On 11 November 1918, the day the armistice ending the 'war to end all wars' was signed, Sir Robert Borden confided to his diary: 'The world has drifted far from its old anchorage and no man can with certainty prophesy what the outcome will be. I have said that another such war would destroy our civilisation. It is a grave question whether this war may not have destroyed much that we regard as necessarily incident thereto.' The Canadian prime minister was right. The Great War had destroyed much that was taken for granted, and in the ensuing decade the powers made various attempts to come to terms with the changes wrought by that tremendous conflict and to prevent another upheaval.

For the three members of the North Atlantic triangle the ten years after the war was a period of transition. The spirit of wartime cooperation was not carried into the complicated, acrimonious, and often confusing atmosphere marked, above all, by growing rivalry and even hostility in Anglo-American relations. This rivalry was to a remarkable degree reflected in Canada. As Canadian leaders pursued their desire for increased autonomy and insulation from international problems, they often found themselves caught between the two senior partners. In the process of avoiding entanglement in Anglo-American and European squabbles, Canada often sided with the United States, and it began to reorient its economic, political, and intellectual focus away from Britain. Canada's interwar withdrawal from Imperial and international commitments and concomitant preoccupation with North American affairs mirrored a more lasting reconfiguration of the North Atlantic triangle: the general shift in power away from Britain and towards the United States.
Although foreign policy is often the product of the complex interplay between domestic politics and international developments – or, as some would have it, 'structural determinants' – it is still shaped and influenced by people. It is therefore important to understand in broad terms some of the attitudes and approaches of those who shaped foreign policy within the North Atlantic triangle during the 1920s. For most of the war and the early postwar period American policy was in the hands of Woodrow Wilson, Democratic president from 1913 to 1921. Wilson’s basic aim was to create what has often been referred to as a ‘liberal internationalist’ world order based on the concepts of freer trade, open diplomacy, and national self-determination. All of these aims were embodied in the League of Nations organization created at the end of the Great War. For various reasons, about which historians still disagree, the Wilsonian vision was rejected by the U.S. Senate and this defeat paved the way for the so-called Republican Ascendancy during the 1920s.

That ascendancy began with the election of Warren Harding in 1920 and continued under the administrations of Calvin Coolidge and then Herbert Hoover, who served from 1928 until his defeat by Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats in 1932. For much of this period the president did not exercise as much control over foreign policy as other members of the cabinet, most notably Charles Evans Hughes, secretary of state under Harding and Coolidge; Andrew Mellon, who served as Treasury secretary under all three Republican presidents; and Herbert Hoover, who exerted a powerful influence at Commerce until assuming office. Traditionally, historians have viewed the Republican era as the American retreat into political isolationism. The rejection of Wilson’s internationalist approach taught Republican leaders to pay more attention to domestic opinion, especially as it was reflected in the Senate, and to shape policy accordingly. Hence, American leaders turned inward. While it is true that the United States did not join the League of Nations and generally withdrew politically from international affairs, the country was far from detached. After all, it participated in three major disarmament conferences, co-sponsored the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war, and, through the Dawes and Young plans, lent its efforts to ease economic and financial problems in Europe. These forays into international diplomacy represented two significant aims in American foreign policy: promoting peace through European and American economic well-being.
and preventing the United States from being drawn into another major European war.

In the light of those general aims, other American goals seem somewhat contradictory. The United States sought to expand economically and pursued naval equality, if not superiority, over Great Britain. American economic expansion has given rise to suspicions that policy was being directed by the business elite. The reality was not that simple. The State Department, for example, often disagreed with Commerce, and various bodies in the United States stood against the 'big naval' lobby in Washington. Thus, although the predominant tendency of the United States was to turn inward politically and avoid international commitments while seeking to increase economic and military power, there was a fissiparous quality to American foreign policy that led to certain misperceptions about the direction in which the United States was moving. This misunderstanding was particularly true in Great Britain.

Six governments held power in Britain during the postwar decade. David Lloyd George headed a coalition that governed from 1916 until his resignation in 1922. Britain then went through three general elections in less than two years (November 1922; December 1923; October 1924). The 1922 election produced a Conservative government led by Canadian-born Andrew Bonar Law until his death from cancer in 1923, and then by Stanley Baldwin. Ramsay MacDonald led the first-ever Labour government for nine short months following the 1923 election, after which Baldwin returned to win the 1924 election; he governed until MacDonald and his Labour party regained control in 1929. Like the situation in the United States, there was a considerable division of opinion within Britain over the direction of postwar foreign policy. Old-style nationalists, such as Law, and foreign secretaries, such as the Marquess of Curzon (1919–23) and Austen Chamberlain (1924–29), were contemptuous of the United States and viewed American intrusion into British spheres of influence with suspicion. Another group, often referred to as 'Atlanticists,' which included the lord president of the council, Lord Balfour, and, off and on, Winston Churchill sought cooperation and understanding with the United States. Other groupings included various politicians, bureaucrats, or intellectuals, such as Colonial and Dominions Secretary Leo Amery, Maurice Hankey, the 'man of secrets' who served as secretary of the cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defence, British statesman Lord Robert Cecil, and Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England. These people wished either to transform the British Empire or to pursue the search for what D.C. Watt has
termed 'a possible America,' meaning an America that would fit in with Britain's image of the world.14

The divisions aside, the British sought to achieve two basic aims during the 1920s. One was to preserve the European balance of power; the other was to maintain and defend the empire. For much of the postwar decade Britain concentrated on European affairs, particularly on the need to satisfy France's demand for security against a resurgent Germany in the aftermath of the American refusal to join the League of Nations. This is not to say that Britain neglected its empire. As always, British strength lay in the continued existence of a unified empire; but in seeking to fulfil this goal the British frequently locked horns with the autonomy-minded Canadians.

