non-hierarchical organizing activities. Without this context, difference will continue to be denigrated as the processes of domination and subordination in the form of hierarchy continue to reassert themselves, and criteria are continually reconstituted by which sameness, however defined, is continually privileged and difference, however defined, is continually denigrated.

Thus, instead of difference as other than the same and therefore lesser, a restructured, non-hierarchical workplace would subscribe to difference as contiguity, or difference side by side, without sameness as the norm or dominant term by which difference is hierarchically constructed. However, it is important to recognize that contiguity is not a relative position. It does not mean everyone is the same, which is the corollary to the notion that since we’re all different, we’re all the same in our difference, the relativism of which has been disputed. Without an absolute, there can be no relative, as Hekman (1990) among others has pointed out. Contiguity means difference without the normative anchor of the same to re-establish privilege. Moreover, contiguity also contains an inevitably political dimension which focuses on the restructuring of relations among individuals, a restructuring which involves reaching out rather than assuming either a dominating or subordinate role based on a position that has been already sorted and ranked. The notion of difference beside difference, or contiguity, is about strategic alliances, negotiated alliances, allegiances, networks. It is about power, but not power as
sovereign, but power as it resides in networks, alliances, allegiances, power as a productive force, not only power as inhibiting, repressive, juridical.

The advantage of difference as contiguity which focuses on strategies, alliances, allegiances and networks has organizational implications in terms of how we think about power and thus how we structure our organizations in order to get things done. We can only work together with people who are different from us if we abandon hierarchy for the flattened organization. Thus I maintain that we can’t theorize difference or diversity in the organization without theorizing the hierarchical construction of sameness/difference, the construction of identity, and the construction of power--and here in my argument I am going to draw on two contemporary French philosophers, Luce Irigaray and Michel Foucault. If we follow Irigaray, our identity--who we are, and whether we are the same or the different--is constructed socio-linguistically, within the symbolic order; if we follow Foucault, we are constructed within capillary-like power relations, power everywhere and nowhere. Whether we are deemed to be the same, and privileged, or deemed to be different and not privileged, these categories of sameness, difference and identity are all constructed within relations of power, or within regimes of truth, a phrase which nicely captures the inevitable intertwining of power and knowledge, the impossibility of innocent knowledge and the inescapability of power.

How, though, given the criticisms levelled against Irigaray, do we capture women’s specific experiences with power without essentializing (cf. Grosz, 1993; Whitford, 1991)? And against Foucault, how is the construction of our identity within this capillary-like network of power relations sexually specific (cf. Diamond & Quinby, 1988; Deveaux, 1994)? How is our otherness as lesser created and maintained within this capillary-like network
of power relations? Finally, how might women act as and for themselves in organizations without re-establishing the very relations of domination and subordination which they first struggled against? How do we deal with difference without re-establishing hierarchical relations? These are the questions which face us.

Part II: The Hierarchical Construction of Sameness and Difference:

Theorizing Identity, Sameness and Difference

In the literature on organizations the focus has been on the universal or the same rather than on 'the different'. Whatever the term used--the subject, the knower, the actor, the agent--the term has been deemed generic, universal, sexually indifferent rather than sexually specific. The different has not been theorized, an absence that has been justified through an appeal to equality as necessarily universalist, a universality which transcends the differences which mark us. The assertion of difference, and by extension sexual difference or sexual specificity, has been seen as fundamentally incompatible with the assertion of equality--to assert difference has been seen as an argument for inequality. Sameness, or the appeal to a common humanity shared by all, is the condition for equality, and transcendence, or the removal of oneself from one's bodily differences whatever they may be, is the condition which must be achieved if knowledge or justice applicable to all is to be discovered.

However, Mary Jo Frug (1992) points out that it is this suppression of difference which results in the perpetuation of conditions of inequality. Contrary to the tenets of the Enlightenment, equality cannot be achieved by asserting sameness through transcending difference. Positing the universal
"requires the suppression and/or denigration of difference" and, "far from making us free, such approaches. . . generate and require relations of domination" (1992, p. 115). Sameness is not the transcendent, neutral universal we have been lead to believe, but a sameness split and unacknowledged, difference set off and deemed lesser in order to create and define the category of the same. It is a process which structures in hierarchical relations, or relations of domination and subordination, privilege and denigration, and in a similar argument, allows for the projection onto the other the unwanted characteristics of the same.

It is feminist theorists in particular, and particularly those who draw on the arguments of Freud and the French post-war theorists like Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, and Irigaray, who have been concerned with exploring the construction of this universal subject--the subject as the same--in terms of sexual specificity. To them, this supposedly universal neutral subject, this subject as the same, this subject without a body, is sexed--but as male. This construction of the subject as a male subject depends on the exclusion and repression of the other, the different, the woman, to maintain its internal coherence, just as reason depends on the exclusion of the body, a construction which rests on the Cartesian equivalencies of the male/female, mind/body dualisms, dualisms which leave the female subject untheorized and the male subject disembodied, and dualisms which create the conditions for hierarchical regulation and control. Within these dominant modes of representation and systems of knowledge the subject as male is left unacknowledged, the male claim of mind and the evacuation of the male body left uncommented, the structural involvement of these dualisms in the creation and perpetuation of relations of domination and subordination overlooked. The female subject is submerged, her sexually specific representation effaced under the rubric of
[male] universalism, her female body inscribed “as a negative, dependent, lacking object” (Grosz, 1986, p. 134), her subjectivity and self-representation denied within a system that depends for its coherence on the female body while systematically denying its difference.

It was Freud who called into question the Western ideal of the knowing, autonomous, conscious rational subject by his positing of the unconscious—how can we fully know ourselves if we cannot ever fully know our unconscious, if our needs and desires remain beyond us, inexplicable in terms of reason? With that move not only the conscious sovereign subject, but innocent knowledge, and power separate and sovereign, are put into play. The subject of the Enlightenment, unified, stable, transcendent in its all-knowingness, is called into question, and a breach in the wall of the fixed categories of sameness, difference, identity and power is made.

