VII. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS:

From a feminist/postmodernist perspective: How Diane, Ellen, Alan and Frank came to know the organization

INTRODUCTION

I maintain that coming to know cannot be separated from relations of power between women and men, and that these relations of power and knowledge and gender expressed in language, these strategies of discourse, masquerade as the rational and purposeful construction of the organization. Like Derrida, who points out to us that the "limitless instability" of language is repressed in order to ground truth and certainty, that the internal coherence of the hierarchical dualities of Enlightenment thought are predicated on repression, I maintain that the internal coherence of the organization, like language itself, depends on the suppression of the [demonized] Other. The irrational, the episodic, the unpredictable, the indeterminate, flux, are repressed so that the organization might appear coherent, rational, predictable, purposeful, unified. But none of these definitions or meanings are fixed except as strategies of discourse attempt to fix them, and they are therefore sites of both domination and resistance. Neither are these strategies which attempt to either maintain or demolish the internal coherence of the organization fixed, stable or sovereign. Like Foucault, I argue that they are all pervasive, sited in the body, disciplinary rather than punishing in their intent. What we call the organization is a war of manoeuvre where nothing is sacred, where everything can be redefined, where neither power nor knowledge nor gender can be removed from the construction of relations between women and men.

Thus a feminist/postmodernist position on how the newcomer comes to know maintains that the internal coherence of the organization depends on the suppression of the other, the definition of which is not fixed but constantly redefined within a play of
power and knowledge and gender which both remembers and denies the power of the hierarchical dualities of the Enlightenment which imprison us still. This suppression can take many forms—it is suppression that is all pervasive, rather than specifically located, and therefore cannot be resisted from one specific point. This is a feminist position which draws on both Derrida and Foucault and their theoretical dismantling of fixity and unity: on Derrida and his attempts to disentangle form and meaning, to liberate us in an endless play of differance from reliance on any external reference point, and in so doing, to point out to us that power resides in the suppression of the demonized other, in the internal coherence which gives fixity its stability; and on Foucault, who maintains not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous. To Foucault power does not arise from a specific site; like Derrida, he argues for the inherent totalitarianism of fixity, of any transcendental reference point: reason, the all-knowing fully present self, language which legitimates itself by referring to the metanarrative which already knows. Instead, power resides in strategies of discourse, the nexus of power and knowledge expressed in language, where nothing can be fixed, where everything is under attack, where no position is completely safe, no theory wholly benevolent, no knowledge fully innocent. In this position, the organization is understood, not as rational, fixed, purposeful, but as an episodic and unpredictable play of domination and resistance, of disciplinary discourses positioning us as they [partially] define us, neither the definition nor the position fixed except as a site of power, both the definition and the position constantly fought over and resisted as we are disciplined rather than punished in carceral institutions where men are in power and women are not.

In this feminist/postmodernist position I focus on how the containment of the Other is maintained through strategies of discourse which arise, as both Weedon and Smith point out, in the sensuous, material conditions of our lives, never located in one site alone, be it patriarchy, or the control of production or reproduction, or the law, or in language. The Other is itself never completely defined, never fixed; it is constructed and
maintained within Enlightenment dualities which are discourses of power and knowledge, women and men occupying a shifting terrain which attempts to ground what has been defined as opposites within the Enlightenment discourse. In feminist/postmodernist discourse, how is the containment of the Other as a structuring principle maintained? How does the newcomer come to know the organization which depends on this containment of the Other where neither the self nor power nor language nor the organization exist as other than sites which cannot be fixed nor unified, but where history is more than a memory, where the body has a physical boundary although reality does not, where the denial of fixity in all its forms is itself a strategy of discourse which seeks to suppress our knowledge of the confinement of women to otherness?

**STRATEGIES OF DISCOURSE AND THE CONTAINMENT OF 'THE OTHER': THE SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN AND THE DOMINATION OF MEN**

I will argue in the following pages that strategies of discourse both create people and position them in the organization, that they create them as knowers and create what they might know, that these strategies of discourse either position people so they "fit in" or they do not, and that this in inseparable from the creation and positioning of women as subordinate, men as dominant*. I will advance the argument that the organization as we know it is predicated on the suppression of the other, of women, that it couldn't exist as it is without the suppression of the other, of women; that by confining women not just to otherness but to subordination, men know who they are,

* Or as Calas and Smircich (1990) put it, our organizations are sustained, not by "essential 'truthfulness'", but by what the organization has "ignored or tied to suppress"; this institutionalized discourse is not "truth, but a cozy arrangement" (p. 35). They go on to point out that "what comes to the fore in Ferguson's (1984) work, as well as in Joanne Martin's (1990) feminist critique of bureaucracy, is the multiple patterns of subordination/domination that sustain the apparent neutrality and unity of a traditional organizational form" (p. 39).
the existentialist argument of Simone de Beauvoir reinterpreted through Derrida and Foucault.

Diane

How was Diane both created and positioned within the organization as strategies of discourse attempted to construct or resist the state of otherness upon which the internal coherence of the organization depended? How was what she could know defined by the strategies of discourse which arose in the "practical activities" of work, to use Dorothy Smith’s phrase?

To Diane, coming to know the organization was inextricably linked to learning that to be a success—to fit in—she had to act like a man, even if, as a woman, she couldn't act like a man, that it was impossible, given the strictures of the organization. But she didn't think that initially. She thought that what she had to do was to do her work well, to do her work "efficiently" and "rationally". Instead, what she found out was that status and hierarchy were far more important than efficiency and rationality. What counted was proving to everyone how busy you were, how your work was the most important and had to be done first, and how nothing was more important than work, and that you proved that by spending long hours at work, and long hours after work socializing with your peers. All of this was based on the maintenance of a gender hierarchy—where women and men did not do the same things, and if they did, women acted like men—that could not change without destabilizing the internal coherence of the firm, without jeopardizing how everything hung together, how everything happened as it did, how people were disciplined rather than punished within the normalizing institution of the firm itself.