If the 1920s were years of the Republican ascendancy in the United States and largely Conservative domination in Britain, in Canada they marked the beginning of the Liberal ascendancy.15 The Conservatives, led by Robert Borden – Sir Robert after 1914 – had been in power since 1911. The 1917 federal election produced a Union government headed by Borden. After ill health forced Borden to retire in 1920, Arthur Meighen led the party until his defeat at the hands of William Lyon Mackenzie King and the Liberals in 1921. Except for a brief hiatus in 1926, King dominated Canadian politics and foreign policy throughout the 1920s – in fact, excepting the period from 1930 to 1935, he dominated Canadian policy from 1921 to 1948.16 Emphasizing the role of the prime minister in the making of Canadian foreign policy – or 'external affairs' in the Canadian lexicon – is no mistake. From 1912 to 1946 all Canadian prime ministers served as their own secretary of state for external affairs. Of course there were others who influenced the direction of foreign policy: for example, Newton Rowell, a Liberal politician who joined Borden's Union government and whose interest in Canada's international position almost exceeded that of the prime minister. Under King there were a number of notable personalities, including Ernest Lapointe, the French-Canadian justice minister, who supported the League of Nations, and J.L. Ralston, the minister of national defence. Others who deserve mention are Walter Hose, the director of the Canadian Naval Services, whose contribution and influence has been only recently recognized;17 J.S. Ewart, a lawyer and constitutional expert who acted as an unofficial adviser to King during the 1920s; and J.W. Dafoe, the editor of what used to be the best newspaper in Canada, the Manitoba Free Press. But the most remarkable protagonists were Loring Christie and O.D. Skelton of the Department of External Affairs.18
Christie cuts a fascinating and rather tragic figure in Canadian history. He served as legal adviser under Borden and Meighen and, though he believed that Canada would eventually have to assume control over foreign policy, he shared Borden's notion of an imperial federation in which the dominions would have a say in the formulation of empire policy. This idea did not endear him to King and he was eased out in 1923. (He returned in 1935 a confirmed anti-imperial isolationist.) Christie's place as a key adviser was taken by Skelton, a former university professor, who became under-secretary of state for external affairs in 1925 and King's most trusted adviser. Skelton was anti-imperialist and neutralist – if not isolationist – from the start, and he fought hard for Canadian independence throughout his career. Although Borden, Meighen, and King – and Christie and Skelton – may have differed over means, they shared a common goal: the advancement of Canadian autonomy, the promotion of good Anglo-American relations, and growing disenchantment with the League of Nations. Borden and Meighen paid a great deal of lip service to the empire, but it was initially under their policies, not King's, that Canada began to move away from Britain and towards the United States. King certainly carried the fight through the 1920s and beyond. Under his leadership Canadians became used to hearing the slogans 'no commitments' and 'Parliament will decide' as the country began to withdraw from European and imperial commitments.

Within the North Atlantic triangle, then, there were three broad currents. One was the gradual Canadian and American withdrawal from international commitments. The second was American economic expansion and its effect on Canadian-American and Anglo-American relations. The third was the growing Anglo-American naval rivalry and its impact on Canada's position in the triangle. These developments did not happen overnight; rather, there was a slow evolutionary change that resulted from separate responses to the new international and domestic conditions each member of the triangle faced after the Great War.

THE PEACE AND THE LEAGUE

Perhaps even more than its triangle allies, Canadian attitudes towards the postwar era were moulded by the charnel house of the Great War which had maimed and slaughtered the flower of Canadian youth. 'It was European policy, European statesmanship, European ambition, that drenched this world in blood and from which we are still suffering and
will suffer for generations,' charged the Canadian delegate, Newton Rowell, at the inaugural gathering of the League of Nations in 1920. ‘Fifty thousand Canadians under the soil of France and Flanders is what Canada has paid for European statesmanship trying to settle European problems.’

Four years later another Canadian representative at Geneva, Senator Raoul Dandurand, spoke for an entire nation baptised by fire when he declared: ‘we think in terms of peace, while Europe, an armed camp, thinks in terms of war ... We live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe.’

To many Canadians, the nascent League of Nations – the brainchild of President Woodrow Wilson – symbolized a perilous affiliation. Canada had successfully lobbied at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to join the world body as a separate member. Yet this campaign had been based more on the ambition to see the dominion’s status and voice as an autonomous nation acknowledged than on any heartfelt belief in the principles of collective security. From the point of view of most Canadians the League was simply an instrument for European nations to manipulate in resolving private quarrels that in no way touched Canada. Clifford Sifton, the proprietor of the Manitoba Free Press and a former cabinet minister, warned that Canada’s continued membership would ‘do us no good and may possibly get us into trouble.’ Sifton spoke for many Canadians when he asserted that the main aim of the ‘people over there’ was to ensnare Canadians in ‘European and Imperialistic complications.’

Small wonder that successive Canadian governments strove first to delete and, when that failed, to amend substantially Article X of the League Covenant. This article, which Wilson termed ‘the heart of the Covenant,’ pledged member states to come to the aid of any one of them who was the victim of an act of aggression. It was not a concept that appealed to many Canadians, including Prime Minister Borden, whose opposition carried an almost hysterical tone. Inclusion of the article, he said, ‘might lead to great disorder, possibly rebellion on the Pacific Coast of the United States and Canada.’ Instead, the League must be regarded solely as a body that furnished the means to mediate, arbitrate, and adjudicate disputes. Christie argued that Canada should work towards ‘a League that is a method of diplomacy and is not an institution with fighting compacts.’ The message here was clear. The League should provide a forum for the discussion and debate of world affairs, but it should do little more. Indeed, argued many Canadians, Canada ought to abandon the League if it remained primarily fixated on European matters. The dominion should always approach its ‘obligations
and interventions in regard to all regions of the earth in a sense compatible with her geographical position.\textsuperscript{28}

Projects designed to enlarge and fortify the collective security aspects of the League Covenant, such as the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes – which called for compulsory arbitration and military or economic sanctions against aggressor states – had to be avoided at all costs. According to O.D. Skelton, Canada was a country ‘fortunate in its comparative isolation and its friendly neighbour.’ It had nothing in common with European nations, ‘heirs to centuries of feuds and fears.’\textsuperscript{29} The Locarno Pact of 1925 was no better. By the terms of this treaty, France, Belgium, and Germany pledged to respect each other’s borders and Britain and Italy guaranteed the arrangement. The renunciation by Germany and France of any wish to alter their existing boundaries, coupled with an agreement to arbitrate disputes between them, were certainly ‘steps toward peace,’ Skelton conceded, ‘but they are Europe’s steps, Europe’s job and should rest for their enforcement upon the conduct of France and Germany, not upon intervention by a country four thousand miles away.’ A Canadian endorsement of Locarno would pose too grave a risk to the dominion, particularly given its racial composition, its proximity to the United States, and its millstone of war debt.\textsuperscript{30}