This position is further elaborated by Derrida. He takes up the subject who cannot completely know, and focuses, like Foucault and Lacan, on language. To Derrida the subject is produced within language, an effect of the repressive dualisms of Western metaphysics which attempt to ground the limitless instability of language, but where both meaning and subjectivity can be nothing other than a temporary, retrospective fixing (cf. Weedon, 1987). He deconstructs the subject to reveal the subject as a text, “to reveal the necessity with which what a text says is bound up with what it cannot say” (Grosz, 1990, p. 97). He takes apart the subject to show how this term hangs together; he shows how this term must repress the necessary other in order to maintain its coherence; he shows how it works in order to “unveil the political commitments of various prevailing discourses” (Ibid, p.101). He shows the “precarious dependence of dominant forms on repressed, subjugated or subordinated terms” (Ibid, p. 110).
With Derrida everything is the text. However, it is not a helpful position to feminist theorists, who need a way of analysing power which allows for resistance and change. If the subject is not fixed, if it is an outcome of the play of the text, then how can power be adequately theorized? Conceptualizing power as sovereign, as something held, unified and fixed, the city on the hill which can be overcome, does not fit with Derrida’s notion of prevailing discourses. Nor does power as sovereign fit with the Freidian subject who cannot know, the subject who cannot transcend the unknowable self to achieve the objectivity which innocent knowledge requires and through which justice is obtained.

In search of a more adequate conceptualization of power, many feminists turned to Foucault, with his sophisticated analysis of power everywhere and nowhere, capillary like, like the body, no part untouched by the silent running of blood. To Foucault, the subject is constructed as the effect of strategies of discourse, where power and knowledge intertwine to produce a disciplinary regime of truth focused on the body. Unlike Derrida, who admits of no place outside of discourse, Foucault does: there is both discursive and non-discursive power, although there is no place outside the relations of power\(^1\). Agonistic power, or the final development of his analysis of power everywhere (cf. Deveaux, 1994), is viewed as multiple, interweaving and "inherently contested" (Deveaux, 1994, p. 223). Unlike Marxist notions of power, it is "not located exclusively or even primarily in state apparatuses or in prohibition" (Ibid, p. 231); it is not equatable to structures, institutions, practices, ideologies, or hegemonies (cf. Grosz, 1990); it is not only or primarily repressive and dominating. Power is exercised. It exists in actions, it is productive, it enables, it produces things (cf. Grosz, 1990, p. 87). It is separate from knowledge, or social relations, but it is "their condition of
existence” (Ibid, p. 89); it enables these knowledges and social relations to exist, and not others. Foucault asks not what do Marx or Freud have to say about women, but what makes it possible for Marx or Freud to say or not to say what they do about women. He questions how the conditions for existence of certain knowledges came about, and not others. He allows us to ask why do we think in the way that we do, and what does it mean?

In Foucault's analysis of the subject and its relationship to power (cf. Grosz, 1990), the body is the place where power is connected to the social order; the body is the mediator between the endless circulation of power and the social order. And it is at the site of this body that feminist theorists find difficulty with Foucault.

His body is, ultimately, a male body, and a body where the mind rules, where rationality takes its place once again as separate and superior to the body and the feelings and emotions which are relegated to it. As sophisticated as his analysis is, he repeats the hierarchical construction of the Enlightenment in its separation of the mind from the body, and its association with the mind and man, the body and woman.

Without a sexually specific body, he neutralizes power. If power is everywhere and nowhere, he has no way of dealing with or analysing women's sexually specific experiences of power, like male violence directed at women's sexually specific bodies. Nor does he have a way of dealing with systemic oppression in its various and specific forms. With power endlessly circulating, how can we deconstruct the specific contexts of women's oppression? For example, Sandra Bartky's (1990) use of shame is a way of looking at how “unreciprocated emotional labour, nurturing, and caregiving” (Deveaux, 1994, p. 234) are sources of both power and powerlessness for women. Given Foucault's stress on the institutional and on the rational, how
can these forms of power be unpicked, and how would Foucault’s theories help to unpick them? Foucault’s analysis of power lies on the side of reason, and he leaves the emotional side as a source of inequality unanalysed. These areas of nurturance—the inseparability of loving mother and good servant, 'the managed heart' of the smiling stewardess in Arlie Hochschild's (1983) memorable phrase—are “easily obscured by Foucault’s agonistic model of power, because it reflects neither outright domination nor the intersubjective play of power between two free agents. Feminists need to look at the inner processes that condition women’s sense of freedom or choice in addition to external manifestations of power and dominance” (Deveaux, 1994, p. 234).

In neglecting to look at sexually specific experiences of power, he reinforces the association of women with the body and men with the mind in the very act of theorizing power. Foucault’s notion of power is itself one that both privileges [male] rationality and excludes emotionality from consideration; it is this privileging of male rationality which is the condition of existence for Foucault’s notion of power.

Nonetheless, feminists find the notion of no place existing outside of relations of power liberating. It allows them to focus, not on the sterile defense of an innate identity—the construction of a truth defended by power sovereign, the moated castle—but on strategy, allegiances, shifting alliances. It allows them to use Derrida and the idea of a coherent term inevitably repressing and suppressing the necessary other, but without seeing everything as a text: it allows them to look for the conditions of existence of that way of thinking. It allows them to ask if the focus on language is only a rewrite of Descartes’ focus on reason, the mind still privileged. Most importantly, it allows them to remember that this condition of existence for these particular knowledges is itself sexually specific, to remember that “all theory, all knowledge is
produced from sexually specific positions and with sexually specific effects" (Grosz, 1990, p. 109).

What is useful for us, then, about Foucault is that we can theorize power as networks, as capillary like, as everywhere and nowhere, as the impetus for shifting and strategic alliances; we can use this theory as a condition for our strategic assertion of the right to act as more than either isolated sexless bodies or as only sexed bodies. Just as Derrida's deconstruction of the totalitarian impulses underlying the position of either/or alerted us to the dangers of advancing dualistic positions, Foucault's notion of shifting alliances alerted us to the advantages of the notion of both/and as a strategy. Power everywhere frees us from advocating fixed essentialism but doesn't preclude us from advancing the notion of strategic essentialism. We can use the notion of strategic essentialism as a way of building alliances; we can reappropriate and subvert "an identity while maintaining an understanding of its historical contingency" (Deveaux, 1994, p. 241). Or as Elizabeth Grosz puts it, "strategy involves recognizing the situation and alignments of power within and against which it operates" (1990, p. 59). We may be inevitably complicitous, but that position never precludes resistance.