But none of this Diane knew—she came to know it as strategies of discourse, constantly shifting, ensured that the women were both isolated from each other, (the construction of allegiances between women are a possible source of power), as well as
ensured that women were marginalized within the organization, by defining their work as lesser because women did it. To do things differently from men meant to do them incorrectly; it threatened the stability—the internal coherence—of the firm. The male lawyers who held the power in the organization told her, 'Lawyers don't type', but it was a strategy of discourse that constructed gender as well as hierarchy: if lawyers don't type, the rigid barriers between secretaries [all women] and the lawyers [mostly men, the powerful partners all men] were maintained. As long as the sexes were separated like that, it prevented women from constructing allegiances, prevented women from working together, maintained not just hierarchy, but gender hierarchy, what a 1991 United Nations report referred to as "the apartheid of gender". To work too closely, too equally, with a secretary ensured that a woman lawyer would not be seen as suitable; she would be too closely identified with the woman/servant/secretary. Diane found it difficult to act like a man, to treat the secretaries like servants, and to treat her work as the most important around. She found it difficult to adhere to 'status and hierarchy' which governed the relationship with the secretaries rather than 'rationality and efficiency'; Diane wished to work with the secretaries as equals, rather than in the feudal way that the firm employed (cf. Kanter, 1977), which tied specific secretaries to specific lawyers. If Diane treated the secretaries as equals, she threatened male dominance, where maintaining relations of female deference and subordination and male dominance

*Cf. The State of the World's Children 1992, Unicef. This report stated that "'the apartheid of gender' is an 'injustice on a far greater scale than the apartheid system that has aroused the fervent and sustained opposition of the international community in recent decades'. Yet the world seems to accept that rights to jobs, social security, property, health care and civil liberties can depend 'upon the accident of being born male or female'" (The Globe and Mail, Friday, December 13, 1991, p. A1). Gertrude Goldberg (1990), in her study of Canadian women and poverty, points out that in Canada "the level of occupational segregation is much higher for women than for all but the most highly segregated ethnic groups" (p. 62). In 1988 3/5ths of Canadian women worked in only three areas, all of them poorly paid: clerical, service and sales (p. 69). She goes on to point out that using the American poverty standard, the poverty rate for one parent families was 42.9% in the U.S., 35.3% in Canada, but only 7.5% in Sweden (p. 76).
was more important than getting the work done, although rationality and efficiency was theoretically what was important in the organization with its emphasis on "timeliness" and being "results oriented". Diane was told that she was not results oriented, which she took to mean that she didn't have her work done on time, but she wasn't allowed to go to other secretaries, she was discouraged from typing the work herself, and the senior lawyer took precedence, in that his work came first. Unless she shouted and screamed, maintaining that her work was more important, (how could she, since she was only an articling student) there seemed to be no way that she could get her work done on time. She was enmeshed by strategies of discourse that both required her to act like a man, but didn't allow her to act like a man because she was a woman, and as a woman, she was expected to defer to men.

Diane 'knew', given the explicit emphasis on billable hours as a measure of productivity and worth, that she needed to get her work done quickly. She also 'knew', because she was told, that she couldn't do the tasks a secretary was supposed to do, because the other lawyers told her ('Betty, you sure look different'). The solution was that she ask Murray, a more senior lawyer with whom she shared a secretary, for permission for her work to be done first, but this was a solution that first and foremost served to maintain the gender hierarchy within the firm. The strategy of discourse—the nexus of power and knowledge put into play to keep Diane in her place—incorporated a hierarchy of gender that was created and recreated both inside and outside the firm in the daily realities of everyone's lives. Murray could and did value his work higher than Diane's; Diane, given the emphasis on gender hierarchy that this incident underlined, had no other recourse but to bow to Murray's higher status. Diane's problem with the secretaries, if you could call it that, was at bottom, how were those women treated, and how might she expect to be treated? If they were subordinate, linked to the lawyer they worked for in ways more feudal than "rational and efficient", if deference rather than an explicit job description was more important to fitting in, what did that mean for Diane as
she struggled to find her place in the firm? How was she to get her work done if she couldn't do it herself, couldn't get another, less busy secretary to do it for her, and had to defer to Murray, who to maintain his own status, had to maintain that his work had to take priority over hers?

Diane never knew how to treat the support staff, in that she was never sure what she was supposed to do, and what they were supposed to do. In the context of the firm, it appears that the support staff had no defined jobs; they did what the lawyers told them to do, strategies of discourse which constantly shifted to maintain the subordination of the women. Diane's problem was that she was constantly trying to figure out a job description when there wasn't one, and without a clearly defined job description, she decided that the best way to treat the secretaries was as equals. But that didn't take into consideration that deference and subordination were an unwritten part of the secretaries' job. Just like a wife has no clearly defined job description, neither did the secretaries. The lack of a clearly defined job description meant that the subordination of the support staff [all female] was easier to maintain, just like the strict divisions between what the secretaries did and what the lawyers did worked to maintain the subordination of women, because without strict divisions, how could the vast differences in pay and status be justified, how could deference and subordination be an unwritten but required part of the job? And as long as deference and subordination were linked to the state of being female, not only being a secretary, it was going to have implications for the women lawyers as well.

But even if Diane attempted to act like the male lawyers, the rules—another word for strategies of discourse—were different for the female lawyers, so she felt that no matter what she did it was the wrong thing to do. As Deborah Cameron has ascerbically noted, "women's place is in the wrong". This rule difference extended to how the working relationship between a female secretary and a female lawyer might be perceived. Even if a female lawyer were to copy the way a male lawyer worked with his secretary,
there was no guarantee that this similarity would work to the female lawyer's advantage in the discourse of the firm. As Diane pointed out, a male partner in the firm with an extremely competent female secretary who did a great deal of his work was seen as a brilliant intellectual with his head in the clouds, too brilliant to be bothered with details; a female lawyer, even with the same extremely competent secretary who did the same amount of work, would be seen as incompetent and lazy. Same scenario, different gender, different meaning, but meaning constructed in such a way, in strategies of discourse, in the nexus of power and knowledge and gender arising out of our daily lives, that kept women in their place, that constructed an equation between subordination and being female.

Strategies of discourse which emphasized that the firm was "one big happy family" were also strategies which subordinated women, because being in a family has different implications for women than for men: they work more and longer hours but their work is invisible, or not counted as work (are you still puttering in the kitchen?), and they are subordinate to the father in the family, patriarchy in the family carried over to patriarchy on the job. Strategies of discourse constantly created and recreated subordination for women, domination for men: women were supposed to serve men, they were there to do what the men wanted, they were linked to one man in a feudal relationship where deference was more easily demanded, rather than to many men where it might be less easy to have such a loosely defined job description.