All in all, the prevailing sentiment in Canada during the 1920s demanded that every effort be geared towards ensuring that Canadians would not again be made ‘catspaws of European imperialism.’\textsuperscript{31} Calamity would definitely ensue through any connection with the ‘legacy of warfare hate & bloodshed which makes Europe a shambles.’\textsuperscript{32} A Liberal MP, Chubby Power, anticipated this mood, which would grip much of the country in the 1920s, in a speech to the House of Commons in September 1919:

\textit{We as Canadians have our destiny before us not in Continental Europe but here on the free soil of America. Our policy for the next hundred years should be that laid down by George Washington in the United States for the guidance of his country-men – absolute renunciation of interference in European affairs – and that laid down by the other great father of his country in Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier – ‘freedom from the vortex of European militarism’ ... let Europe be the arbiter of its own destiny while we in Canada, turning our energies to our own affairs, undertake our own peaceful development.}\textsuperscript{33}

That a Canadian should invoke the spirit of one of the founding fathers
of the United States to argue the case for his own country's non-interventionism was no coincidence; for during the postwar decade many Americans were making strikingly similar arguments about the need to evade military and political commitments abroad.

Isolationist sentiment in the United States during the 1920s had many standard-bearers but its main leadership undoubtedly came from the American Senate. It was a point of view first articulated in the battle waged there in 1918–20 to prevent the country from joining the League of Nations. There were several arguments advanced against membership that were unique to American sensibilities, but certain of their essentials closely resembled Canadian attitudes. The League of Nations was 'nothing but a mind cure' and a 'pipe dream,' suggested Senator Frank Brandegee. Moreover, as far as the United States was concerned, Idaho's William Borah firmly believed, it would 'finally lead us all into all kinds of entangling obligations and conditions with European affairs.' Article X would see to that. Underwriting the territorial integrity of every nation which comprised the League was 'a very grave, a very perilous promise to make,' warned Wilson's bitter enemy and chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Henry Cabot Lodge: 'because there is but one way by which such guarantees, if ever invoked, can be maintained, and that way is the way of force ... If we guarantee any country on earth ... that guarantee we must maintain at any cost when our word is once given, and we must be in constant possession of fleets and armies capable of enforcing these guarantees at a moment's notice.' In the end, the Treaty of Versailles, along with the League of Nations, was rejected by the United States Senate in March 1920. However, that body's isolationist vanguard remained ever vigilant for any other initiative that might similarly sacrifice their country's peace, prosperity, and independence on the altar of European or Asian ambitions and rivalries. An inviting target soon appeared in the form of the Four Power Pact, one of the agreements arising out of the Washington Conference on naval arms limitation of 1921–2. The United States, Britain, Japan, and France agreed to respect each other's territorial rights in the Pacific, to refer disputes between them to a conference of all four nations, and to consult one another in the event of an outside attack against them.

For Senate isolationists the treaty was an armed alliance pure and simple through which the United States incurred dangerous obligations. It flew in the face of traditional American foreign policy, injected the republic into foreign squabbles unconnected with its own interests, and
threatened its sovereignty in diplomatic affairs. Worst of all, it would one day drag the country into a war.\textsuperscript{40} Senate opponents attacked the pact as a ‘menacing little imitation league,’ another example of ‘the old hellish system whose frightful story is told upon a thousand battlefields of the Old World.’ If it were ratified, ‘American boys [would] again shed their blood on foreign fields.’\textsuperscript{41} The Senate eventually passed the treaty, but not before its isolationist members succeeded in neutering it by attaching a reservation to American adherence that excluded any commitment to armed force, an alliance, or the obligation to assist in defence against aggression.\textsuperscript{42} The Senate also operated against other foreign policy initiatives such as American membership in the World Court. The Senate approved American membership in the court in 1926, but only after affixing several reservations.\textsuperscript{43} Three years later isolationist Senators were similarly able to protect America’s freedom of action and limit its international obligations by so qualifying the country’s adhesion to the Kellogg-Briand Pact – which renounced war as an instrument of national policy – that it amounted to nothing more than ‘an international kiss.’\textsuperscript{44}

One belief in particular underlay and unified American isolationist attitudes during the 1920s: that the decision of the United States to enter the Great War in 1917 had been a mistake. This view sprang from post-war histories of the origins of the conflict by both European and American writers that marshalled impressive evidence to support the thesis that not only had the Germans not been completely villainous or the Allies completely altruistic, but that perhaps the Allies rather than the Central Powers were primarily culpable for the war. American revisionist historians condemned their country’s intervention in the conflict on that basis in the hope that the same error would not be made again.\textsuperscript{45} Why, then, had the United States participated at all, if one side had been no more virtuous than the other, unless it had been duped? All the moral and selfless reasons for American intervention seemed to be stripped bare. The revisionist interpretation was fuelled by the conviction that the entire peace settlement was founded on a misconception, since it formally assigned Germany special responsibility for the conflict. In fact, there was much that American isolationists considered iniquitous about the Treaty of Versailles. In many ways, when it came to both the war-guilt question and the criticism of Versailles, they took their cue from European, and particularly British, opinion.\textsuperscript{46}

Indeed, the ‘thesaurus’ of American isolationists was British economist John Maynard Keynes’s \textit{The Economic Consequences of the Peace}, pub-
lished at the end of 1919. In a scathing critique, Keynes denounced the
Versailles settlement as excessively severe towards Germany. He argued
that its draconian reparations arrangements represented the triumph of
political retribution over fiscal common sense. Rather than laying a solid
foundation for peace, the treaty sowed the seeds of another war. It
was, Keynes reproached, 'one of the most outrageous acts of a cruel vic­
tor in civilised history' and would be the 'death sentence of many mil­
lions of German men, women and children.' The impact of Keynes's
study of the peace conference was widespread. It was also immense,
no more so than in his native Britain, where it soon became the rarely
challenged view of the majority. 'All the phrases of the 1920's,' Martin
Gilbert has observed, 'peaceful change, treaty revision, bringing Ger­
many back to her rightful place in Europe, obtaining equality for the
former foe, appeasement,' could be traced to Keynes. Even though
Britain's geopolitical position was radically different from that of either
Canada or the United States, this frame of mind closely approximated
mainstream thinking in those two countries. One might have expected
that the island nation's proximity to the continent, coupled with its
recent participation in the Great War, would have erased any thoughts
on the part of its inhabitants that they might be able to stand aloof from
Europe. Instead Keynes's assault on the injustice and immorality of Ver­
sailles resulted in a guilty population unable to justify the peace and
unwilling to enforce it.