However, as helpful as Foucault's notion of power everywhere and nowhere is in allowing feminist theorists to focus on the construction of strategic allegiances, his inability to conceptualize a sexually specific subject is not. Thus, in search of a way to conceptualize a sexually specific subject without essentializing, a number of feminist theorists have drawn on the psychoanalyst and linguist Luce Irigaray. She herself has drawn on Lacan and his rereading of Freud for her notion of the subject constructed within the symbolic order, but unlike Lacan's, her focus is on both the possibility and the
necessity of change within the symbolic order in order to create a place for women, a place which they do not yet have.

To Lacan (cf. Grosz, 1990) it is through the naming role of language that the subject becomes the subject. He argues that if Freud had read de Saussure, a linguist writing about the same time as Freud, he would have recognized that the unconscious is structured like a language. It is through language that we are named, through language that we take our place in the social order, through language that we are constituted "as an ego or unified self (the imaginary) and as a social and speaking subject (the symbolic)" (Grosz, 1990, p. 72). As we are constituted in this act of naming, we enter into the social or symbolic order, an order which for Lacan hinges on the phallus, “the signifier of signifiers” (Wright, 1991, p. 319). It is within this symbolic or social order, or the law of the father, that "the phallus as the preeminent signifier provides the stability through which the subject is constituted, and through which the sexes are distinguished and positioned as opposites" (Grosz, 1990, p. 79). There cannot be a “sexually neutral model of subjectivity”; our sexuality is not “contingent or incidental” (Grosz, 1990, p. 79). In taking up our place in language, we become who we are and who we may be; this is a symbolic code that dictates our place in the social order.

However, although the use of the phallus as the signifier of signifiers consigns women to the “negative or suplementary side”, rendering “the structures and power relations between the sexes eternal and universal, conditions of the very existence of language and sociality” (Grosz, 1990, p. 105), feminists have argued that Lacan’s rereading of Freud remains helpful because he focuses on “the powerful subjective effects of language and systems of signification in producing the socio-symbolic subject” (Ibid, p. 106). He links "the individual to the social” through his materialist understanding of
language (Ibid, p. 107), he points out that language has “primacy over experience”, and that “what is not spoken is as significant as what is said” (Ibid, p. 106-07). And through his theory itself, with its focus on the phallus and its elaborate theorization, we gain insights regarding “male fantasies about women that are actively imposed on women” (Ibid, p. 107). Lacan theorizes male desires, giving feminist theorists an ambivalent insight into the intersection of power and desire dressed as reason.

Luce Irigaray, the French philosopher, psychoanalyst, and linguist, takes from Lacan his focus on the subject as a creation of the symbolic order, but she analyses Lacan’s focus on the phallus as the pre-eminant signifier as an expression of power and desire, and moves from there. She asks, in a way that neither Derrida, Foucault nor Lacan could, how we might account for and theorize the sexually specific body, the body which is not the same. Irigaray insists that the sexually specific body must be theorized, that a subject position for the specifically sexed female body must be articulated within a symbolic order which recognizes sexual difference. She analyses man the subject as a man who cannot see himself as sexually specific, a man who simultaneously relies on and disavows the role of the sexually specific, concretely sexed body in the production of knowledge within which his subjectivity is also understood, confusing himself with the universal. To Irigaray, patriarchy is a symbolic order which is sexually indifferent, that is to say, which does not recognize sexual difference; in this hom(m)osexual economy, there are only men, either men possessing a phallus/penis, or castrated and defective men. The other sex is defined in terms of its relation to men: as mother, virgin or whore, for example, but not in relation to itself. Women have no identity as women. This sexual indifference is far reaching: it is embodied in language, in representation, in theory, in
scientific knowledge, in philosophy and in psychoanalysis, yet it remains unrecognized, because women's difference is never symbolized. (Wright, 1991, p. 180)

Within the present symbolic or social order which we inhabit we are what men do not want themselves to be, or to have; we are their rejected parts of themselves, we are their necessary but disavowed bodies, disavowed to maintain the purity of reason, the mind unsullied by immanence. We are ourselves unsymbolized, unarticulated and inarticulate; we are a blank screen for men's projections, a state of nature, a condition of dereliction, lost and abandoned. We need a "home in the symbolic order", our own "house of language" (Whitford, 1991, p. 156), we need to speak in a language which speaks of and to us, in the symbols and myths which "indicate representationally how that society is structured and organized at other levels (Ibid, p. 170), myths that resonate far beyond those which we have available to us now, where only the "maternal function" speaks, not the woman, where the mother-son of the Pieta presides, but never the mother-daughter. What Irigaray wishes to construct are "new fictions, to anticipate and perhaps assist the birth of a new social order" (Ibid).

As an undutiful daughter, Irigaray undertakes to use the same tools as Freud and Lacan to creatively imagine a place within the symbolic order which women might inhabit as women, not as men with a lack, the metaphysics of Freud and Lacan. We wish not to reveal our innate being, but to create a female symbolic--a place in the language--where one has never existed, to symbolize the relations between women, to find a place "distinct from the maternal function" (Whitford, 1991, p. 109). In so doing, we wish to construct an Other as distinct from the other of the same, where "there is only one sex, that
that sex is male, and that therefore women are really men, in a defective, castrated version" (Ibid, p. 120).

Our goal is not merely invention, or new terms for a place in the symbolic order where before there was none--it is also redistribution. In this total symbolic redistribution, (cf. Whitford, 1991, p. 165) men would reclaim not only their disavowed bodies on which the myth of transcendence depends, but those parts of themselves--the disavowed emotionalism which serves to support the rationalism which they alone claim as only one example--which they have rejected, and in rejecting, gave to women; and women creatively imagining what it means to be a woman. Here "Lacan, notoriously conservative, emphasizes the [symbolic] code...the domain of constraint...Irigaray emphasizes the context, the possibility of limitless combination, a new syntax of culture which is creative and open-ended...the metonymic allows for process" (Ibid, p. 179-180). Irigaray calls this the contiguous or "metonymical subject-to-subject relation between women" (Ibid, p. 184) which stands for "women's sociality, love of self on the women's side, the basis for a different form of social organization and a different economy" (Ibid, p. 180). In this creative imagining and re-imagining of the symbolic order, Irigaray proposes for both a space to be free, for both to exist in contiguity, side by side, not in opposition, one over the other, within the hierarchical dualisms which structure our thoughts, our relations, and our organizations.
Part III: Managing Diversity: The Organizational Literature

Given difference as continguity, and power everywhere and nowhere, how might we understand the organizational literature on diversity or difference in the workplace? In this next section I will look at four examples from the literature, all of whom approach this question in slightly different ways: Roosevelt Thomas's *Beyond Race and Gender* (1991), an American analysis which focuses on the management of diversity and the shift from doing to enabling; Pam Stewart's and Janice Drakich's short monograph on using the rules to achieve diversity in Ontario universities (1994); Ricardo Seler's book length analysis of the transformation of his Brazilian factory through restructuring and the minimizing of difference [*Maverick* (1993)]; and Helen Brown's account of the struggles facing feminist organizations in the 1980's in Britain as they tried to organize in non-hierarchical ways by minimizing difference through sharing work activities, *Women Organising* (1991).