Within that sense of "one big happy family" the male lawyers also expected that all the lawyers live their lives the way the male lawyers did, which was predicated on wives staying at home with the kids because the men made a healthy income. For women lawyers, just given the statistics, life was much more difficult—husbands don’t do most or nearly all of the housework and childcare the way middle class wives do, nor do their
husbands necessarily make the same healthy incomes male lawyers might*. For example, when a sympathetic male lawyer asked Diane, 'How are your nanny problems?', she told me, 'They are so out of touch with my reality'. She felt that even the nice guys had no conception of what her world was, so the words that she used that arose out of her world—the material conditions of Smith and Marx—had no relevancy. They didn't mean anything to him. Why would he assume that she had enough money to have a nanny? As an articling lawyer, she couldn't pay for one on the salary she earned, so to her he must have meant that she had a husband earning enough money so the two of them together could afford a nanny—which was not the case. But his remark, "How are your nanny problems?", meant to express sympathy, also embedded, made more concrete, the dominant discourse of the law firm: that women had nannies, which rested on the assumption of high incomes, but more importantly, rested on the assumption that the women in the firm did the same amount of home work that the men in the firm did; that men's common experiences were also the women's. Either the wives, or the wife surrogates—the nannies and the housekeepers—or in some cases the mothers, because some of the male lawyers still lived at home, as Alan did, took care of all the work

* According to Brockman (1992) in a survey of the active members of the Law Society of Alberta, "The profession's lack of accommodation for family commitments affects both women and men; however, women still bear the brunt of this. . . . Of those respondents who worked full time and had children requiring care, the women spent a median of 35.0 hours a week on such care, the men a median of 15.0 hours a week. The women provided a median of 40% of the time required for their children needing care, whereas men provided a median of 25% of such time. Women reported that the persons with whom they lived contributed a median of 20% of the care required for their children, whereas the men reported that the persons with whom they lived contributed a median of 66% of such care" (p. viii). However, in spite of those extra hours spent on childcare by female lawyers compared to male lawyers, female lawyers billed slightly more median hours than their male counterparts: 1400 to 1300 (mean 1322 to 1321 respectively). However, although women billed more hours than men, their incomes were substantially less (median income for women: $55,500 to $77,000 for men; mean income for women: $63,518 to $94,314 for men. As Brockman points out, "measured by both mean and median, the men in this survey earned more than the women of every call year except for those called in 1990-91" (p. 26-27).
necessary to get the lawyers fed, watered and off to work, paid the bills, looked after the kids. The women lawyers had to become surrogate men, in that they lived in the same way, both at home and at work, surrounded by women servants disguised as wives, mothers, nannies, and at work, as secretaries. If the women lawyers couldn’t afford to hire nannies and housekeepers, if they put in, on average, an extra 50 hours a week on childcare and housework, their husbands an average of 20 hours, there was no discourse by which this might be recognized*. The dominant discourse defined male and law as inseparable; that dominant discourse also rendered invisible women's different experiences, and by rendering those differences invisible, hidden behind the theoretically genderless lawyer who was actually male, helped to maintain the subordination of women.

In order to fit in Diane had to act like a man; strategies of discourse operated in such a way as to maintain the link between women and subordination and men and domination. Act like a man and be dominant, act like a woman and be subordinate. That there were real difficulties for Diane to act like a man were simply seen as the price a woman lawyer had to pay. Treat the secretaries the way the men did—as servants, to do what they’re told, not as equals—never do what the secretaries do, because that might blur the line between secretary and lawyer, female and male, might call into question the sexual subordination that was at the heart of the firm, the "I know who I am

*As Susan Faludi (1991) has pointed out, contrary to popular myth, women "complain to pollsters about a lack of economic, not marital opportunities; they protest that working men, not working women, fail to spend time in the nursery and the kitchen" (p. xv). She goes on to point out, quoting from Arlie Hochschild's *The Second Shift* (1989), that "Hochschild's 12 year survey, from 1976 to 1988, found that the men who said they were helping tended to be ones who did the least" (p. 463). In Hochschild's study, working class men did more at home and talked about it less than middle class men, who talked about equality, but did little. Certainly Hochschild's major point is startling: despite the vast numbers of women working in the 1980's who are married and have children, there has been little change—and even less for middle class men compared to lower class men—in the number of hours per week husbands and fathers devote to housework and childcare.
because I have the power to define you, and you are the other”. To dismantle that
would be to dismantle the firm itself, although paradoxically people might get their work
done quicker, it might actually be more efficient and more rational if there were not such
rigid definitions, linked to the men and women, lawyers and secretaries, about who did
what. Men needed their domination fix so they knew who they were, but where did
women lawyers fit in? To define themselves as women, did they ally themselves with the
other women, or did they dominate the other women in order to define themselves as
women? What might have been integral and necessary to the men made no sense to
Diane, but if she was going to fit in, it was going to be necessary that she do the same
things as the men, live in the same way.

ALAN

To Alan, in order to fit in, to be like the others, to be like the men who controlled
the organization, following the rules meant getting married, buying a house, having
children, which had very different implications for men than for women. For the men it
meant status, acceptance, a recognition of stability and heterosexuality. For the women
this strategy of discourse meant the assumption of doubtful allegiance, not greater
acceptance; it meant more work, more calls on a limited amount of time, since women
did not have wives. They had husbands, who did not have the children, look after them,
and do the housework, which even male lawyers with wives who worked outside the
home could generally depend on. The implicit assumptions about the way men do things
as the way ‘everybody’ does things, marginalizes women. So, for example, Alan's law
firm, which emphasized marriage, made it more difficult for women, because women
have more work to do at home than men, are more criticized if they don’t do that work,
and held responsible in ways that fathers are not for children. It also demands, in a
fashion that is rendered subtle only because it cannot be discussed, that women follow a
pattern, based on billable hours and no long absences, that puts them at a disadvantage
compared to men with wives. What was seen as a neutral requirement was a way of constituting subordination for women, because Alan gave no indication that there was any change in the organization of the firm itself, no recognition that women still had different demands on their time that the men did not face, no recognition that the way things were done in the firm depended on wives providing the necessary labour for the requirement that everyone be married, with a mortgage and kids.*

If one strategy of discourse which emphasized marriage constituted the maintenance of subordination for women, another strategy of discourse that ensured the continued subordination of women was Alan’s denial that there was any discrimination against women in the firm#. He maintained that there was none. This denial worked to men’s advantage; if there was no discrimination, then change wasn’t needed. The firm didn’t need to do anything differently; everything could continue on as it always had, the women hadn’t made any difference. The unspoken assumption was that women had been added, but the organization itself did not have to change—the reason, of course that the organization did not have to change was that the women were forced to act like the men if they wished to succeed.