From there it was but a small step to belief in the merits of 'splendid
isolation.' By the mid-1920s in Britain, the concept that 'if peace is to be
obtained, it must be paid for by certain sacrifices, the assumption of cer­
tain obligations,' was, one observer noted at the time, greeted with 'gen­
uine bewilderment.' In any event, the domestic situation precluded
such an activist role. 'We cannot act alone as the policeman of the
world,' Bonar Law announced in 1922, 'the financial and social condi­
tion of the country makes that impossible.' 'Imperial isolation' became
the rallying cry of many British conservatives: the repudiation of expan­
sionism in favour of strengthening the empire, the emphasizing of
nationalism over internationalism, the resolve not to permit government
policy to be beholden to any supranational institution, the desire to
defend existing interests rather than to seek out new responsibilities.

Based on these considerations, being a member of the 'League of
Notions' was tantamount, one conservative organ suggested, to 'expo­sing England's throat to the assassin's knife.' At best, 'the average con­
servative thought of it as a forum in which disputes could be aired and,
if all went well, settled,' one observer later commented. 'The League's function was not to do but to be.' At worst, many on the right viewed the organization with contempt and suspicion, scepticism and distrust, because of the threat they believed it posed to national sovereignty.

Imperial isolationism perhaps found its most vocal champion during the 1920s in the Round Table movement, which included the likes of Amery, Curzon, Cecil, and Christie. During that decade the members of this group were concerned about international peace and security, but they were soon disillusioned with the League of Nations. Britain ought not to become embroiled in Europe any more than necessary. The country 'must be made to look away towards the outer world, as she always has done in the past,' Philip Kerr, later Lord Lothian, maintained. Accordingly, he and other Round Table members took as their main goals the consolidation of imperial unity and the enhancement of Anglo-American relations. Indeed, it was with an eye to not alienating the dominions or the United States that the Round Table viewed the League of Nations. Thus, given Canadian and American attitudes towards that body, the group looked askance at the Geneva Protocol's plan to bolster the League's collective security powers. It perhaps made sense as a pact between continental nations, but from Britain's perspective, agreeing to support compulsory arbitration and automatic sanctions might seriously impair imperial and Anglo-American collaboration. The League should confine its activities to fostering dialogue. The Round Table's assessment of Locarno was similar. On the one hand, it welcomed this rapprochement in the relationship between France and Germany as well as the treaty's limitation of Britain's continental commitment to western Europe. On the other, the group bemoaned even that obligation, not to mention the fact that, in assuming a responsibility that her dominions did not endorse, the mother country was imperilling the diplomatic unity of the empire. British governments of the 1920s refused to adhere to the Geneva Protocol, signed the Locarno Pact comforted by the fact that it actually diluted the nation's continental commitment and placed conditions on British acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact similar to those enacted by the American Senate.

Thus, Anglo-American-Canadian diplomatic relations in the 1920s did not evolve in a vacuum but were played out against a backdrop of various domestic factors operating within all three countries. And a particular kind of collective ideological climate born of the Great War and wary of undertakings that might lead to a repetition of that ghastly experience helped to fuse the individual lines that comprised the North Atlantic
triangle. Within it, however, there were differences of opinion over how best to achieve the goals of peace and security. One way for Britain to maintain its position was to promote just what the Round Table suggested: strong imperial unity and cordial Anglo-American relations. But Canada, the senior dominion, proved uncooperative and the United States hostile.

NORTH AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL

Although many have attributed to King the drive for Canadian autonomy, which resulted in the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster of 1931, as well as the gradual shift in focus towards the United States, it is wrong to do so. The pursuit of autonomy and Canada's move towards the United States began not with King but with Robert Borden and his successor, Arthur Meighen, as they sought to come to terms with the changed circumstances of the postwar world. For most of his career Robert Borden championed the British Empire and promoted the idea of a cooperative imperial commonwealth. Borden believed that through a process of continuous consultation between London and the self-governing dominions, Britain could establish a strong and unified foreign policy for the empire. This goal been achieved, in part, at the Imperial War Conference of 1917, when Borden and Jan Smuts of South Africa pushed through Resolution IX. It declared that Britain 'should recognise the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern.'

At the time Borden hailed this resolution as a major step – but in which direction? Borden himself was not sure. In one breath he told the Canadian House of Commons in 1917 that Resolution IX did 'not sacrifice in the slightest degree the autonomy of the power of self-government' in Canada; in the next he alluded to the 'opportunity for consultation, co-operation and united action' between Canada and Britain. If Borden still believed that Canadian autonomy could be squared with a unified imperial foreign policy throughout 1918, he was beginning to change his view by the end of the war. The first indication came at meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet during the summer of 1918 when he launched a scathing attack on the conduct of the war and warned British leaders that unless Canada could have a 'voice in the foreign relations of the empire as a whole, she would before
long have an independent voice in her own foreign affairs outside the empire."  Although the British worked hard to secure Canadian representation at the Paris Peace Conference, they had no intention of permitting Canada a full voice in imperial affairs. Lloyd George was willing to allow full Canadian participation in a series of preliminary inter-Allied conferences, but little more. As he became more and more disillusioned, Borden began to believe that perhaps the time had come for Canada to take a new direction. In words that could have emanated from the pen of King, Borden wrote in his diary one late night in early December 1918: 'I am beginning to feel that in the end and perhaps sooner than later, Canada must assume full sovereignty. She can give better service to Great Britain & United States & to the world in that way." Borden took the first steps in this direction at the end of December 1918 when he told the British cabinet: 'if the future policy of the British Empire meant working in co-operation with some European nation as against the United States, that policy could not reckon on the approval or the support of Canada. Canada's view was that as an Empire we should keep clear, as far as possible, of European complications and alliances. This feeling had been immensely strengthened by the experience of the war, into which we had been drawn by old-standing pledges and more recent understandings, of which the Dominions had not even been aware." The same day he also announced, against British wishes, that Canada was going to withdraw the expeditionary force that had been sent to Siberia to fight the Bolsheviks.