Roosevelt Thomas (1991) expresses a widely held view in the literature on management and difference in the workplace. Like many others, he stresses two points: first, the manipulation of organizational culture is the key to the successful management of diversity--only if a culture is made more inclusive will diversity succeed. Second, because a more diverse workforce assures that there are more ways of doing things, it's also more efficient. Diversity is not less efficient because of greater difference, but more efficient because of greater choice. It's the principles of consumerism applied to the workforce.
To Thomas, the organizational culture is both the unexamined milieu in which we work, and the unifying force--the glue--which holds the organization together. Only by manipulating the culture to produce the view that greater choice is all to the good, and that narrowing the types of people who work there means less choice because there's less access to differing views, will managers be able to achieve the harmony they desire. Only then will people understand why there has to be change because this type of change is in the best interests of all.

Affirmative action, or managing by numbers, is a necessary step, albeit only the first step, towards managing diversity. The second step is education, or valuing diversity. But the third step, and to Thomas the most important and the most overlooked, rests on changing the core culture by changing the way we manage, or in Thomas's metaphor, changing the roots of the tree. We must change the roots--the management style--not just graft on branches, or graft diverse peoples onto the organization, leaving the culture of the organization unchanged. We have to go beyond achieving diversity--numbers--and valuing diversity--education--to managing diversity if we are to move beyond the problems engendered by those actions: the view that special treatment is unfair, and that some groups are special interest groups, and others are not. In other words, it is through managing diversity, not just adding different people, and then educating the others about the value of working with different people, that the backlash can be avoided.

To succeed, because changing the organizational culture won't happen without both a knower and leader, an outside consultant and an inside change agent are absolutely necessary. Outside consultants are invaluable for their ability to analyse the organization and for their advice on how to manipulate the culture to achieve the desired ends. An outside consultant can provide both the
necessary distance from the organization, and provide the necessary insight to rethink metaphorically how people of diverse backgrounds might best work together.

Inside change agents are equally necessary if this knowledge is to be used to advantage. This is someone, and not only someone in the human resources department, who can clarify the motivations and concepts, insist on consistency, foster a pioneering spirit and a long term perspective, and conduct diagnostic research. It is also someone who can emphasize education rather than training, because "training builds specific skills; education changes mindsets" (1991, p. 36-38), although education is only the last step towards managing diversity, not the thing itself.

Change agents can, for instance, ensure that the definition of diversity is wide rather than narrow--by including everyone opposition is muted. And most importantly, they can focus on the necessity of simultaneously rewarding a different management style, those who enable rather than those who do for. It is enabling that is the key to managing diversity, because enabling is the only management style which can deal with a diverse work force. However, as Thomas underlines, doing for is far more common than enabling, and thus "the number one barrier to acceptance [of managing diversity]. . . is the way 'managing' is defined in most corporations. . . . In spite of recent trends towards participatory management styles" most managers want a clone of themselves, people who do things just like them. They are doers, taking charge; "taking care of people [is] secondary" (p. 46). Cloning prevents diversity; it also prevents any focus on managing people as a legitimate purpose within the organization. But according to Thomas, most managers in organizations aren't interested and aren't very good at managing people because they don't see managing people as directly contributing to the bottom line. What does
contribute to the bottom line is ensuring that people do it right, and that can only be ensured by either doing it for them, or by having someone in charge who does it just like they would have done. Enabling, in that context, is a foreign concept.

That's why the enabling or empowering model of management is much better: enabling helps people find the best way for them to achieve their goal, cloning demands that one way be followed. Not everyone is going to be a white male; if people are different, they are going to be different in how they work, how they work together, and how they achieve the goals of the organization. Enabling, rather than cloning, is the only answer to the successful management of a diverse workforce, but if enabling is going to be successful, it must operate on two levels. Not only does enabling allow for different ways of doing things; enabling must also include how white males do things, which points out of course that no one group acts in one, stereotypical, way.

As Thomas points out, managing a diverse workforce by enabling does not mean excluding white men; it means including everyone. For diversity to work well, managing diversity must be broadened "to include multiple dimensions" (p. 81), which means white men, but it also means that the many different styles of working and leading on the part of everyone are to be encouraged. Paradoxically, the focus on assimilation has meant that white men have had many routes to the top, but others found that imitation of the stereotypic [white, male] managerial style was necessary for advancement. As one woman pointed out, if you're part of the majority, you can act in a number of ways, but if you're part of the group labelled different from the same, you have to act in a way that closely emulates the stereotype: "The women who have been promoted . . . share a common style. They are extremely aggressive and appear to subordinate their personal lives for the laboratory. Many are not married. In
contrast, men. . . have all kinds of styles—from aggressive to quietly competent" (p. 108). To Thomas, if the routes to upward mobility are based on cloning the stereotype, the glass ceiling remains, because "no amount of mentoring or adaptation will result in women becoming men" (p. 109), or anyone black becoming white, or any other characteristic which belongs to the privileged group, and which the less privileged group, by definition, does not have and cannot achieve.

Although they do not take a Foucauldian stance, the approach of Stewart and Drakich lends itself to a Foucauldian analysis. They are concerned with the subversion of the existing rules and regulations, the interstices of power, not the who of power, but where power lies, in "performance evaluations, audits, selection and promotion procedures, tenure mechanisms", in the "routinization of procedure", in the "many minute forms" which characterize the regimes of power and knowledge that are our organizations (Jermier, 1994, p. 3, 4).