Alan admitted that the firm continued to hire people who were pretty much the same as those who have been hired before, and although he stated that things were changing, that it was much more competitive out there than it once was, he also admitted that the firm was going to try to change from within, not from without by

* According to Teresa Goulet (1992) in her summary of the Alberta survey of active lawyers, more male respondents than female respondents were married, fewer men than women were divorced, many more men than women had spouses who were not employed, more men than women had children (p. 9).

# In the summary of the survey of Alberta lawyers, Goulet noted that ”an overwhelming majority of the respondents in this survey (97.2% of the women and 77.6% of the men) were of the view that there was some bias or discrimination against women in the legal profession. Of those who thought bias against women existed, most of the men (53.8% as compared to 25.3% of the women) thought it was not widespread, while most of the women (55.2% as compared to 19.2 % of the men) thought it was widespread, but subtle and difficult to detect (1992, p. 11).
hiring different people. That this was a way of ensuring that the dominant discourse, inseparable from the dominant men who ran the firm, remained firmly entrenched, Alan did not explore.

Neither was Alan aware that his admittance to the dominant discourse, to conversations, or that his acceptance of the hierarchical relationship between secretary and lawyer were not problematic to him was because he was a man, like most of the lawyers in the firm**. This was a strategy of discourse which rendered invisible both the particular problems of women and the gender hierarchy, because he assumed that it was this easy for everyone new to the firm, and not that it might be—as it was for Diane—fraught with much more difficulty if one were a woman, one who might not find it so easy to be admitted into conversations where one can catch the gist of the approach in thirty seconds, where the relationship between lawyer and secretary is taken for granted, where everyone understands the intent of the Christmas skit. To Alan, fitting in wasn't going to be difficult—it meant acting like everyone else—but everyone else was also male, and if they weren't male, they acted in male ways, treated the secretaries in male ways, worked in male ways, got married in male ways.

Both Diane and Alan struggled with the word lawyer and with what it meant. Who is a lawyer? To Alan, a lawyer is someone who is married, with family responsibilities, a mortgage, necessary responsibilities so you just don't get up one day and leave, "go do something else". These are words which also mean stable, committed, traditional, doing things at the right time. Having a baby at the beginning of your articling year indicates poor timing, an unwillingness to do things in the way the firm wants, something one of his fellow articling students did, a fellow who wasn't kept on. For young men wishing to be kept on with the firm doing things the way the firm wants ensures that they are seen

** What Goulet diplomatically terms "career advancement and attaining partnership were the most frequently cited forms of bias against women mentioned by women and men", although only 42% of the men compared to over 80% of the women believed that there was "unequal opportunity for career advancement" for women (1992, p. 14).
as stable, committed and traditional, all qualities the firm valued. Unfortunately, all of those ideas held very different implications for women, resting as it did on a very traditional division of labour in both private and public lives, one that women found much more difficult to accommodate, but one within the dominant discourse of the firm, could not be discussed. Strategies of discourse which required women to act like men constituted the continued subordination of women in the firm as long as the organization did not change, as long as the dominant discourse could pretend that it was possible for women to act exactly like men, and on that premise, admit them in.

ELLEN

The strategy of discourse which operated to ensure Ellen’s subordination within her organization was that she had not lived her work life the way a man might have, however that might be defined by the powerful. What Ellen came to know was that none of her previous work was worthy of recognition and reward; she was classified with the other women in a male dominated organization as one of the secretaries, a strategy of discourse that in a circular way reinforced that all she was, was a marginally more educated secretary, because if she wasn’t, she would have been paid more and given a different title. As it was, because of what she was paid, and because of her title, what she knew was discounted. She could not get beyond her sex—that worked to discount her competency, her hard work, her previous education and her work experience. No matter what she did, she was not able to rise above who she was in the organization itself—her position meant that she was support staff. She was marginalized, she was never going to fit in, because she had not done what a man might have done, nor was she able to have what she had done over the last twenty years recognized as important and valuable.

If Diane couldn’t fit in, if her subordination in her organization was ensured because she couldn’t do things the same way men did them, if Alan was going to be able to fit in
because doing the right thing was easy, for Ellen it was too late to fit in—she hadn't done the right things over the past twenty years, what the right things were defined by those in power. Diane could fit in if she acted like a man—as difficult as that might be, it was still possible. Ellen couldn't fit in because her chance was past, and the strategies of discourse which operated in the organization, operated in such a way as to pin her to what might have been, and what she could not overcome. For her, fitting in meant accepting what little there was for her. In Ellen's case, the lack of opportunities were cumulative; what she should have done at 25, 30, 35, 40, what a man might have done at those ages, or a woman following the same path as men, Ellen had not, and she wasn't going to catch up. The strategies of discourse which reinforced that were the ones which Ellen constantly referred to: how the kinds of jobs that she had held previously weren't seen as relevant, that competence and hard work didn't matter, but that being well-connected, and in particular being male, was what really counted, not the diverse kinds of work experiences that a middle-aged woman might accumulate. Strategies of discourse which denied the value of those work experiences, that narrowly defined what work was in ways that were much easier for men to accumulate than women, worked to subordinate Ellen.

These conditions of existence were expressed, in Foucault's term, as strategies of discourse, that nexus of power and knowledge through which we, the knowers, speak of what is known to us in ways that are only partially ours. Thus both Ellen and Diane spoke immediately of where women and men were placed in the organization and what that meant to them, in often painful ways as they became more and more knowledgeable about where their "real" place might be in the organization. For Ellen it became apparent on a number of levels that her real place was not where she thought it was, a slow constricting of what had been initially imagined possibilities and which over the course of a year took shape as a naive caricature—looking around her, how could she have imagined that for her, that things would be different, that competence would matter!
She related at length how puzzling the way competence was defined in the organization, how many excuses were made by her own boss for her younger male colleague, who in her eyes didn't work hard, nor did he know very much, her two criteria for competence. If he didn't work very hard or know very much—both areas where she felt sure of herself—then perhaps being young and male was more important than she had thought: "I took for granted that structures worked the way you thought they did, but then you get in and quite quickly see what you see and you don't . . . like the feeling".