Admittedly, Borden does not appear to have abandoned completely his hope for some form of imperial unity. But in these statements there was clearly an expression of a new national awareness of Canada's position in the postwar world, a new self-interest, and a sense of the role Canada might play, namely, as potential peacemaker – or linchpin – between Britain and the United States. The chance for just such a role was not long in coming. The United States and Britain, allies of late, were entering a decade that would be characterized by growing antagonism. As one American observed in 1919: 'relations between the two countries are beginning to assume the same character as that between England and Germany before the war." One issue over which Britain and the United States disagreed was the Anglo-Japanese alliance. First negotiated in 1902, it had been renewed in 1905 and again, for ten years, in 1911. In 1921 it was up for renewal. Americans took a dim view of the alliance. It was, in the words of former secretary of state, Elihu Root,
'regarded by the people as an alliance between Great Britain and Japan against the United States.'

Against this background of mounting tension Arthur Meighen travelled to London to attend the 1921 Imperial Conference. He went with one aim: to make sure the British did not renew the alliance. Arguing that the renewal of the alliance would have a disastrous effect on Canadian-American relations, Meighen threatened to dissociate Canada from any British attempt to form an alliance with Japan. His reasoning is instructive. 'If we now in this state of affairs renew a confidential and exclusive relationship with Japan,' he told delegates at the Imperial Conference, 'it is wholly impossible to argue convincingly, to my mind, that it is not going to affect detrimentally our relations with the United States, no matter how steadfastly the British Government sets its face to keep those relations good.' Canada thus urgently and successfully helped to pressure Britain to end the alliance. It was replaced by a series of agreements reached at the Washington Conference of 1921–2, the most important of which was the Five Power Treaty limiting a tonnage ratio for capital ships – warships over 10,000 tons carrying guns larger than eight inches. The ratio was \( 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 \) for, respectively, Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. Borden was called out of retirement to represent Canada at the conference.

That the Americans had been urging Canada to oppose the alliance cannot be doubted – Root, for example, did so in the belief that the termination of the alliance and British acceptance of the Washington treaties would make Britain more dependent on American support. Nevertheless, Meighen and Borden believed that they had demonstrated two things during the Imperial and Washington conferences. One was that Canada could act as a linchpin between Britain and the United States. The other was that the Imperial Conference had demonstrated the viability of a unified imperial foreign policy based on consultation. In reality, however, they had acted in the self-interest of Canada, and in so doing they had succeeded in knocking out the foundation of British policy in the Far East, demonstrated that if forced to choose between Britain and the United States Canada would choose the United States, and instilled in the British a distaste for future adventures in cooperative commonwealth experiments. In this sense they paved the way for King.

King's role has been misunderstood, an error that is understandable, since his policies generally had an opaque quality. Thus he has been variously portrayed as the great Canadian who single-handedly battled the British for Canadian autonomy or as the demon who broke the British
connection and led Canada into the arms of the United States or as the crafty statesman who reversed the policies of Borden and Meighen.77 The ‘truth’ — if it can be said to exist in history — probably lies somewhere between these conflicting views. King did not so much reverse policy as follow what Borden had started to its logical conclusion. He was undoubtedly a Canadian nationalist who sought autonomy, but he did not favour breaking the imperial tie. He favoured closer relations with the United States, but not too close. As one American observer later pointed out: Canada ‘wished to get all the benefits out of the protection afforded her by geography, by membership in the British Empire, and by friendship with the United States without assuming any responsibilities.’78 That may be the definitive statement of Canadian foreign policy in the interwar years.

King was not long in demonstrating where he stood on the question of Canadian autonomy. In September 1922 the British government asked each of the dominions for assistance in confronting a Turkish threat to Britain’s garrison at Chanak, on the banks of the Dardanelles in Asia Minor. Owing to sloppy practices, the uncoded cable communicating this request reached Canadian newspaper offices before the government was aware of the appeal. King first learned of its contents from a newspaper reporter. Ottawa took no action. An irate King politely but stiffly notified the British that only the Canadian Parliament could decide what course the country would follow — and he had no intention of calling Parliament into session.79 The Chanak crisis was instructive for many Canadians. Meighen’s attempt to embarrass King with his ‘Ready, aye, ready’ speech did not succeed. For if it was true that European statesmanship had catapulted the world headlong into the Great War, it was equally true that British statesmen were European. And if bungling British diplomats had helped to plunge the world into a devastating four-year holocaust, so had the peculiar nature of the dominion’s relationship to Britain automatically made it a party to the conflict. That ruinous experience, compounded now by the irksome circumstances surrounding Chanak, served during the first decade of peace to strengthen the unsettling knowledge that Canadians were not in control of starting the engine of war. Canada’s ties with the mother country were quite capable of drawing the dominion into hostilities not of its own interest or making. Canada did not yet exercise full authority over the making of war and peace. The dominion could determine the nature and extent of its participation in British wars, but it was automatically a belligerent the moment Britain was one.
This lesson, of course, was not lost on King, and he certainly inflicted a further dent in the concept of a unified policy for the empire at the Imperial Conference of 1923. There, he nipped in the bud any talk of continuous consultation, coordination of defence policies, and commitments in advance to support British foreign policy. There, too, the dominions' right to sign their own treaties with other countries was enshrined. Nevertheless, the prospect of joint diplomatic action with London remained a powerful bogey for many Canadians throughout the 1920s. J.S. Ewart, for example, a close friend of King, suggested that it was doubtful whether Britain really desired sincerely to confer with Canada. 'We understand you perfectly,' he wrote in a book intended for British as well as Canadian eyes, 'France wants to be able to call blacks and browns from Africa; and you want to be able to summon whites from Canada to fight blacks, browns, or other whites as you may think your interests require.'

Thus the Locarno Pact, about which London had not consulted Ottawa, which appeared between two general elections in Canada, was a disturbing development. 'We cannot admit [that we are] automatically committed to all Britain's wars,' Skelton maintained. 'Canada can best decide on her course in the light of the facts and circumstances of the time, rather than give a blank cheque now to whatever men may be in power in London in 1940; their case will be more circumspect if [they are] not sure of our support in advance.' For Christie, Locarno had to be the parting of company with Britain. 'I cannot escape the conviction,' he wrote to Borden in February 1926, 'that ... in order to play our unique part in the English-speaking world we must assume a more independent and detached position than existing forms allow us.' That goal was achieved in large measure at the 1926 Imperial Conference, which produced the Balfour Declaration proclaiming that the dominions and Britain were 'in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.' The conference also agreed that the dominions could not 'be committed to the acceptance of active obligations, except with the definite consent of their own governments.'