In their discussion of diversity in Ontario universities, the intent of Stewart and Drakich (1994) is to show the process by which rules and regulations, the mutinae of any large organization, can be turned inside itself to reveal the repression that is at its heart, and to use that revelatory process to advance those whom the rules and regulations were supposed to keep out. Their study of Ontario universities indicated that there had been very little progress increasing the percentage of women as full-time professors over the last two decades, so they were particularly concerned with detailing how the barriers to hiring and retaining women could be overcome. Although they take a standard approach to organizational analysis, in that organizations are understood to have both a formal and informal structure, they point at the rules of the
organization as both the place of resistance and the place of advancement. If power is everywhere and nowhere, it is most likely resisted everywhere and nowhere, in the rules, procedures and mechanisms which are the university. Those same nodes of power which keep women in their place can be used to advance women, the process turned against itself, a feudal bureaucracy predicated on the exclusion of women liberated for emancipatory ends.

Rather than endless study— they point out that employment equity officers often have their time used for endless and purposeless data collection— they recommend action. A full time equity officer is a necessity, but not for research purposes. Instead, the equity officer helps to ensure that due process is indeed followed, from the initial discussions of the wording of the advertisement, to ensuring that the advertisement itself is widely distributed, to ensuring that the interviewing questions are vetted, and that the interviewers are taught how to read letters of reference. What is theoretical to Stewart and Drakich is made practical through equity officers who do more than monitor numbers, interviewing committees that are called to account at every step, and finally and most importantly, hiring which can be refused at the vice president’s level if all the steps are not followed, monitored and justified in terms of fairness applied to ensuring demographic diversity.

They recognize that an "equity culture" must be put in place if people who are different from the already there are to be welcomed, but they are most concerned with numbers and with process. In that sense, theirs is an excellent reply to Thomas’ account of diversity in the workplace. To Thomas, reason and a more enlightened form of domination in the form of enabling will work to bring together people who are different to get work done. Stewart and Drakich recognize that at a university reason has been dressed in a number of ways to maintain privilege. Rather than argue the more esoteric points, they focus on
strict adherence to the rules, which in the classical move of work to rule, subverts them.

However, they do point out that in order to begin this process of subversion, universities must have a committed group of feminists and men sympathetic to feminism--in other words, a body to lobby--and someone in the administration with clout who is committed. They point to one Ontario university with a committed president and successful implementation of the process of strict adherence to rules of fairness, and to one Ontario university with a president who stated that he found this focus on increasing diversity reverse discrimination. At that university, the process failed. It is a sobering insight into hierarchical relations constituting and reconstituting relations of domination and subordination, and how easily difference is squashed in the absence of a commitment to egalitarian relations.

How might Ricardo Semler’s notion of restructuring as empowerment and difference or identity as tribalism be understood from the point of view of Luce Irigaray’s notion of difference as contiguity, and Foucault’s notion of power as capillary-like networks, or power everywhere?

Semler understands the minimalization of difference in the workplace in structural terms—as fixed and unified—in the way he understands power, the way he understands organization, and the way he understands diversity. As a very practical example of how the flattened hierarchy and worker empowerment is achieved, Semler is instructive: only by minimizing difference among workers by restructuring the hierarchy can success be achieved, and success is making your workers want to come to work in the morning. To accomplish this, he eliminated most supervisory and management positions, allowed the workers to decide how, when, and where they would do
the work, to hire those they would work with and those they would work under, instituted profit sharing and bonuses and allowed the workers to decide, after reading the balance sheet, how much those would be. In the interests of keeping supervision and coordination to a minimum, he also spun off satellite units from the main company, creating positions for outside entrepreneurs who sold materials and services not only to his company but to others. To maintain flexibility and creativity, he eliminated any rules for innovators within the company, the only criteria imposed a six month renewable contract, but no other guidelines, timelines, or supervisors.

Power in the form of rules is an anathema to Semler; workers freed from the stifling net of rules are free to be responsible, to be motivated, to be creative, to be involved--to want to get up in the morning to come to work. Hierarchical ways of organizing are not innate, nor are they necessary to get things done. Instead, they stand in the way, inhibiting workers and turning them into children, obeying with reluctance as father hoves into view.

But if hierarchy is not innate, tribalism is. To Semler the need for like to associate with like is nothing the organization can change; it might as well learn to live with this need for “identity”, to accept this need to define the different and the same. Workers were allowed to hire whom they liked, and one of the few policies in an organization that banned policy manuals focused on promoting from within: those with seventy percent of the qualifications wished for would be hired in preference to outsiders with a hundred percent match. Semler pays very little attention to the construction of the different and the same. What intrigues Semler is one aspect of power in the organization, and that is power as it resides in rules and regulations.
This is precisely the problem which Helen Brown struggles with in *Women Organising* (1991): power and the construction of ranked differences among people who work together, and the hierarchical structures which ensue. To Brown, dealing with diversity or difference in the workplace cannot be separated from restructuring the workplace in order to minimize hierarchy, as Semler does. She argues that power exists not only in the structure of the organization, but in the differences among workers, however those differences are defined, and that those differences must be minimized. Brown's solution to this problem is to minimize hierarchical relations among workers by focusing on organizing as a process or as a series of activities, none of which can be ranked, including the activity of leading. By stressing the necessary involvement of everyone in everything, she hopes to provide a way for organizations to get things done with a minimum of domination.

Brown's analysis rests on negotiated order theory, a theory which maintains that the social order is negotiated and as such always involves struggle. She takes pains to point out, however, that although negotiating is not something which is bereft of struggle or conflict, it is not only antagonistic. In the process of negotiating, decisions are made "through a process of consensus which encourages dissent" (Ibid, p. 16), a process of decision making which is repetitive, reflective and political. It is not a process which is complacent or innate, spontaneous, or natural. It is work and struggle, not a happy anarchy which just emerges, thus requiring no analysis. Most importantly, it is in these organising activities, none of which are ranked, that we have to find a way of "managing a priori differences between individuals" (Ibid, p. 17), however these differences might be described and categorized. The question then becomes how do we figure out to deploy these differences so that hierarchy is not constructed and reconstructed on the basis of those differences?
To Brown the answer lies in understanding organizing as a process. It is not the organization which exists, but the organizing activities which give it the temporary retrospective fixing which allow us to define a structure which is itself a construct of meaning, a taken for granted set of assumptions which allow us to act within the illusion of a structure. But this structure, as illusionary as it is, can be hierarchical or non-hierarchical; this set of assumptions is both literally and figuratively the outcome of our organizing activities which are either kept separate or shared among us. In her discussion of these organizing activities Brown is careful to make no real distinction other than to use the names already familiar to us, of doing, working, managing and leading--all are activities which can be exchanged, learned, negotiated and shared.