Ellen also talked about how cavalierly salary was used as a way of maintaining the gender hierarchy, how cavalierly salary related to credentials, credentials in her mind linking directly to a salary grid, and in particular, how little experience was granted her, although she had spent all of her adult life working, but at different jobs. What women did, it seemed, was not regarded as "real" experience, something that Ritti (1985) alluded to in his article on who gets hired and why. She talked of an all-female department, unable to find a suitable candidate, which raised the salary by $10,000 and hired a man, prompting Ellen to comment that "One thing you know, the value that the institution puts on us, is what they pay us for what we do. That tells us what they think of us, and . . . that's not a very good feeling because . . . we're not paid very well". This was the meaning that Ellen attached to the raised salary and the subsequent hiring of a man.

In another case, she comments on how those in power in the organization—the men—could just dispense with the criteria determining how much someone will be paid—a woman with a masters' getting paid less than a woman without, in this case—and how that "discouraged me, or made me feel sad that it could happen". She goes on to comment that what that did is made her think that "no matter what, no matter what your structure, no matter how rigidly defined, still up there, people do what they want to, there's a certain leeway granted". The "inkblot" which she referred to at the beginning, where "all you see is black and white" is changing: "then the more you look at
it, the more you discern shapes and nuances of black". Her inkblot is a place where what she thought: "get an education, work hard" is being replaced by a place where the men on the top, all "tall, slim and athletic, and not necessarily there because they have the biggest brains, the best brains" is the message communicated to her through the hiring procedures, her knowledge of how people get paid, how little the women get paid compared to the men, how little the procedures linking salary to credentials and experience really seem to matter. Strategies of discourse are our organizations, and those strategies inform Ellen that there is very little opportunity there for her—those who succeed are young, well-spoken males who can play a game where if they play by the rules, they get rewarded. To her, being seen as competent is really just another way of being seen as subordinate. Speaking of one man she worked for, she says: "He doesn't call us girls, but I know he thinks of us as girls . . . If we keep him happy he will tell people we did a good job . . . He would say, I think, as long as I do things the ways he wants them, he'll say I can do my job".

For both Diane and Ellen the nexus of power and knowledge in the organizations which constructed what 'men' are and what 'women' are were inescapable—to be seen as competent, promotable, they would either have had to have been men, or would have, like transvestites, to so have acted like men as to have been indistinguishable from men, to have been just "one of the boys". However, most transvestites are men who, through the power of being able to define, to say "this is what this is", define women on their own terms—creatures who wear impossibly high heels, impossible make-up. How, in a society where men are the powerful ones, would women be able to even approach the transvestism implicit in acting like "a man", in implicitly stating, "this is what a man is, and I am acting like a man" and have her audience collude with her in the deception?

*The problem with the social construction of reality and with the symbolic interactionism which inform Garfinkel and Goffman and the work of their disciples is that their focus is, ipso facto, on the presentation of the self and how it is accomplished, not on the why of that particular self as a result of a particular set of relations of ruling or strategies of
If the infinite variety of human behaviours are carefully assigned to one or the other sex, what is available for the less powerful sex? The less fixed the assignment of those behaviours, the more latitude, the easier it is for the less powerful sex to challenge the remaining rigidities of definition, and in doing so, to challenge the more powerful sex in their assignment of those behaviours. Ellen felt that as an older woman her technical and potential managerial competence was either taken for granted, ignored, or granted to her younger male colleague—technical and managerial competencies were male prerogatives, not female prerogatives. Unable to shed who she was, she remained imprisoned within the institution's narrow definition of what a woman was. Her hard work and competence, she felt, were expected by her boss, but she wasn't seen as someone who was potential managerial material. Her much younger male colleague, less technically competent than she, much more preoccupied with outside matters, was seen as potential managerial material by their boss. Unaware that she had been hired as a support person—one of the servants, along with the secretaries, with poor pay and low power/knowledge that put that particular self in place. For example, in Garfinkel's (1967) famous analysis of the transvestite, he focuses on how this man, raised as a man, reproduces himself as a woman. My question when I reread that chapter in Garfinkel is why was the simpering sexuality, among other things, of womanhood simply taken for granted by Garfinkel and his cohorts? As Marjorie Garber (1991) points out in Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety, why was sexuality simply taken for granted as established: this biology produces this form of sexuality, this way of presenting ourselves as sexual beings, all unquestioned linear equations? Nor did Garfinkel ask an equally fascinating question—why would a man want to turn himself into such a repressed and powerless creature? If we are seen, by ourselves and by others, as confined to little boxes: this is what women do, this is what men do, transvestism is much more likely than if the possibilities of what women and men are is much more fluid. Unisex blurs the lines. As Garber points out, cross-dressing, transvestism, and transexualism depends on fixity, on rigid definitions of what a 'man' and a 'woman' mean. But the paradox of these rigid definitions, that their very rigidity creates the possibility for an explicit copy that everyone recognizes as 'real', is explored in a documentary that is both disturbing and liberatory. In this documentary on the New York drag balls, male transvestites compete to achieve 'realness' as female movie stars, college girls, et cetera. (Cf. Paris is Burning, 1991, Jennie Livingston, director). The documentary made me think of Gloria Steinem's ascerbic remark that women have been female impersonators for a long time.
status, and few promotional possibilities, Ellen felt hamstrung, unable to break free from people's preconceived notions of her capabilities, her desires, her need for challenge. The competence which she felt she displayed was simply overlooked by the men she worked for—it was simply expected, like dinner every night at six, its lateness the occasion for comment, not its continual presence. Only when she transgressed the bonds of womanhood—when she spoke her mind, as it were—was she criticized by her boss. As she pointed out, if she had been a man, would she have been criticized? She didn't think so. Only in being literally agreeable was her job easy—as long as she agreed with the ideas of one of her male superiors was the relationship easy, as she pointed out. To her, it wasn't whether or not she did her job well, she defining what well was, but whether or not this man presumed that she was in agreement with him, and by being in agreement with him, was therefore doing the job well. Agreement, agreeableness and competency were all linked together, in Ellen's eyes, but that left no place for her to define the job or its possibilities either. The challenge effectively disappeared. What Ellen learned was how unimportant her competence was, and how important it was to be a man if you wanted to be seen as someone who had the "right stuff"—Tom Wolfe's words about the all male astronauts of the American space program.