Although there were those who grumbled that the Balfour Declaration did not provide enough freedom from Downing Street, it was nevertheless a significant shift away from Britain. On the one hand, J.S. Ewart observed in 1927 regarding the Canadian outlook: 'antipathy toward Americans has decreased, and is now tending to disappear ...
making impossible the perpetuation of a Canadian felling of antagonism to the United States'. On the other, 'there is an increasing disinclination to participate actively in British wars merely because they are British.' Many believed that Canada's future lay in North America and the nurturing of relations with the United States. After all, as Christie pointed out, it was 'a simple truth of geography and history that Canadians are North American and not European.' So far as Skelton was concerned, Canada's future lay 'in her own reasonableness, the decency of her neighbour, and the steady development of friendly intercourse, common standards of conduct, and common points of view.' In the light of this attitude it was of no small consequence that Canadian autonomy was first demonstrated by the establishment of diplomatic missions, in Washington in 1926 followed by Paris in 1928 and Tokyo a year later. British recognition of that autonomy occurred in 1928 with the appointment of a high commissioner to Ottawa. As King prepared to go to Paris to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1929, he reflected proudly on his achievements in foreign policy: 'I am convinced the period of my administration will live in this particular as an epoch in the history of Canada that was formative and memorable.' Indeed it was, but another epoch in Canadian history in the making was the economic shift towards the United States.

THE ECONOMIC SHIFT

The Great War's enormous impact on the international economy inevitably affected economic relations within the North Atlantic triangle. In the pre-war era Great Britain had functioned as the commercial and economic centre of the world. The war dealt a serious blow to sterling and Britain's pre-eminent economic position. The gap thus created was to a large degree filled by the United States. During the 1920s America rose to a nearly commanding position as the international financial centre. A debtor nation by nearly $4 billion in 1914, the United States emerged from the war a net creditor to the tune of about $10 billion. By 1922 this figure had risen to some $17 billion. Other indicators of America's new position are equally telling. In 1900, for example, the United States held roughly 3 per cent of the world's long-term investments; by 1929 it held more than 30 per cent. Between 1920 and 1929 American private investors lent more than $7.5 billion to foreign borrowers.

By contrast, Britain emerged from the war in a weakened and precarious state. The nation faced declining trade, unemployment that ran to
nearly 18 per cent in the early 1920s, shrinking gold reserves, and, at least initially, growing public unrest in the form of strikes. Above all, Britain was in debt, and in debt to the United States to the tune of about $4.7 billion. British hopes for the cancellation of war debts, however, were dashed. The Americans proved unwilling to cancel, and this reluctance gave rise to the notion that the United States wanted to exert economic dominance over Britain. The central ambition of ... American politicians,' the British ambassador, Auckland Geddes, informed his government in 1920, 'is to win for America the position of leading nation in the world and also leader among the English-speaking nations.' To do this they intend to have the strongest navy and the largest mercantile marine. They intend also to prevent us from paying our debt by sending goods to America and they look for the opportunity to treat us as a vassal State so long as the debt remains unpaid. By the mid-1920s there was considerable bad feeling in Britain. 'The debts and similar claims on the part of the United States have already made the average Englishman think the Americans are dirty swine,' wrote a senior Foreign Office official.

There is little evidence to suggest that the United States wanted to reduce Britain to a vassal state, as Hughes was well aware: 'There will be no permanent peace unless economic satisfactions are enjoyed.' Rather, as Frank Costigliola has pointed out, both Britain and the United States wanted to reconstruct the international economy, but each wanted to do so on terms that would fulfil its own national interests. For the United States it meant an international economy based on the concept of the free market-place, the open door, and a return to the gold standard. For Britain it meant a London-centred financial bloc, reduced war debts, stabilized prices, and internationally regulated capital flows. Possessing more economic clout, the Americans won the battle during the 1920s. Indications that the United States won the day were apparent in a shift in trade and investment patterns within the North Atlantic triangle, particularly with respect to Canada.

Prior to the Great War Canada had balanced its imports from the United States through exports to Britain. The United States accounted for an average of 60 per cent of all the goods Canada imported while Britain accounted for an average of 53 per cent of all the goods Canada exported between 1900 and 1914. During those same years Canada imported only 23 per cent of its goods from Britain and exported 36 per cent of all its goods to the United States. As these figures suggest, in the pre-war era the vast bulk of Canadian trade was carried out within the
North Atlantic triangle – 83 per cent of all import and 89 per cent of all export trade was with the United States and Britain. The war significantly affected these trade patterns. During the 1920s Canadian imports from the United States rose from an average of 60 per cent to 68 per cent; exports to Britain declined from an average of 53 per cent to 36 per cent. During the 1920s there was also a further decline in imports, from Britain to 16.5 per cent of total imports, while exports to the United States rose to an average of 39 per cent for the decade. In terms of overall trade, 84.5 per cent of Canadian import trade and 75 per cent of export trade were done with Britain and the United States. Clearly, the most significant development was the decline in Canadian trade, especially export trade, with Britain and the increasing trade with the United States. In fact, in 1921 Canada exported more to other countries than it did to Britain – $312,845 million worth of goods were exported to Britain, $333,995 million to ‘other’ countries. This trend would continue throughout the decade, so that by 1929 the total trade between Canada and the United States ($1,372 billion) was larger than that of the total trade between Britain and the United States ($1,178 billion).

Far more significant than the changing trade pattern was the dramatic shift in investment. In 1913 British investment represented 75 per cent of the total foreign capital invested in Canada. Following the war that figure fell to 57 per cent and then declined steadily, so that by 1930 only 36 per cent of foreign investment in Canada originated in Britain. At the same time American investment in Canada grew from a pre-war rate of 23 per cent of total investment to 36 per cent in 1919 and then to 61 per cent in 1930. The turning point was 1922, when, for the first time, American investment in Canada exceeded British investment. By the mid-1920s total American investment had passed the $3 billion mark and continued at an annual rate of $2.5 million for the remainder of the decade. This shift was of some concern to the British, who were worried that increasing American economic influence in Canada posed a threat to the imperial link, if not to the empire itself. ‘American money power is trying to get hold of the natural resources of the empire,’ warned Baldwin in 1928. They are working like beavers.’ The reference to Canada’s national emblem was probably unintended.) Britain did little to rectify the situation. Sterling remained weak through much of the 1920s, and displeasure over losses suffered in railroad bankruptcies tended to make British investors shy of Canada.