Brown points out, however, that leading, because it has occupied such a central place in the literature, needs to be dealt with in a way that demystifies its separateness and its individualization, as something that in order to get things done, must ideally reside in one person alone. In what comes close to a parody of the 50s lament for any marriage which strayed from Father Knows Best: 'But somebody has to be the boss!', the assumption is that individualized leadership is the only effective way of getting things done. But according to Brown, leadership, like the notion that families could not function without a [male] boss, must be rethought if organizing non-hierarchically is going to succeed. As long as the activity of leading is individualized or confused with the position, non-hierarchical relations among workers will not be possible. Leading, just like all the other organizing activities, must be shared and exchanged to ensure that it does not reside either with one person or in one position for long.
To Brown, leading, although a particularly skillful kind of organizing activity, is the purview of every worker. To accomplish this, every worker must be involved, an involvement requiring constant negotiating; no one can be left out. As she stresses in her analysis, and particularly in her analysis of leadership and how it is usually presented, she wishes to differentiate between the usual elision of leadership with management and its behaviourist and positionalist focus. She proposes that we separate our study of management from leadership, or from "status position or delegated task management" (Ibid, p. 64), and recognize that the activity of leading is far more sophisticated than a simple analysis of positional responsibilities and how well they are carried out. What we need to do instead is to teach more people to be skillful organizers so more can be leaders. Thus we should focus not on what people are, or the traits they exhibit in particular positions, nor on what they do in particular positions, but "rather on leadership as process, and specifically processes in which influential acts of organizing contribute to the structuring of interactions and relationships, activities and sentiment; processes in which definitions of social order are negotiated, found acceptable, implemented and renegotiated; processes in which interdependencies are organized in ways which promote the values and interests of the social order" (Ibid, p. 69).

Leading then becomes a political process in which everyone must be involved; the only way to achieve order without hierarchy is if every member "has both the right and the responsibility to contribute" (Ibid, p. 163). If we are to get things done, everything must be shared, which includes any activity termed leading.

To Brown this is the key to understanding how we organize non-hierarchically. It is a constant process of organizing, a constant process of negotiation, involvement, teaching and sharing. Nothing is individualized in the
sense that not one of these organizing activities is left to any individual for long. And of course, as we are involved in these organizing activities we ourselves are shaped: we become what we do. Non-hierarchical organizing activities construct us as confident, autonomous, innovative and creative individuals bound together by these collective, consensual, negotiated activities, activities in which leading is an intrinsic—and shared—part.

**Conclusion**

How have these five authors approached diversity in the workplace? What have they used as their analytical framework, and how helpful has this analytical framework been for understanding how we can all work together in our difference, in our infinite human variety?

In their analyses, Thomas, Stewart and Drakich, Semler, and Brown have all assumed some version of power as fixed and sovereign, a notion which has had a direct impact on their theorizing of diversity and hence on how to attain and maintain diversity in the workplace. Power as diffuse, ambiguous, capillary-like networks, as enabling, not only prohibiting, has not been considered. Nor has difference been considered in any other semblance than in its relationship to the same. In this conceptualization of difference, women lack symbolization except as the other which must be excluded and repressed in order that the category of the same might maintain its internal coherence—what Irigaray calls "the economy of the same".

Roosevelt Thomas uses metaphor as a unifying trope which prevents any analysis of how power circulates to construct difference or diversity as lesser at the same time as it constructs organizational hierarchy. He focuses on realigning the organizational culture to account for organizational diversity, substituting one form of management style, enabling, for another form, doing
for. Paradoxically, diversity among employees is to be marshalled to achieve harmony in the organization, and Thomas has no way to account for the relentless processes which construct and reconstruct both sameness and difference and their hierarchical relations. Culture and change are manipulable variables, agency is separate from structure, the outside consultant and the internal change agent are indispensable, and difference as a category can easily be expanded to extend to everyone. Power everywhere and difference as difference side by side and not as sameness suppressing difference are not part of what is, to him, an equation.

In his analysis, organizations are understood as "relatively homogeneous, integrated and unicultural" (Jeffcutt, 1994, p. 243), meaning that the culture of the organization is understood as a coherent category, as something which both acts as the glue which unifies the organization as well as symbolizes the organization. Thomas uses the metaphor of the tree, its roots and branches, in order to both exemplify the culture of the organization and to indicate what can be done—changing the roots rather than grafting strange fruit onto the existing branches. However, the use of metaphor is problematic. As a literary trope it is unifying and fixing. Nor does the use of metaphor allow for a sophisticated analysis of power: shifting discourses of power and knowledge which create the conditions by which a tree with roots is an appropriate representation is not admitted to. There's no way of analysing why this metaphor is used, what its use silences, how it fixes a particular representation to the benefit of some and not others, or how it is completely inapplicable for analysing how women and men are differently situated in the organization. Where are the sexually specific subjects who exist and work there? Where are the discourses of power and knowledge which position them differently, construct them
differently, which are impossible to pin down, which circulate as silently and efficaciously as blood in the body?

In Thomas' analysis culture as a fixed and unifying category is also something which can be revealed by the neutral and dispassionate observer/consultant who is able to strip away the layers to show the truth of the organization to itself, and thus provide a guide to what needs to be done. But that this guide is also an orientalizing discourse, that the outside consultant is also the professional stranger who interviews and then decides the truth which the natives are not privy to, is not admitted. Or that this guide, in the interests of presenting a unified truth, suppresses "division and disharmony" in order to privilege the "epic and romantic narrative" which the hero on the quest for truth requires, is not admitted (Jeffcutt, 1994, p. 250). Nor is it admitted that the outside consultant who knows, the professional stranger who constructs the orientalizing discourse, the romantic hero: all require the presence of women as the other in order that knowledge as it is constructed in Western thought (cf. Hekman, 1990), the idea of the Orient (cf. Said, 1978), and the romantic quest itself, may maintain their internal coherence. Difference as other and as lesser is structured into Thomas' analysis.