FRANK

For Frank it was nearly the opposite. Strategies of discourse which subordinated women by discounting their experiences as relevant work experiences secured a dominant position for men by determining that whatever they had done was worthy of recognition and reward. Frank talked again and again about how all his life experience—he did not say work experience—was extremely relevant to what he now working at, to where he was in the organization, and to how much he got paid, although his field was a field where rapid technical change was the norm, and it could be argued that applying rigid technical criteria would discount what he had as no longer applicable. But
strategies of discourse operated in such a way as to make what Frank maintained was relevant to his job—life experience—relevant to his organization, although what was considered relevant to Frank’s organization was discounted in Ellen’s. Strategies of discourse validated what Frank had done with his life, but they didn’t validate what Ellen had done with hers. Operating as objective criteria where those in power never asked themselves how the criteria which they devised maintained them in power, these strategies of discourse worked to keep Frank, and men, dominant, Ellen, and women, subordinate.

Frank alluded to that in his emphasis on the rules of the organization, which he maintained were very fair, very efficient, very rational. What they did do, of course, if we consider rules another name for strategies of discourse which position people, is to ensure that Frank was placed in a dominant position, and that in the guise of the rational and efficient organization, maintained that what men did was considered directly relevant, no matter what they had actually done, which was not the case for Ellen. Frank was really talking about power and knowledge and gender when he talked about the rules, and it was this that put him in the dominant position, this which maintained and justified his position, this that masqueraded as the rational and efficient purpose of the organization.

Rules are by their very nature sites of power and powerlessness—the powerful make the rules, the powerless live by them. Neither Diane nor Alan ever felt that they really knew by which set of rules they were being judged; they did feel that it was more than just what their performance appraisals said. Whatever criteria were applied, by Christmas Alan started to feel "comfortable"; by Christmas, Diane reported, she felt that in her firm you could be a "geek" as a guy and still "make it", be "pretty much a normal woman" and not make it. Ellen’s understanding of the rules in her institution was somewhat different. She thought she knew initially what they were, but then over the course of a year she decided that it wasn’t based on competence and hard work; it was
based on being an engaging young man. Of the four, Frank talked the most about the rules, and the most specifically, and with the most regard. None of the others really seemed to know, at least initially, how they were being judged, or what the rules really were. But Frank knew. To Frank, rules were the mechanisms by which objectivity and fairness towards employees were ensured; they were what made the organization a good place to work.

But unlike Frank I maintain that no criteria is transcendent, that there is no knowledge that stands outside of relations of power and gender, nothing that cannot be contained within strategies of discourse. So the question is whose political interests do the criteria reflect and how are they put into play to maintain the power of the dominant group? The veneer of the objectivity of evaluation, the rules arising from the game itself, the tautology of reason adjudicating reason as it were, ensures the maintenance of power—and of gender power relations. Because the rules are deemed totally objective, there is no way to criticize, to state that those in power could manipulate the evaluation to get, or retain, or promote, who they wanted, Ritti's (1985) thesis that evaluations, performance appraisals, simply justified what the powerful had already decided.

Paradoxically, although Frank maintained that the rules used by the firm were fair and objective, that the rules were the same for each person and were applied in the same way, that was not the case for him. Frank simply recast the rules of the game so that he fitted what the organization wanted. Although the firm was known for hiring young, aggressive over-achievers, and he was none of those things—he was twenty years older, by his own admission he wasn't an over-achiever, and by his demeanour he wasn't aggressive—all of that he turned around and put to good use. He was older, but he was experienced. He was not aggressive, but he was calm, rational, able to understand where others were too quick to judge. He was tempered by his long years of experience; his training was not out of date in a rapidly changing technical area. It was
not what he knew but who he knew that was important. He did not feel that what he knew was not recognized, as was the case for Ellen. She felt that her competence, her hard work, her varied work experience, were all either simply expected or ignored, not rewarded. Instead, Frank felt that that his long work experience and his age—his life experience—gave him the ability to "know what to look for" in a new organization; he knew he could cope with the uncertainty that a new organization meant because of both his life and work experience. What had been a drawback to Ellen—age—was an advantage to Frank, as relations of domination and subordination were reconstituted by the shifting nexus of power and knowledge which masquerades as rules, evaluative criteria, the rational organization based on the principle of merit.

He knew that he was valuable to the new organization because they made a special—and secret—dispensation in terms of vacation time, although that directly contravened what those in charge said they were going to do—give every person the same amount of vacation time, regardless of actual vacation time accrued. He told me without a trace of irony that when the rules were broken to benefit him and him alone, it was a necessary breaking. Although the ethos of the organization was that everyone was to be treated the same, some people were treated differently than others, and the different treatment was kept a secret.

Frank maintained that people were promoted on the basis of managing projects well, which meant ensuring that everything was planned for. However, just like his own hiring did not match the stated criteria, nor did his vacation time assessment, neither did promotions exactly match planning. Although Frank stated that very careful planning by the person responsible for the project should eliminate the unexpected, and that the unexpected was frowned on, nevertheless, if the unexpected did crop up (even if it wasn't supposed to, given all this careful planning) then you had to be available, and if you weren't, you'd end up on a very different career track. If the perception was that you might not be available—although projects were supposed to be so well planned that
they weren't supposed to run into the totally unexpected and therefore unplanned for—then you would jeopardize your career path. You could only ensure that you would be rapidly advanced if you were always available, no matter what, for the unexpected.

What that meant to Frank was that you really could not have any other commitments other than work; if you indicated in any way that you might have problems if something totally unexpected came up, you wouldn't be on the fast track for career promotion.

Considering that careful planning was supposed to eliminate the unexpected, this seemed less to be about work and efficiency and planning, and more about outside work commitments. This is a stance that has different implications for women than for men, and certainly one that both Alan and Diane alluded to. Long hours at work were expected in both their firms; being there was seen as a sign of commitment to the job, as well as to fellow workers. This extended to quite a lot of stress on socializing after work, particularly for Diane, less so for Alan. For Frank, Alan and Diane in particular, although much less so for Ellen, time spent at work, and socializing after work, were ways of evaluating commitment to work. And again, that has different implications for women than for men, but that emphasis on being with the group was never phrased in such a way that it was readily apparent.

But even with all of these exceptions, Frank remained convinced that the rules, the forms of evaluation which the firm employed were objective and fair, and that they applied to everyone equally. That these strategies of discourse might be ways of keeping some people out and some people in was not something that Frank considered. To him, the rules were the epitome of the rational bureaucracy where he felt he worked, where no one was above the rules. The rules embodied reason and efficiency, objectivity and fairness, certainly not politics, certainly not subtle forms of exclusion.