None of the foregoing is to imply that Canada had jumped, or was willing to jump, into America’s economic bed. There were a number of
problems in Canadian-American economic relations, most of them stemming from the high-tariff policies the United States employed. Moreover, throughout the 1920s King sought increased economic ties with Britain, most notably at the 1923 Imperial Economic Conference.\textsuperscript{104} Trying to explain the aims of his budget at the end of the decade, King wrote: 'It is essential to increase, not decrease, imports from Britain if we wish to increase our exports to Britain, and the Budget ensures this by diverting trade from the United States to Britain.'\textsuperscript{105} Further attempts to increase Canada's trade with Britain would be made during the 1930s, but the economic shift that occurred during the 1920s would never be reversed.

\section*{Anglo-American Naval Rivalry}

At one point during the Washington Conference of 1921–2 Borden had a disturbing conversation with Admiral Sir Ernie Chatfield, then serving as assistant chief of naval staff. 'Admiral Chatfield,' he recorded in his diary, 'whom personally I like, indulged in some loose and foolish talk as to his willingness to fight [the] United States with an inferior fleet. He does not seem to realise that war between the two countries would mean the destruction of a civilisation [sic] already rocking under the impact of the late war.'\textsuperscript{106} Chatfield's comments and Borden's concern underscored what would develop into probably the most serious problem for the North Atlantic triangle during the 1920s: the Anglo-American naval rivalry. The British official naval historian, Stephen Roskill, characterized the period from 1919 to 1929 as 'the period of Anglo-American antagonism.'\textsuperscript{107} By the autumn of 1928 Anglo-American relations had so declined as a result of the naval issue that Robert Craigie, the head of the American Department of the Foreign Office, was writing that 'war is not unthinkable between the two countries.'\textsuperscript{108}

The immediate origins of the Anglo-American rivalry can be traced to the summer of 1915, when the General Board of the United States Navy recommended that 'the Navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world.'\textsuperscript{109} Thus was born the 'second to none' naval policy that the United States sought to initiate in the naval construction programs of 1916 and 1918. As it originally stood, the 1918 program was to produce 1,000 ships, including twelve battleships and sixteen battlecruisers.\textsuperscript{110} Although the American naval program was reduced to 156 ships after the war, in part because of the domestic opposition of the 'Mugwump'
factor and the National Council for the Limitation of Armaments, it nevertheless caused considerable concern in Britain. Churchill believed that there was an element of ‘bluff and bluster’ behind it, but he was not ‘prepared to take dictation from the US.’ ‘We do not wish to put ourselves in the power of the United States,’ he warned the cabinet. This was an important consideration indeed, because the security and well-being of the empire depended upon a powerful navy, and in their weakened financial situation the British had no desire to meet new challenges. As Sir Emile Chatfield, the first sea lord, later observed: ‘We are in the remarkable position of not wanting to quarrel with anybody because we have got most of the world already, or the best parts of it, and we only want to keep what we have got and prevent others taking it away from us.’

The problem was how to accomplish the task. Despite the fact that Britain had emerged from the Great War with the world’s largest navy – sixty-one battleships, which was more than the American and French navies combined, 120 cruisers, and 466 destroyers – it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain that superiority. Britain had been weakened by the war and faced the difficulty of trying to finance a large military machine to oversee empire commitments. The Royal Navy alone swallowed about £160 million, or 20 per cent of government expenditure in 1919–20, at a time when budget estimates were shrinking. In an effort to retrench, Britain was forced to abandon one of its long-standing policies: the ‘Two-Power Standard.’ Adopted in 1889, this policy held that the Royal Navy should be as strong as the combined might of any two powers. Unable to continue such a goal, Britain adopted the ‘One-Power Standard’ in 1920. The United States naval program was therefore viewed as a threat, or at least as a potential threat.

Although the Washington Conference settled some outstanding differences in Anglo-American relations by setting limits on capital ships, the treaties said nothing about cruisers. It was over the limitation of cruiser building that the next round began. Here the British enjoyed a decided advantage over the Americans and they wanted to keep it that way. When Coolidge put forward a proposal in 1924 to hold a second Washington conference to limit construction of smaller-class ships, the British refused. The Americans kept pressing, and in 1927 the British agreed to attend the ill-fated Coolidge conference, which met in Geneva during the summer. By this time there was close to open talk of war between Britain and the United States. The basic problem was neatly summed up by Lord Jellicoe: ‘The American programme has only one
object in view, viz. Equality with Great Britain on the sea. We cannot help it if they build up to our required standard, but we can avoid lowering our standard to suit them." Should the Americans gain the upper hand, in Churchill's view, they would then be 'in a position to give us orders about our policy, say, in India or Egypt, or Canada or any other great matter behind which their electioneering forces were marshalled ... I would neither trust America to command, nor England to submit.' It was not until the London Naval Conference of 1930 that the United States and Britain came to an agreement, and even then relations were less than cordial.

This Anglo-American naval rivalry concerned Canada deeply for a number of reasons, chief of which was that Canada always suffered when Anglo-American relations soured – and a war would be an unmitigated disaster, since Canada would likely be a battleground. This was, in fact, one of the arguments Meighen advanced at the 1921 Imperial Conference. Hence, during the 1920s and the 1930s Canada repeatedly sought to promote good Anglo-American relations. As Walter Hose noted: 'We, who know the U.S., should be in a position to give advice which may prevent the British Cabinet being led into playing the U.S. Big Navy Party's game by the Admiralty.' Another Canadian concern rose from a general mistrust of the United States. Canada was most certainly moving towards the United States in terms of trade and attitudes to Europe, but that trend did not extend to military matters. Walter Hose strongly warned against Canada's 'placing itself entirely in the hands of the friendly neighbour.' Other military figures, such as James Sutherland Brown and A.G.L. McNaughton, did not discount the possibility of war. Brown was in fact the author of 'Defence Scheme No. 1,' a plan that actually called for a 'first strike' at the United States in the event of trouble.