However, if culture is not something which we can reveal, show or interpret through the inspired use of metaphor, if is a way of representing the world to ourselves which we ourselves create, it is then a recursive process from which transcendence is not possible. If organizational culture is "relatively heterogeneous, diffuse and multicultural" (Jeffcutt, 1994, p. 243), if the observer stance is not possible and there is no truth to be revealed, discerned, or correctly interpreted, where is the outside consultant? What happens to the change agent if change is not to be pinned down, if it, like culture, is diffuse and ambiguous, if agency and structure both disappear into
capillary-like networks of power and knowledge, if organization can be read
like a text constructed within these networks of power and knowledge where
meaning is only temporary and retrospective, where then is managing
diversity, enabling, and efficiency?

If we follow Derrida (cf. Grosz 1990), texts inscribe order through
suppression and repression, and nothing can be separated from anything else,
not the author from the text, the reader from either. If we follow Foucault,
organizations themselves are discourses of power and knowledge; the point is
not to ask What is this truth?, but What are the conditions which enabled this
truth to be labelled as such? We might ask ourselves then if what Thomas
postulates is even possible, or if it is inherently contradictory. For difference
to be labelled as such, it depends on sameness. Neither could exist without the
other. Thomas's analysis depends on reason freeing the organization from the
bonds of power which determine difference as lesser; his faith in education--in
the triumph of reason--and in enabling, which is still power as domination,
only with the sharp edges less apparent, indicate that. However, he fails to
grapple with the inherent contradiction of his analysis: without confronting the
processes which construct difference as both other and as lesser, and thus
which continuously create and recreate hierarchical relations, his focus on
enabling will come to naught. The criteria which create difference remain, and
humanist organizational theory becomes merely manipulative.

In their analysis of how diversity might be achieved at universities,
Stewart and Drakich recommend that the rules and regulations of a hierarchical
institution like a university be turned inside out and used against themselves:
first, to show that the explicit intent of these rules to ensure fairness in the
hiring and retention process can be doubled over to ensure diversity, and
second, to show that this doubling over can expose the old boys' network
embedded in these rules to reveal the contradiction at their heart: affirmative action for men. Although Stewart and Drakich use a version of the formal versus the informal structure for their analysis, this strategy of using the rules and regulations against themselves can be more usefully analysed using Derrida and the pleasures of the text, but embedded in Foucauldian notions of organizations as networks of power and knowledge, and extended to include Irigaray’s focus on creating a space in the symbolic order for women. That rules can be overturned to reveal the repression and exclusion of the subordinate term which allows the whole edifice to stand—as Irigaray points out the same dualistic structure which creates the domination of men and the subordination of women—is ultimately a more useful way to analyse how diversity can be achieved in organizations.

Thus these rules and regulations, the mutinae of power, are both the place of resistance and the place of advancement; they both keep women in their place and can be used to free women; they are contradictory in intent and ambiguous. It is in these rules that the coherence of the organization is most clearly revealed to be based on the necessary exclusion and repression of women through the interstices of power, the what and where of power, not the who, the rules and regulations, not the people. Using the rules against themselves rather than focusing on the people who hold the position seems to be the more successful approach to achieving diversity, and perhaps more permanent. But these rules and regulations are also nodes in the networks of power and knowledge which are our organizations. These networks enable some to advance feminist goals, like the top administrators and others sympathetic to feminism as well as feminist lobby groups; and they enable others to oppose these goals, like the university president who saw equity proposals as reverse discrimination.
However, just as Weedon (1987) has pointed out that Derridean analysis lacks a theory of power, Dorothy Smith (1990) points out that Foucault's analysis lacks an ontology, a bodily presence, a point which a large number of other feminist theorists have reiterated (cf. Deveaux, 1994). Without a bodily presence, Foucault is incapable of analysing either specific sexual oppression, or systemic oppression, like the lack of demographic diversity in the institution of the university.

The Irigarayan analysis directly confronts that lack of specific bodily presence in both Derrida and Foucault. If women are not symbolized, if they lack symbolic representation, if we lack ways of understanding what women might do or how they might act because women still exist in the state of nature, it is only in creating that symbolic representation for women—not discovering, but creating—that we may have a place for women as women in institutions without demanding either that women be the same as men—Irigaray's economy of the same—or the same as all other women, a fixed, unified and ultimately confining category of woman. Instead it is contiguity, in metonymy, in symbolizing in new and creative ways our incredible human variety, that we find a place for women. It is not enough to overturn the rules and regulations of an institution to be used against itself, not enough to understand how discourses of power and knowledge are both the organization itself and that which enables us to think about the organization in the way that we do. Only in symbolizing women differently, and not as the necessary other which enables man to achieve its coherence, can we find a place for ourselves in the organization.

Ricardo Semler wishes to negate the effects of power by removing power from the structure of the organization, from the position held or the credentials required. To Semler, power as domination is effectively negated by
restructuring alone. Without an oppressive structure, workers are free. His notion of power is similar to Baumann's description of the dentistry state (cf. Jermier & Clegg, 1994); power is intrusive and violent, but can be avoided; the king and his troops are not always out. But to follow Foucault and his dispute with the notion of power as sovereign, if power is everywhere and nowhere, if power is disciplinary and normalizing, power does not disappear in the act of restructuring. Power simply assumes a different guise, amorphous, ambiguous, reappearing in the self-policing subject, the subject who disciplines himself and who has internalized the capitalist goals. The workers police themselves and each other, they become stand-ins for the absent boss. As Stewart Clegg points out, we can use the notion of the self-policing subject as a way of theorizing power in organizations; we can see these subjects who constantly regard "themselves, their labour processes, their products and practices, from the singular auspices of zero defects as a discourse organizationally implanted into them" (Jermier & Clegg, 1994, p. 7). To Clegg it is a form of "neurotic subjectivity" (Ibid, p. 7), an analysis which is very similar to the linking of self-policing, women, and shame of Sandra Bartky (1990). In Semler's theorization of power, the boss never really disappears, and mutual policing is no substitute for mutual cooperation.