Frank fitted very well into his new organization, because the rules, the strategies of discourse which maintained that whatever men did was recognized as the right thing to do, benefitted men, and Frank was a middle-aged man who had followed those rules, who
never felt any conflict. Alan would be the same in 20 years, and if Diane could make herself act like a man, do all the things that all the other men did, she would benefit too. For Ellen, it was really too late, she hadn't played by the rules, and when the rules dictate the game, she'd already lost. The strategies of discourse which operated to ensure the subordination of women and the domination of men continued to ensure the internal coherence of the organizations themselves.

**CONCLUSION**

In feminist/postmodernist theory, knowledge is not discovered through the application of natural law by the detached and unbiased observer. Neither rationality nor epistemology nor language—an important caveat—are accorded a position of privilege. Nothing is transcendent, nothing stands outside relations of power. There are no transcendent justificatory appeals of universality, objectivity, impartiality. Instead relations of power and knowledge and gender, constantly shifting—strategies of discourse in Foucault's terms—and materially based, define what can be known by newcomers to the organization. Our talk, expressed discursively, embedded materially and shaped by gender power relations, is what we can know about the organization. It is not, then, questions of knowledge which concern me, knowledge which we can acquire, information which can be exchanged between the newcomer and the old hand, but the meaning we attach to what we think we know, that nexus of power and knowledge that is put into play through the material and gendered conditions of our lives.

If the meaning we attach to our experiences is mediated by power and gender, and if we ourselves are constructed by relations of power and knowledge and gender, then my task is not to uncover invariate experience, to prove that this knowledge is more pure than other knowledge because the knower is more objective. But if the question is not whose knowledge is more pure, whose experience is more likely to illuminate a reality that can only appear the brighter the light, then what do I focus on? My answer is that
in this entanglement of the knower and the known, it is not whose knowledge, whose experience, but how relations of gender and power and knowledge construct the organization which the newcomer comes to know, a process that is at one and the same time, both recursive and circular, immanent and inescapable.

The anti-Enlightenment critique has focused on the inescapability of knowledge from power, that truth cannot make us free because we cannot free ourselves from ourselves. Feminism has focused on the inescapability of gender—like transcendental truth, the transcendent, or abstract individual, cannot exist except as something that we wish, and therefore in hubris, create. The organizations which these newcomers came to know—their knowledge of them—was inescapably created within the nexus of power and knowledge and gender which created them as these relations created the organization.

If, as Dorothy Smith has stated, "We're not after the truth, but we do want to know more about how things work, how our world is put together, how things happen to us as they do" (1990, p. 34), how did everyone who talked to me struggle to do this? What was of concern to them, and how did they talk about it? What concepts which were "available to be thought about because their character and the distinctions they [made] apparent [were] already structured in actual social relations" (Ibid, p. 40) were used to frame how they thought about how things worked, how their world was put together, how things happened to them as they did?

For Diane and Ellen, those "conditions of experience created by the practical activities of people" (Smith, 1990, p. 34) were gendered. In both organizations, it was men who overwhelmingly gave the orders, made the money, and had high status, women who carried the orders out, didn’t make very much money, and had low status. In both these organizations, where professional equalled male equalled well paid, high status order giver, their status as women professionals was ambiguous. Where did they fit? Where were they positioned, both in terms of the female support staff and the male order givers, and how did they see themselves within this gender hierarchy? As Smith
has pointed out, our concepts, our ways of understanding the world, arise from these conditions of existence, conditions of existence where what women do is accorded less pay, prestige and power than what men do in the organizations where these women worked and which they sought to understand.

For Diane and Ellen, coming to know the organization could not be separated from who they were—women—and the discourses of power, knowledge and gender which were the organization; they could not ignore the intimate link between power and gender, between men who had power and women who did not. For both Diane and Ellen what they noticed first, what concerned them, was how they were treated as women by the men; what they noticed later, and more slowly, was how little power women as a group had, and what that boded for them. But this link between power and gender which was of such importance to the women, what they devoted so much of their talk to, was little noticed by Alan and Frank. And if Alan and Frank did notice their gender—and the link between having power and being male—they did not talk about it because it did not concern them.

What is absent in theory by the men who write it, was also absent in what was noticed, and talked about, by the men who spoke to me. Like Hegel's master who never noticed the servant's work, so it was in these organizations. The nexus between power and gender which produced subordination was felt by the women, but not the nexus between power and gender which produced domination for the men. As Michael Kimmel noted in a book on men in organizations, "As a middle class white man, I was able to not think about the ways in which class and race and gender had shaped my existence. Marginality is visible, and painfully visceral. Privilege is invisible and painlessly pleasant" (1989, p. 94).

The absence of women in theory reappeared as the men spoke to me about their experiences: what concerned them as newcomers were not relations of power between men and women, but between men and men, and gender disappeared. Women, if
mentioned at all, existed in the shadows. Other men were firmly front and centre, and the talk dealt with, in Alan’s case, of being welcomed; in Frank’s, of his long experience and therefore of his value to the new firm. But to both Frank and Alan women were irrelevant: never mentioned by name, just one of an amorphous group, to Frank; or secretaries or occasionally women lawyers who worked in a law firm, according to Alan, where there was no discrimination, where everyone was treated the same. Women were either not there, or they were one of many, disappearing in a faceless, genderless crowd where equality had already been achieved. However, as Susan Faludi noted in a recent (1991) and best-selling book on American women, the myth of equality achieved is pervasive, although it is not one which women adhere to when they are questioned. To both Alan and Frank, discrimination by men against women was simply irrelevant; it just didn’t exist any more, an argument that Faludi explores as another way to push back whatever few gains women have made by denying that the problem of discrimination against women still exists.