In the end, of course, the United States and Britain did not go to war. But the Anglo-American naval rivalry served to demonstrate the precarious nature of the triangular relationship during the 1920s. Many of the problems that arose during the postwar decade would reappear during the 1930s – though there would be a different set of circumstances and, once again, different responses. Indeed, Canada would once more join the mother country in war, again temporarily leaving the Americans behind on the sidelines. But it was the last gasp of an already altered triangular relationship. The 1920s represented the beginning of a transition that would continue through the course of the twentieth century, and that was the gradual shift in power away from Britain and towards the
United States. For Canada, more than any other country, adaptation to the new order of things was imperative, controversial, and tumultuous.

NOTES


2 For the wider impact of the war, see Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford, 1975).

3 Although dated, one of the few studies of the triangular relationship during these years is J.B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain (New York, 1945; Toronto, 1966).


7 Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant, 1921–1941: American Foreign Policy between the Wars (New York, 1965); R.E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953).


10 For example, William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, 1959).

11 See Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920–1933 (Lexington, KY, 1971).


13 Churchill served in a variety of positions during and after the war, including secretary for war (and air), 1918–21, colonial secretary, 1921–22, chancellor of the Exchequer, 1924–9.
14 Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 49–50.


18 For a wider study, see J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935–1957 (Toronto, 1982).


21 See J.L. Granatstein, How Britain’s Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States (Toronto, 1989).

22 Quoted in Margaret Prang, N.W. Rowell: Ontario Nationalist (Toronto, 1975), 361.


26 Quoted in Richard Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto, 1975), 8.


29 Skelton ’Notes on the Protocol of Geneva,’ Department of External Affairs Records (hereafter DEA) [NAC], vol. 813, file 629 (1).
31 O.D. Skelton, ‘Current Events: Canada and the Making of War and Peace,’ Queen’s Quarterly, 28(July 1920), 105.
32 Cook, Dafoe-Sifton Correspondence, 122.
33 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 11 September 1919, 230.
34 See T.N. Guinsburg, The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbor (New York, 1982).
36 Ibid., 144.
38 Quoted in W.C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA, 1980), 316.
41 Ibid., 207, 208, 210.
43 Ibid., 207–10.
44 Ibid., 236–7; Guinsburg, Pursuit of Isolationism, 128.
46 Ibid., 27–30.
47 Adler, Isolationist Impulse, 69–70.
51 Lentin, Pre-History of Appeasement, 140–1.
52 Quoted in K.E. Miller, Socialism and Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Britain to 1931 (The Hague, 1967), 137–8.
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57 See ibid., 137–8; Robbins, Appeasement, 13; Thornton, Imperial Idea, 286–9.
58 J.E. Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto, 1975), 276–7.
60 Ibid., 112.
61 Miller, Socialism and Foreign Policy, 148, 184, 186; Thornton, Imperial Idea, 290; W.R. Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s (London, 1977), 35.
62 The strongest critic of Mackenzie King is Donald Creighton, Canada’s First Century (Toronto, 1970); idem, ‘Decline and Fall of the Empire of the St Lawrence,’ Canadian Historical Association Papers (1969).
63 Kendle, Round Table, 115–16.
64 Stacey, Age of Conflict, I, 213.
65 Ibid., 217.
66 ‘Report of the Committee of Prime Ministers on War Policy,’ Borden Papers, file OC 628; Stacey, Age of Conflict, I, 225.
67 Lloyd George to Borden, 27 October 1918, Documents on Canadian External Relations (hereafter DCER), vol. I, 218.
68 Borden diary, 1 December 1918.
69 Imperial War Cabinet Minutes [IWC 47], 30 December 1918, CAB [Cabinet Archives, Public Record Office, Kew] 23/43
71 Quoted in Granatstein and Hillmer, For Better or for Worse, 76.
74 Governor-General to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1921, CO [Colonial Office Archives, Public Record Office, Kew] 42/1042
75 Minutes of the Ninth Meeting, Imperial Conference, 29 June 1921, DCER, III.
77 See A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation (Toronto, 1957); Donald Creighton, Canada’s First Century (Toronto, 1970); Stacey, Age of Conflict, II.
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78 ‘Record of meeting of Dominion Representatives,’ 2 November 1937 FO
[Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, Kew] 371/21016/06666;
Moffat diary, 10 November 1937, J.P. Moffat Papers [Harvard University].
The statement was made by Norman Davis.


80 Wigley, Transition to Commonwealth, 173–205.

to note Mackenzie King’s comment on Ewart and his book: ‘Ewart is very able
& better informed than any one in Canada on foreign affairs,’ he wrote in
his diary, ‘but too extreme. Is for separation. I am not. I believe in the
British) Empire as a ‘Co-operative Commonwealth.’ Mackenzie King diary,
8 April 1922.

82 Skelton memorandum on Locarno, 21 October 1925, DEA vol. 753, file 230;
Skelton memorandum, 1 January 1926, Mackenzie King Papers, vol. 92.

83 Quoted in Wigley, Transition to Commonwealth, 246.

84 Stacey, Age of Conflict, II, 86.

85 J.S. Ewart, ‘Canada, the Empire, and the United States,’ Foreign Affairs,
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86 Christie to Kerr, 14 December 1925, Christie Papers, vol. 11, file 35.

87 Skelton memorandum on ‘The Locarno Treaties,’ 1 January 1926, Mackenzie
King Papers, vol. 139.

88 See Norman Hillmer, ‘A British High Commissioner for Canada, 1927–28,’

89 Quoted in John Thompson and Allen Seager, Canada, 1922–1939: Decades of
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90 Gabriel Kolko, Main Currents in Modern American History (New York, 1984),
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94 Quoted in M. Leffler, ‘Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or
Diplomatic Realism: American Policy toward Western Europe 1921–1933,’


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The figures are from ibid., 432–5. We have made the calculations.

Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, 300.


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See Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, 296.

See Wigley, Transition to Commonwealth, 199–205.


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Roskill, Naval Policy, I, 26–1.

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Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 42.


Roskill, Naval Policy, I, 70.
116 Roskill, Naval Policy, I, 70.
117 Ibid., 516.
118 Quoted in Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 59.
120 DCER, III, 178.