Semler's theorization of power extends to his categorization of identities as merely tribal. Identity is irrelevant because the goal is the flattening of organizational hierarchies. Differences in status or position are bad, rules and regulations as sites of power are bad, but people, grouping or being grouped or categorized is irrelevant. However, categorization as a site of power that interpellates identities is not irrelevant, as Semler would have it. It is another site where difference as lesser is constructed, and through which hierarchical relations are created and sustained. Semler, for all his discussion of
hierarchy, overlooks the most obvious of all, the domination of men and the subordination of women, apparent even in his own factory. His analysis rests on the elimination of difference among men by understanding difference as encased in credentials, in position, in status. That this lacunae in his theorization of eliminating power differences among people working together does not extend beyond eliminating the differences between father and son, the rule of the church replaced by the Enlightenment, where equality is presumed among all men but the women are left out, means that hierarchical structuring will inevitably reappear. The son freeing himself from the omniscient and omnipresent father may be an easily discernable sub-text, but the role of a sister and what restructuring might mean for her in the absence of any notice of how sameness/difference is constructed, is left unattended. Although he points out that the metaphor of one big happy family forces everyone into either parental or children’s roles, he does not attend to any of the very different roles occupied by mothers as opposed to fathers, sisters to brothers, and what a rereading of tribalism might necessitate in order to grapple with that.

Brown’s stance on minimizing difference is neither Foucauldian nor Irigarayan, although negotiated order theory, in its emphasis on flux and indeterminacy and on meaning as temporary and retrospective, is similar to the concerns of Derrida, as well as to Habermas and his theory of communicative action (cf. Brown, 1991; Burrell, 1994). In that focus on the negotiated social order, both deconstruction and particularly critical humanism share a concern with the unifying nature of culture (cf. Jermier & Clegg, 1994). As Jeffcutt points out, in critical humanism "culture is . . . theorized as a creative expression of the inhabitants of a particular setting, a symbolizing process which is amorphous, transient and sensual. . . . a
communal possession, a meaning system through which disintegrative forces are mediated and negotiated order pursued" (1994, p. 244).

However, in this theorization of culture, power and diversity, if culture is unifying it is also and at the same time exclusionary and repressive. Something must be both excluded and repressed so that the dominant term may attain and maintain its coherence. And in that process of exclusion and repression, in that projection onto the excluded and repressed other that which we most hate and fear in ourselves and by which we create difference, lies the means by which hierarchy continually reasserts itself. In this analysis of culture, power and diversity, there is no room for discord, for ambiguity, for flux. Culture as a unifying force suppresses the "heterogeneity" (Jeffcutt, 1994, p. 256) which characterizes organizing activity and suppresses conflict between those who are different from the most privileged, however the most privileged are defined. This fixity which underlies this idea of culture is inevitably repressive, not the least to the diversity which Brown wishes to encourage.

Brown attempts to deal with the inherent contradiction between the unifying nature of the negotiated social order and diversity or difference in the workplace by focusing on the notion of distributed power, or power shared in the form of shared skills, including the skill of leading. By distributing leading, Brown is attempting to ensure that leading cannot reside in one person or in one position, and that hierarchy cannot reconstitute itself through the privileging of one particular position or person associated with leading. To Brown, organizing is an ongoing process composed of organizing activities. These organizing activities must be distributed or shared: all are skilled, and leading is an organizational skill which is just somewhat more skilled than others. Decision making, which is part of leading, is a process of negotiating,
hence the term negotiated order. By all taking part, all negotiating, all making decisions, all leading, we construct the social order or the organization in which we work.

However, as Blackmore (1989) and Calas and Smircich (1989) have pointed out, although in different ways, the reconstitution of hierarchy and the concomitant--and seemingly paradoxical--demand that everyone be the same is a subtle process. To Blackmore, theories about leadership are embedded in notions of how men should act and are based on men’s experiences, whether they are trait or behavioural; there is no place for women other than as subordinate. To Calas and Smircich, leadership is based on the exclusion and repression of seduction, a denial of the female which allows an exclusionary male dominated form of leadership to stand defended. What exists in both analyses is the economy of the same: the coherence of leadership depends on the exclusion of women.

Although Brown attempts to rectify that exclusion by focusing on the notion of distributed leadership, because it continues to depend on the idea of power as sovereign, as fixed and therefore divisible into parts--distributed--her argument is undercut both by Foucault’s notion of power everywhere and Irigaray’s idea of the necessity of symbolizing women, that we might understand women as other than only the nurturing mother, that women might relate to each other not only as mothers and daughters, but in other ways in which men do not play a part. The skill of leading, shared among many, cannot overlook the necessity of creating new myths through which women might talk about leading in order to lead in ways that have not yet been thought.

I have argued that power operates to construct and reconstruct hierarchy in organizations through the construction of hierarchical relations among the
different, not only as other than the same, but as lesser than the same. I believe that instead of the inevitable suppression of difference which is the outcome of hierarchical relations, difference as something other than lesser is possible only if difference is constructed as contiguity, or as difference side by side. Hierarchical relations in organizations, then, could not exist along with difference side by side; conversely, hierarchical relations in organizations will inevitably reconstruct difference as lesser. Organizing activities, including the activity of leading, which do not construct and reconstruct hierarchical relations are only possible if they are put into play by sexually specific subjects who exist in contiguity, side by side, where difference is symbolized rather than suppressed so that we may maintain the masquerade of the same. Contiguity also contains an inevitably political dimension, in that contiguous relations are not hierarchical. Just as contiguity is about difference in relational form without rank, without suppression, so can power be relational rather than hierarchical as it takes form in capillary like networks, allegiances, alliances, enabling contiguous relations among people who are infinitely variable. Rather than denying difference, or privileging difference, we need to rethink difference if we are ever going to work together where getting things done can be an actual goal rather than a mask for power held by a few.
Bibliography


150 Word Biography
Collette Oseen has a doctorate in feminist/postmodernist organizational theory from the University of Alberta. Since completing her doctorate, she has worked as an organizational equity consultant. Previously she taught in Northern China and at the University of Alberta. Her research focuses on the processes through which women are marginalized in organizations.

^Unlike Derrida, to Foucault not everything is discourse; he sees discourse, non-discursive events, and effects. In terms of discourse, “power utilizes strategies for the production of truth and the disqualification of non-truths”; at the level of non-discursive events, power establishes technologies "that inscribe themselves on the bodies and behaviours of subjects”; “at the level of events, power establishes programmes, forms of extraction of knowledge and information that help constitute at particular moments in time, overarching more global systems"(Grosz, 1990, p. 89).

^For both Foucault and for Semler I use that pronoun advisedly; neither of their analyses has a place for women.