*Faludi begins her book by stating that "To be a woman in America at the close of the twentieth century--what good fortune. That’s what we keep hearing, anyway. The barricades have fallen, politicians assure us. Women have 'made it'. . . . Women's fight for equality has 'largely been won' . . . . Enroll at any university, join any law firm, apply for credit at any bank" (p. ix). But the reality is far different, a reality which is sobering in its implications for Canadian women: "But what 'equality are all these authorities talking about? If American women are so equal, why do they represent two-thirds of all poor adults? Why are nearly 75 percent of full-time working women making less than $20,000 a year, nearly double the male rate? Why are they still far more likely than men to live in poor housing and receive no health insurance, and twice as likely to draw no pension? Why does the average working woman’s salary still lag as far behind the average man’s as it did twenty years ago? Why does the average female graduate today earn less than a man with no more than a high school diploma (just as she did in the '50's)--and why does the average female high school graduate today earn less than a male high school dropout" (p. xiii). She goes on from there to paint a depressing picture of even the very few--and very paltry--gains in danger from those who are convinced that women are already far too equal, and they need to be made less so. One way of ensuring that, she argues in Backlash, is to trumpet that equality between women and men has already been achieved, and furthermore, that women don’t need feminism anymore either, because it’s made them unhappy, infertile and unmarried. But the women themselves don’t say that; they say that the women’s movement should keep
But to the women, the men were there, concrete in their bodies, their thoughts, their marriages or lack thereof, their habits, their way of dealing with both these two women and other women in the institution and firm. No abstract individuals here, no faceless groups. Instead there were bodies with power, bodies without, men who could do things, women who could not, men who took for granted the subordination of secretaries and the strictly defined differences between what men did and what women did, and women who did not take for granted any of these things, who resisted the link between being female and being subordinate. The women puzzled over how not just they, but how other women were treated, who tried to figure out, as Diane did, where she fit when deference was required from the secretaries, all women, but it was unclear how much deference was required from the female lawyers. Whatever the secretaries—all women—did was by definition less important than what lawyers—mostly men—did; what secretaries did, lawyers did not, strategies of discourse by which relations of domination and subordination between men and women were constructed and maintained. Or the other woman, Ellen, talking about realizing with a sick feeling that she was classed with the secretaries, all of whom were women, none of whom were paid very well or who had very much status. She wasn’t part of the group, headed by all men, who were paid well and who had the most status. If power resides in that which is fixed, that which is simply assumed, what both Diane and Ellen kept talking about was their struggle to find a place in their organizations defined by the equation between being female and being subordinate. Only when this nexus which constructs our organizations is put into play through questioning can the meaning which underlies gender and power and knowledge be deferred. And in deferral of meaning lies change.

In Diane’s case, for example, the meaning of lawyer was not confined to what a lawyer did or did not do, but the way these meanings were attached to gender.

pushing for change, so that women achieve better jobs, and more money, and for men to take responsibility for their share of child care and housework (p. xv).
Lawyers/men did not type, file or fax; secretaries/women did that. Lawyers/men had wives or nannies—surrogate wives—secretaries/women had daycare. Lawyers/men were free after work to go for drinks, and get drunk and do outrageous things to amuse the partners, play basketball, go on ski weekends where kids were verboten, where expensive ski equipment was mandatory. Lawyers were competitive, rushed, status seeking individuals, willing to spend a great deal of time at work because the emotional and physical work of marriage and kids was taken care of by someone else. Who we are is constructed, at least partially, by words, and particularly at work. Words define us. In discourse we are constructed: What is a lawyer is answered in words, not naming entities, but as a place where power and knowledge and gender coalesce. A lawyer is this, not that: a lawyer tells a secretary what to do. A secretary does what she’s told—that’s both who a secretary is, and what she is, and the gender of the pronoun is no accident in that sentence. A lawyer is married with a mortgage and kids, and still averages 1500 to 1800 billable hours a year—but the addition of the words marriage and kids has different implications for women than for men. Lawyers have wives or surrogate wives and if they’re women they come back to work two weeks after giving birth, less than men might take off for a prostate operation. These words are all definitions which are contested: "lawyers are people who"—and part of that contested definition deals with gender.

Words, and the meaning we attach to them, arise out of what we do—materially based discourse in Weedon's terms, constructing our world, and [partially] constructing us. Gender is reinforced or created and recreated in words, so the intersection of gender, power and knowledge in discourse creates us at the same time as it creates what we know: This is what a lawyer does and this is who a lawyer is are inseparable, and the who is not abstract. In this process of creation and recreation, resistance and struggle, a lawyer may not necessarily be only a man, but a lawyer acts like a man. The
meaning of what a lawyer is has still not been pried away from the word's link to men and masculine privilege.

In organizations where men have power and women do not, the relationship of power to the male gender is not noticed by men, any more than my whiteness is noticed by me in a predominantly white country where we take for granted, so much so that it is not even worthy of comment, a predominantly white male ruling class*. So Alan and Frank took for granted, so much so that it was not even worthy of comment, a predominantly male ruling class. That discourse of power and knowledge and gender produced, paradoxically, invisibility, but only for one sex, and in one particular way, but in doing so, ensured the continued subordination of women. It seems that only when disparate relations of gender and power are noticed and talked about by the powerful, when links are made between gender and domination, and gender and subordination, is the uncoupling possible between men and power and women and powerlessness. When this link between gender and power is invisible, it is fixed, a site of power beyond questioning. It is silence as repression, the situation so acceptable, so normal, that it is taken for granted, not even discussed.

Strategies of discourse which make invisible women's knowledge about the organization help to constitute the paradoxical invisibility of women, where what women know about the links between being a man and being powerful and being a woman and being powerless are ignored. The invisibility of women and their powerlessness, and the invisibility of women's knowledge about their powerlessness, go together; they are

*Although a recently released United Nations report clearly stated that Canada was the best place in the world to live if you were a man, and only eighth if you were a woman, the headlines in the newspapers invariably read that Canada was first in the world (cf. The Globe and Mail, Friday, April 17th, 1992, p. A1; The Edmonton Journal, April 18th, 1992, p. A1). Peter Gzowski on This Country in the Morning on C.B.C. RADIO (April 22, 1992) blandly repeated that Canada was the best country in the world to live. As Blackstone stated in his dissertation on marriage in the nineteenth century, "man and wife are one, and the one is the man", so do our newspapers reiterate that the one is the man, two centuries later. Invisibility reconstitutes itself.
intimately linked. When women talk about power they talk about men; when men talk about power, they talk about power abstracted from its links to gender, specifically their own gender. When men talk about power, they call it rules, rules that arise in the rational requirements of the organization, or they call it "fitting in". What women talk about—the links between power and men—is ignored by the men; men don't talk about gender when they talk about power. But by not talking about these links between power and gender, gender is elided, and subordination is constituted for women. What women come to know, and what men come to know, are nearly two different worlds, power and knowledge inseparable.

Like organizational theory itself, women have been added on to the organizations in which they worked, but the organizations themselves have not really changed. The rules by which people fit in or not are still inextricably linked to the gender of the person, rules that are ignored by the men, but cannot be ignored by the women because this discourse demands that they act like men, and in the effacement of the female gender lies subordination. Resistance is there, but what dominates the centre is still domination by one gender, men still defining the rules of the game, the internal coherence of the organization itself, like the Enlightenment dualities on which organizational theory depends, still assured by strategies of discourse which link domination and coherence in a dance of words where power and gender intertwine.